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The financialization of housing has become a crucial discussion point since the financial crisis of 
2008. This dissertation aims at focusing on the financialization of housing in the Greater Toronto 
Area and Istanbul Metropolitan Area. While the existing literature tends to describe the 
financialization of housing as the increasing impact of finance capital on the production of space, 
in this dissertation I argue that the financialization of housing appears as an economic growth 
model that transforms the socio-economic conditions of households at least in certain countries. 
The dissertation examines the cases of Brampton in GTA and Göktürk in IMA (Istanbul 
Metropolitan Area) in order to underline the ongoing property relations and the rise of suburban-
financial nexus as an economic growth model. The financialization of housing occurs in many 
different forms in different countries. In certain countries it appears as a simple dynamic of the 
housing market, i.e. it is just a matter of mortgage credits and the banking system linked to the 
global financial investments. In certain countries, it appears as the financialization of rental 
housing systems (e.g. Germany), and in certain countries it appears as the dominance of finance 
capital in order to speculate the investments in securities. In fact, the financialization of housing 
began to become the dominant economic growth model in certain countries. Canada and Turkey 
can be examined as the economies that pursue the strategy of using the financialization of housing 
as a boosting tool for economic growth. In these two countries, the real estate market and its 
connection to the financial flows have become the key growth engine of the economy. In this 
dissertation, I examine how in these two countries, the financialization of housing has become the 
leading economic growth strategy and how this process transforms the cities. The cases in this 
dissertation aims at contributing to this argument by going into details of how finance capital 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Capital is dead labour which, vampire-like, lives only by sucking living labour,  
and live the more, the more labour it sucks. The time during which the worker works is  
the time during which the capitalist consumes the labour power he has brought from him.  
If the worker consumes his disposable time for himself, he robes the capitalist. 
- Karl Marx. Capital Volume One, 1977 
The financialization of housing has become one of the crucial focus points in the social sciences 
since the global financial crisis of 2008. This dissertation explores the financialization of housing 
in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) and the Istanbul Metropolitan Area (IMA – Istanbul 
Büyükşehir Belediyesi - IBB). Building on the perspective of financial geography, I examine how 
the financialization of housing occurs in the GTA and the IMA and how it impacts the 
communities, socio-spatial configurations, and socio-economic organization of society.  
In Western parts of the world, one of the characteristics traits of the financialization of housing is 
the growth of financial transactions associated with the mortgage systems. In the research 
literature, scholars often discuss household indebtedness in cities of the mature capitalist 
economies (Aalbers, 2012; García-Lamarca and Kaika, 2017; Shwartz, 2012; Walks, 2014); 
however, research on the financialization of the housing market in the developing countries 
remains much more limited. Although multiple studies on Brazil (Rolnik, 2019), China (Fu and 
Zhu, 2019), and Turkey (Erol, 2019) have recently been published, the literature as a whole 
remains limited. In the case of Turkey, it is difficult to access much of the data on financialization 
(e.g. the rate of household indebtedness based on cities), including data on indebtedness. However, 
despite such challenges, the literature on the financialization of housing in the developing countries 
will continue to increase and more and more comparative studies will be conducted.  This 




1.1. What is the financialization of housing? 
Defining financialization is tough work: the concept sounds simple, but it encompasses a vast 
number of variables, related not only to socio-economic relations but also to the terrains of banking 
systems, financial transactions, mathematical calculations, and the stock exchange. There is a 
tendency among scholars to define financialization within the scheme of “ponzi capitalism.” David 
Harvey (2004) uses this concept to describe a system in which financiers aim to convince people 
to risk their investments and savings and these financiers usually end up with accumulating a lot 
of wealth. However, in gambling there are always losers as well; among those who take on risk, 
not all win in the end. In a similar vein, Susan Strange in Casino Capitalism (1986) also compares 
financial markets to gambling, while making the distinctive point that this gambling character of 
the markets did not emerge all of a sudden but was rather brought into being by governmental 
decisions at national and international levels. Hence, to understand financialization, we should 
begin by acknowledging this aspect: people dealing with the stock market, currency wars, and 
lately bitcoin and blockchain perceive financial markets as a sort of gamble, in which they take on 
risk with an investment and then speculate on that risk.  
This casino capitalism dimension of financialization raises the question of whether or not the 
financialization of housing constitutes a type of financial mania. Charles Mackay’s Extraordinary 
Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds (1980 [1841]) was written in the 19th century and 
it may be counted as a contemporary of Karl Marx’s works on surplus value and capitalism. In this 
interesting book, Mackay delves into the historical mobilization of crowds around social events 
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and financial mobilization, such as Tulipmania1. Is it possible to consider the financialization of 
housing as a phenomenon similar to Tulipmania? Or in other words, should we count 
financialization as a kind of mania that creates delusion and social madness? The answer for this 
question would be “no” in this dissertation due to the fact that housing plays a different role as a 
necessity in our lives than other commodities that have served as tools of financial speculation 
throughout history. Housing is not a simple commodity that might be depicted as an object of 
madness in the age of financialization. Rather, the importance of housing for the social existence 
of humankind is a leading factor that drives the financialization of housing to dominate socio-
spatial reality. 
What is the financialization of housing, then? It is not a madness of crowds. Nor is it an ultimate 
gambling tool, in a game that everyone has the right to join. Albeit, it is true that certain capitalists, 
investors and financiers, perceive housing as a tool in the gambling games ingrained in 
contemporary financial systems. Many financiers work to create delusory expectations in the 
minds of people who are looking to park their money in asset ownership. However, this does not 
 
1 Tulip mania refers to the time period when tulip became a financial investment tool. Tulip was originated in 
Turkey in the 16th century and became very popular in Istanbul, the capital city of the Ottoman Empire. During the 
16th century the tulip coming from Istanbul became very popular in Holland and Germany. As Mackay notes “Rich 
people at Amsterdam sent for the bulbs direct to Constantinople, and paid the most extravagant prices for 
them…Until the year 1634 the tulip annually increased in reputation, until it as deemed a proof of bad taste in any 
man of fortune to be without a collection of them” (Mackay, 1980: 89). Even though tulip has a short life span, it 
became a precious commodity due to its rarity. In 1634, tulip became a mania; “In 1634, the rage among the Dutch 
to possess them was so great that the ordinary industry of the country was neglected, and the population, even to its 
lowest dregs, embarked in the tulip trade. As the mania increased, prices augmented, until, in the year 1635, many 
persons were known to invest a fortune of 100,000 florins in the purchase of forty roots” (Ibid., 90). In 1636, as 
Mackay notes again (93), tulip became an investment tool in the stock exchange of Amsterdam, this development 
occurred hand in hand with the rise of a new speculation and gambling greed, and tulip-jobbers controlled the 
market by speculating the prices, and they made a remarkable wealth out of the speculation of Tulip seeds. Tulip 
then became the central investment tool and crucial sign of prestige, people from all walks of like invested their 
savings in flowers. However, when rich people stopped buying tulip, the confidence in these flowers as an 
investment tool was destroyed, and the prices fell incredibly, many people went into bankruptcy and only  a few 
wealthy who were able to convert their tulip revenue into an investment in English funds benefited from this mania.  
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mean that the gambling dimension of financialization is viable for everyone. Not everyone can 
join this game, and not everyone who enters financial and mortgage markets does so for the sake 
of playing a game of delusion. Therefore, I argue that the financialization of housing is a neoliberal 
agenda that changes and restructure the socio-spatial reality.  It is a process, a multiplicity of 
governance, and a business and economic growth model that aims to insert the financial debt 
mechanism right into the centre of social relations. It refers to a hegemonic production of space 
through which certain capitalists, investors, and business elites continue to accumulate more 
prestige and wealth. Finally, the financialization of housing can be instrumentalized for an 
economic growth strategy in many national and regional economies. In this dissertation, I focus 
on the fact that the financialization of housing entails a socio-economic reorganization of the social 
for the sake of political society. It is a process that situates housing within a new hegemonic 
accumulation regime.  
In this case, how should we understand housing? Is it possible for instance to evaluate the 
financialization of housing from the perspective of social welfare? In fact, the concept of social 
welfare per se is open ended. As Thomas Piketty argues in his latest book, Capital and Ideology 
(2019), adherents of diverse ideologies claim they would establish a social order that provides for 
society members’ welfare. Housing is thus intrinsic to each ideology because it is part of the social 
welfare system that each promises to bring about through its own particular means. Therefore, we 
need to understand the specific means by which welfare is provided under a given ideological 
system.  
Under neoliberal urbanization in particular, the financialization of housing proceeds through a 
strategy of eliminating alternative housing models. In other words, neoliberal production of space 
in many parts of the world is being organized in such a way as to commodify housing rather than 
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situate it as a basic human need. Under neoliberal hegemony, housing is a commodity of real estate, 
through which financial money circulates via sophisticated channels of securitization and 
shareholder value production. In this hegemony, the financialization of housing takes place 
through the reduction of housing options in the market and the inflation of financial options. The 
decline of social housing programs, the abandonment of affordable housing systems, and the 
reduction of affordable rental housing in many parts of the world are foundational housing policies 
of neoliberal urbanization. Advocates of neoliberal hegemony still claim that the market can 
provide housing for everyone, if we supply more housing and liberate the financial systems — that 
is to say, offer more financial tools to everyone so that people can easily own a home. This naïve 
but also offensive assertion of neoliberalism operates within a welfare regime that is known as 
“workfarism”. Advocates of the financialization of housing claim that there is housing for 
everyone in the market; the only thing that people have to do is know which financial tools to 
choose and develop the necessary financial literacy to handle the risk.  
One might ask a key question about the financialization of housing: what is the role of the state in 
this new neoliberal hegemony? The state is an ultimate actor of this hegemony. It is both the 
regulator and initiator of the financialization of housing depending on the national context. This 
new neoliberal hegemony has brought about a new growth model, in which the state plays an 
important role in the production of space for the sake of financial liquidity and wealth 
accumulation. I use “wealth accumulation” here as a synonym for “capital accumulation,” but 
capital has many forms. As Marx (1977) indicates, capital refers to a social relationship in which 
one class (i.e., the bourgeoisie, or capitalist class) is able to accumulate capital, whereas the other 
class (i.e., the proletariat, or working class) has only labour power to sell. This social relationship 
can be depicted within the trajectory of property relations, with the owners of the means of 
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production and the owners of labour power acting as the two key pillars of those relations. As 
Marx puts forward, capital accumulation occurs through the dominance of the bourgeoisie over 
the working class. Within this relation of dominance, capital undergoes several metamorphoses 
and emerges in several forms: money capital, fixed capital, and finance capital. Accumulation 
occurs in all forms of capital, and the term “wealth” encapsulates all forms of capital, too. This 
also applies to asset ownership: assets refer to the accumulation of properties acquired through 
either inheritance, appropriation, investments, or labour. Therefore, assets also encompass the 
different forms of capital. Money capital is an asset, since it refers to the ownership of money in 
the form of cash or bank deposits. Fixed capital is an asset, since it refers to the ownership of land, 
houses, commercial facilities, or other types of fixed properties. Financial capital is an asset, which 
only a few institutions and business elites can own. They may distribute this capital on the 
condition that it will return to their hands with valorized value. Hence, financialization is a form 
of wealth accumulation. 
As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2011) highlight, what makes neoliberal hegemony distinct 
from other ideologies is that, in one way or another, it has managed to create a steady link between 
financialization and assetization or property ownership. In other words, what Hardt and Negri 
strive to emphasize is that neoliberal hegemony has created a new type of property relation. To 
explore this idea, I draw on Marx’s well-known explanation for the existing material conditions of 
societies. In the preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1999 [1859]), 
Marx indicates that the socio-economic conditions in a society are determined by the existing 
property relations. This argument provides a critique of Hegelian idealism: Marx does not believe 
that it is an idea or an ideal form of life that conditions the material conditions of life; rather, he 
believes that the existing production relations and property relations linked to those production 
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relations are the key determinants of socio-economic conditions. Similarly, to explain the ongoing 
course of neoliberal capitalism, Hardt and Negri (2011) also begin with a discussion of property 
relations. They indicate that property relations are the foundational basis of society. I draw from 
this perspective and argue that financialization operates through a new set of property relations 
and hence refers to a reconfiguration of the social order. In this reconfiguration, ever-expanding 
finance capital dominates socio-spatial relations. In other words, financialization dominates the 
production of space by dominating the housing market and the relations intrinsic to home 
ownership and people’s perceptions of housing.  
Why does this argument matter? In order to understand it, I review in Chapter 2 the definitions of 
financialization provided by manifold schools of thought. The basic approach to defining 
financialization begins with the claim that financialization represents the increasing effectiveness 
of financial markets and institutions over other sectors and actors in the economy (Aalbers, 2017). 
For example, Epstein states that: “financialization means the increasing role of financial motives, 
financial markets, financial actors, and financial institutions in the operation of domestic and 
international economies” (2005: 3). Chapter 2 seeks to answer the following questions: Is it that 
simple to describe financialization under neoliberal hegemony? How we can identify and 
reformulate financialization through critical social theories? How can we define financialization 
through a new perspective that includes the socio-economic conditions that emerge out of the 
dominance of finance capital? 
In order to answer to these questions, I discuss in Chapter 2 various approaches to explaining 
financialization and illustrate how different schools of thought define the role of financialization 
in capitalism. I begin with the original work of Marx and explain how he defined the motion of 
capital, as well as the role of finance capital in industrial capitalism. I then explore contemporary 
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explanations of financialization in the exemplary writings of Harvey, Saskia Sassen, Kostas 
Lapavitsas, and Judie Froud. I place particular emphasis on the Foucauldian approach to 
conceptualizing financialization. Foucauldian accounts argue that financialization must be 
interpreted as a new entrepreneurial spirit, which is associated with the neoliberal human capital 
theory that Michel Foucault explains in The Birth of Biopolitics (2008). Foucault and his followers 
argue that neoliberalism refers to the construction of a new social code based on an entrepreneurial 
discourse, which is fostered by the formation of human capital through investment in the training 
of children. Many Foucauldian scholars, cited in detail in Chapter 2, perceive the financialization 
of everyday life within this framework. These Foucauldian scholars argue that taking risk has 
become a new rationality of socio-economic life, and this new rationality reflects a new cultural 
shaping of everyday life. This new culture defines the distinctive point of contemporary enterprise 
society. In other words, financialization and the taking of financial risk for the sake of capital 
accumulation are either entrepreneurial initiatives in and of themselves or steps that must be taken 
to be entrepreneurial. 
However, this account from the Foucauldian literature is not sufficient to conceptualize the role of 
financialization today. I argue that the financialization of everyday life—the financialization of 
every aspect of the economy and the articulation of people into debt mechanisms—cannot solely 
be described as a matter of Zeitgeist, or Hegelian universal idealism, which is known as the new 
entrepreneurial spirit. Rather, I suggest that financialization is a process in which people feel 
obliged to articulate themselves into debt mechanisms for the purpose of property ownership, not 
just for the purpose of being entrepreneurial in and of itself. The concept of the entrepreneurial 
self is problematic: what defines entrepreneurialism if the market offers you limited choices? Is it 
possible to equate each act of risk-taking with entrepreneurialism? What happens, for instance, in 
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the case of housing when the market limits housing options and offers you the sole path of taking 
risk to obtain mortgage credit? There is no clear answer to these questions offered by Foucauldian 
approaches. The Foucauldian accounts propose that people take risky choices because they are 
taught to do so (see Chapter 2). If we instead situate property ownership as a central motivation 
for taking risk, entrepreneurialism becomes a more useful concept not only for evaluating people’s 
willingness to acquire property but also for analyzing why property-ownership-seeking and risk-
taking go hand in hand.  
One question remains before I delve into the details of this dissertation: How should one analyze 
the financialization of housing? This is both a methodological and theoretical question. I begin by 
expanding my argument that financialization refers to the reorganization of the social order 
through the changing of property relations. For me, the key problem lies in how to expand this 
argument. Housing is part of the production of space, and it stands at the intersection of different 
types of the production of space, as Lefebvre (1991) would suggest. Housing is a social space, 
where the social conditions of life confront one another and go on in a dialectical manner; i.e., the 
use-value and exchange-value of housing have always been in conflict under capitalism. Housing 
is also a space that provides social and ontological security (Madden and Marcuse, 2016). Without 
proper shelter, one cannot have a feeling of ontological and social security because lack of shelter 
leads to existentialist and social problems (e.g., homelessness, increased risk of crime and mental 
illness). Therefore, housing is indispensable for one’s individual and social life.  
Housing is also a matter of urbanization and urban planning. Who will dwell in the city centre? 
What kind of housing will exist in the suburbs? What will the market offer as housing choices? 
How will people obtain proper housing to live, for instance, through freehold ownership or rental? 
These are questions of urbanization and urban planning. Housing stands as a key matter in urban 
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planning. That is why it is necessary to analyze the financialization of housing within the existing 
multiplicities of urbanization.  
Neoliberal urbanization is often associated with the decline of manufacturing industries in cities 
in the Global North, as well as the emergence of a new type of urban regime that operates in 
parallel with neoliberal market fundamentalism, austerity policies, and an assault on the conditions 
of the working class. In their famous contribution Spaces of Neoliberalism, Neil Brenner and Nik 
Theodore write: 
Neoliberal programs have also been directly “interiorized” into urban policy regimes, as 
newly formed territorial alliances attempt to rejuvenate local economies through a shock 
treatment of deregulation, privatization, liberalization, and enhanced fiscal austerity. In this 
context, cities—including their suburban peripheries—have become increasingly 
important geographical targets and institutional laboratories for a variety of neoliberal 
policy experiments, from place-marketing, enterprise and empowerment zones, local tax 
abatements, urban development corporations, public private partnerships, and new forms 
of local boosterism to workfare policies, property-development schemes, business-
incubator projects, new strategies of social control, policing, and surveillance, and a host 
of other institutional modifications within the local and regional state apparatus. (2002: 
20–21) 
Therefore, to understand the ongoing discussion around the housing question, we need to consider 
how neoliberal hegemony operates not only globally but also domestically. Neoliberalism has 
divergent points in many different countries. In certain countries, it may entail a smooth transition 
to market fundamentalism, it may have a smooth market fundamentalism aimed at increasing 
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competitiveness; however, in certain countries it may become hegemonic through “shock 
therapies,” as Klein argues in The Shock Doctrine (2007).  
In this dissertation, I focus specifically on the financialization of housing in the GTA in Canada 
and in the IMA in Turkey. To analyze the financialization of housing in these two contexts, I draw 
on comparative urban studies and the approach of financial geography as guiding methodologies. 
While conducting this comparative analysis, I grant particular emphasis to the financialization of 
suburban housing. Massive suburbanization is the driving force of economic growth in many parts 
of the world. This massive suburbanization and its convergence with the financialization of 
housing in the GTA and the IMA are my key points of analysis. If the financialization of housing 
refers to the reorganization of the social order as it structures a new growth model based on 
property ownership and assetization, then this growth model mainly operates in the production of 
suburban space. 
1.2. Chapter overview 
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters, including this introduction (Chapter 1). In Chapter 
2, I discuss key approaches to conceptualizing financialization, including Marxist and Foucauldian 
approaches. I begin the chapter by discussing why property relations matter under neoliberal 
hegemony. Then, I discuss the importance of the Gramscian theory of hegemony for 
comprehending the latest hegemony of finance capital over urban space. Finally, I discuss why the 
approach of financial geography is essential for my analysis in this dissertation. 
In Chapter 3, I focus on the phenomenon of housing. Why is housing important for 
financialization? What makes housing unique as part of economic growth? In addition to 
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addressing these questions, I also explore the different types of financialization of housing that 
exist in different parts of the world. 
In Chapter 4, I focus on the increasing convergence of suburbanization and financialization. This 
chapter deals with the question of how to define massive suburbanization vis-à-vis its link to 
financial markets. I also address the question of why suburban land matters for the new hegemony 
of finance capital. 
In Chapter 5, I study the case of Toronto, Canada, including how the financialization of the housing 
market has become an economic growth model in the province of Ontario and how the GTA has 
become the gravity centre of this growth model. After providing a comprehensive discussion and 
analysis of these question, I zoom in on Brampton in the GTA. This case study provides a plethora 
of insights for understanding how new property relations based on the financialization of housing 
instigate a new socio-spatial reality. 
In Chapter 6, I examine the new growth model in Turkey, which is mainly dependent on massive 
suburbanization in Istanbul. I analyze how Turkey has shifted from a manufacturing economy to 
a construction economy and how suburbanization in Istanbul has played a key role in this shift. 
This case is helpful for understanding the financialization of the housing market as a governmental 
strategy. I end this chapter with a detailed analysis of the suburban Göktürk village of Istanbul. 
Chapter 7 is the conclusion section of this dissertation. In this section, I deepen my analysis of the 
cases explored in Chapters 5 and 6. I begin by situating these cases within the wider literature on 
financialization. I also explain why the comparison between these cases is useful for understanding 
certain parameters of suburbanization, as the cases have several similarities and differences with 
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one another. Finally, I pose questions to stimulate further research on topics addressed in this 
dissertation. 
1.3. Data Collection and the Discussion of the Methodology 
Different cities or types of urban neoliberalism cannot be effectively evaluated without a 
comparative approach, since urbanization is not a single universal process that follows the same 
path everywhere in the world. Thus, to explore the topics addressed in this dissertation, I use a 
primarily qualitative methodology of comparative urbanism. Comparative urban studies has 
become a significant approach to find global reference (and inter-referencing points) points for the 
problems of urbanization in different regions. (Roy, 2011). There exists now a growing and 
increasingly sophisticated literature on comparative urbanism that has captured the imagination of 
critical urban researchers across the globe (McFarlane, 2010; Robinson, 2016). Jennifer Robinson 
asserts that as current “urbanization trends displace the former heartlands of urban theory; urban 
studies will produce a new generation of scholarship which arises in new centres of authority and 
expertise” (2015: 187). Comparing the financialization of housing in the GTA and the IMA allows 
me to pinpoint and identify everyday life in rapidly financializing arrival cities, with an approach 
that is consistent with the prioritization of comparison and inter-referencing in new urban studies. 
Comparative urbanism is necessary for revealing the different dynamics of the financialization of 
housing and massive suburbanization in different parts of the world. The comparison that I draw 
between the GTA and the IMA is crucial not only for understanding the dynamics of the 
financialization of housing in both cities but also for comprehending the outcomes of housing 
crises. Istanbul and Toronto are located in different type of countries: Canada is known as a 
developed country, while Turkey is still regarded as a developing or latecomer economy. However, 
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both Toronto and Istanbul position themselves as competitive global cities that offer incentives for 
financial investment and serve as transportation hubs. Hence, policymakers and investors in both 
cities are trying to change the urban morphology through new policies on the production of space. 
In both cities, housing prices are increasing with incredible haste, and both are experiencing 
housing crises marked by unaffordability and increasing indebtedness. The suburbanization 
process in the two cities involves different dynamics, those dynamics result from different kinds 
of national and local policies, and they involve different social compositions of suburban 
development. Nonetheless, the outcome is the same: increasing indebtedness and housing crisis. 
By investigating the research questions identified above, this study seeks to understand the reasons 
for that similarity of outcome. In doing so, this study will make a meaningful contribution to the 
research literature on the suburban production of space in neoliberal times. 
In addition to employing methods of comparative urbanism, I also use a financial geography 
approach. Financial geography deals with how, and through which actors, a socio-spatial 
configuration is financialized. In other words, it aims to elucidate the actors, processes, and 
jurisdictions behind the financialization of housing. These topics constitute key points of analysis 
in this dissertation. I describe the financial geography approach in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
1.4. Data collection 
I used three main types of data collection to inform this study: 1) literature review, 2) qualitative 
fieldwork, and 3) quantitative data collection.  
Literature review: I focused on three types of literature. These included: 1) literature on the rise 
of financialization, assetization, and the shift to new property relations; 2) literature on the 
financialization of housing; and 3) literature on the financialization of massive suburbanization. In 
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my case studies of the GTA and the IMA, I attempt to make a meaningful contribution to these 
three genres of literature, through the lens of financial geography. 
Qualitative fieldwork: Qualitative fieldwork methodology has a paramount significance in social 
sciences in order to understand the ongoing problems, circumstances and transformations in a 
given location and/or social group. As Mohajan (2018: 24) underlines “Qualitative research is a 
form of social action that stresses on the way of people interpret, and make sense of their 
experiences to understand the social reality of individuals”. In fact, the most difficult part of the 
qualitative research in urban studies when there is a necessity to conduct open-ended semi-
structured interviews is that there are also always two sides of the coin: insider/outsider. It is not 
easy to identify the boundaries of being insider and outsider essentially if the study is conducted 
in a city that the researcher already dwells or lived for a very long time. Hillier and Milne (2018: 
98), in this case, clearly highlight that the outsider is not a member of the designated community. 
As an outsider, the task of the researcher is to understand the experiences, everyday life dynamics 
and the factors that create the designated problems in that community. In urban studies (or in 
human geography), the researcher should not only try to get the answers she seeks to receive for 
the purpose of her studies, but she must feel the dynamics of everyday life and observe the urban 
landscape in first place. Therefore, researchers that seek to conduct a qualitative fieldwork 
methodology embark on answering the question “what is going on here?” (Lereau & Schultz, 2018: 
4). The question of “what is going on here?” reveals the necessary curiosity to conduct a qualitative 
research in a particular urban landscape as this question is important to understand urban dynamics 
and day-to-day experiences of people vis-à-vis the existing problems. As an immigrant who came 
to Toronto in 2013, I could consider myself as an insider of Toronto’s urbanization as I have been 
living in this city for more than seven years. In fact, being in Brampton was a total experience of 
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outsider for me. One of the reasons for me to work on “what is going on here?” is that there is not 
adequate academic work on the housing market in Brampton even though this suburban city has 
many social problems pertaining to urban planning and housing issue. Therefore, my work in 
Brampton began with the curiosity of understanding the socio-economic dynamics of the suburban 
housing market, day-to-day experiences of immigrant communities in this suburban city and also 
the impact of financialization over the suburban housing market and communities. Meanwhile, as 
part of my comparative urbanization approach (that I combine with financial geography), I 
conducted the fieldwork study in Istanbul – Göktürk in order to find out how the suburban housing 
market and the financial flows intersect and transform the suburban peripheries of Istanbul. Even 
though I was born in Istanbul and lived in that city for 29 years, I can still not count myself in the 
group of insiders for two particular reasons; 1) I am currently a resident of Toronto and Istanbul is 
now only the city that I was born, 2) Göktürk is not an area that I had been familiar with when I 
used to live in Istanbul. As an outsider in Göktürk, I tried to familiarize myself with the existing 
urban landscape and suburban morphology. 
I completed qualitative fieldwork in order to observe: 1) the ongoing financialization of housing 
in the GTA and the IMA; 2) how the financialization of housing has become an economic growth 
model in Ontario and Turkey; and 3) the role that massive suburbanization plays in this new socio-
economic reorganization. I conducted semi-structured interviews with real estate agents, officials, 
academics, residents, and other informants in Toronto/Brampton and Istanbul/Göktürk. The main 
goal of these interviews was to understand how different actors and stakeholders see the 
financialization of housing. In these interviews, I also aimed to learn how people in the housing 
market are dealing with the changing political economy of capital accumulation. Qualitative study 
entails more than capturing informants’ accounts through interviews; it also requires the researcher 
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to attend to the feelings, general expressions, and struggles of communities. It is important to 
comprehend how community members feel about housing crises, unaffordability, and social 
exclusion. I spent a considerable amount of time in Brampton between December 2017 and May 
2019, commuting there several times from my residence in Toronto, not only to meet with the 
people that I interviewed but also to understand the urban morphology and how life is going on in 
this suburban area.  
Below, I provide a list of all the interviews included in this dissertation. I actually conducted more 
interviews; however, for the purposes of this particular study, I only drew on those listed below. 
Interviewee 1 Professor and expert of housing systems in Canada 
Interviewee 2 Realtor and housing market expert in Toronto 
Interviewee 3 Retired planner from the Ministry of Municipal Affairs in Canada 
Interviewee 4 Academic and social housing expert in Canada 
Interviewee 5 Chief planner of Brampton’s Vision Projects 
Interviewee 6 Economist at Brampton City Hall 
Interviewee 7-1  Planner at Brampton City Hall 
Interviewee 7-2 Second interview with the same person as 7-1 (Brampton Urban Tour) 
Interviewee 8  Associate professor and expert on Ontario’s economy 
Interviewee 9 Architect and project coordinator who ran a project in Brampton 
Interviewee 10 PhD candidate and housing finance expert  
Interviewee 11 Activist and resident of Brampton 
Interviewee 12 Journalist and former resident of Brampton 
Interviewee 13 PhD candidate and resident of Brampton 
Interviewee 14 Medical doctor and resident of Brampton  
Interviewee 15 City councillor in Brampton (phone interview) 
Interviewee 16 Young couple living in Brampton 
Interviewee 17 Immigrant and resident of Brampton 




Interviewee 19 Construction worker and immigrant in Toronto  
Interviewee 20-1  in Canada 
Interviewee 20-2 Second interview with the same expert as 20-1 (phone interview) 
Interviewee 21 Coordinator of Brampton’s Vision Team (informal interview with consent) 
Interviewee 22  Professor of real estate economics in Istanbul 
Interviewee 23 Real estate appraisal expert in Istanbul 
Interviewee 24 Resident of Göktürk 
Interviewee 25 Real estate agent and resident of Göktürk 
Interviewee 26 Real estate agent in Göktürk 
Interviewee 27 Resident of Göktürk 
Interviewee 28 Academic working on local municipalities in Istanbul 
Table 1. The list of interviewees  
Quantitative data collection: Although my research is primarily qualitative in approach, 
quantitative data plays a secondary role in bolstering my qualitative findings. I use statistical data 
on demographic patterns, housing market indicators, and general economic indicators for Canada, 
Ontario, Toronto, Brampton, Turkey, Istanbul, and Göktürk. The primary sources of this data 
include Statistics Canada, Canada Housing and Mortgage Corporation and Turkish Statistical 
Institute (TurkStat). I also draw on data from multiple reports on the Ontario economy, the Toronto 
housing market, and the economic outlook of Peel Region and Brampton. I similarly include data 
from reports on the latest housing market dynamics in Turkey, as well as reports on economic 
transformation and urban dynamics in Istanbul. 
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Chapter 2: Defining Financialization: Is It an Entrepreneurial Spirit or a New Hegemony? 
In this chapter, I discuss different approaches to conceptualizing financialization. The key question 
of the chapter focuses on how to define financialization and what makes it unique within the 
framework of the capitalist mode of production. I also discuss the relationship between property 
relations and financialization. 
Before delving into the details of how to define financialization vis-à-vis property relations, I need 
to highlight a crucial point that is important for the rest of this dissertation. In Marx’s time, or in 
Marx’s terminology, property relations are identified with respect to productive forces. According 
to Marx, the bourgeoisie (i.e., the capitalist class) owns the means of production, whereas working-
class people only have their labour to sell in this property relation. The social relationship has been 
built for the purpose of extracting surplus value from the labour power of workers. When defining 
property relations under neoliberal hegemony, we may need to employ a broader explanation of 
property. Lazzaratto (2015) indicates that property is now everything: everything can be turned 
into property, and property relations are now broader than the productive forces of society. This 
does not mean that the main class conflict between the bourgeoisie and the working-class has 
waned; rather, it has taken a new shape that transforms the modes of existence in society. Property 
ownership is now composed of asset ownership, and assetization is a leading characteristic of 
neoliberal hegemony.  
I will use two key approaches in this chapter to explain these new property relations. The first 
draws on Piketty’s (2014) formulation of capitalism in the 21st century. The second builds on 
Antonio Gramsci’s conceptions of hegemonic equilibrium and common sense. Piketty explains 
that what is characteristic about current capitalism is the ultimate will of the middle-classes to own 
property. However, what is missing in Piketty’s theory is a detailed account of the role of 
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financialization. Furthermore, Piketty’s explanation of class formation also misses the point that 
many people are excluded from society, not only because of their income streams but also due to 
racism, xenophobia, and ethnic segregation. This is where I turn to Gramsci’s notions of 
hegemonic equilibrium and common sense to help explain how capitalist hegemony operates 
through the founding of coalitions and the manufacturing of consent, which I will show to be 
relevant in the current era of financialization.  
2.1. New property relations and financialization 
In his famous preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx explains the 
dynamic and transformative force of the mode of production in a society and its impacts on 
material life. In each mode of production, there exists a set of property relations that forge the 
conditions of the material life and social consciousness of people:  
The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political 
and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but 
their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of 
development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing 
relations of production or—this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms—with the 
property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms 
of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins 
an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to 




Marx continues:  
In broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production 
may be designated as epochs marking progress in the economic development of society. 
The bourgeois mode of production is the last antagonistic form of the social process of 
production—antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism but of an antagonism 
that emanates from the individuals' social conditions of existence—but the productive 
forces developing within bourgeois society create also the material conditions for a solution 
of this antagonism. The prehistory of human society accordingly closes with this social 
formation. (1993 [1859], pr. 7) 
Marx perceives history within a taxonomy that has come into being out of the modes of production 
that determine material life and social consciousness. In this taxonomy, there are epochs in history 
in which the mode of production and property relations evolve into new material realities. Each 
time, new material conditions transform the socio-economic structures of communities, and they 
instigate a new set of relations and antagonism pertaining to property ownership. In a parallel vein, 
Hardt and Negri, in Commonwealth (2011), argue that it is property relations that shape the social 
and material conditions of people. The capitalist condition of ownership is based on an ideology 
that excludes those who are not able to own property. This ideology is based on class antagonism 
between those who own property (whether it be in the form of productive forces or fixed/liquid 
assets) and those who do not. To Hardt and Negri, this capitalist mentality of ownership is 
fundamentally embedded in the juridical framework of capitalist societies: that is why rule through 
property—or in other words, the link between the legal system and property ownership—has been 
accepted a priori. For instance, the colonization of lands by the English and French was centred 
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on the establishment of a legal property system; of course, this system was based on the 
dispossession of those who were already inhabiting those lands.  
While Marx classifies the transformation of socio-economic conditions through his description of 
different historical epochs, Hard and Negri (2011) suggest that what we have witnessed as different 
epochs since the rise of bourgeois capitalism actually refers to changes in how property relations 
are defended. Analyzing paradigm shifts over the course of capitalist development since the 18th 
century provides a means of examining the changing structure of property relations, as well as how 
property relations are protected through transformations in the dynamics of the capitalist mode of 
production. In a nutshell, Hardt and Negri argue that: “the concept of property and the defense of 
property remain the foundation of every modern political constitution” (Ibid., 15). Building on 
Marx’s view of private property as the foundational point of the capitalist mode of production, 
Hardt and Negri also emphasize that the existence of property in capitalism takes different forms. 
Capital, commodity, and labour are the three main forms of capitalist production, and in this 
production system, capital constantly operates through these different forms. According to Marx:  
The relation of private property as labour, the relation of private property as capital and the 
connection of these two are intrinsic examples of capitalist property relations. On the one 
hand we have the production of human activity as labour, i.e. as an activity wholly alien to 
itself, to man and to nature, and hence to consciousness and vital expression, the abstract 
existence of man as a mere workman who therefore tumbles day after day from his fulfilled 
nothingness into absolute nothingness, into his social and hence real non-existence; and on 
the other, the production of the object of human labour as capital, in which all the natural 
and social individuality of the object is extinguished and private property has lost its natural 
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and social quality (i.e. has lost all political and social appearance and is not even apparently 
tainted with any human relationships). (Marx, 1975: 336, from Hardt and Negri, 2011: 22) 
Hardt and Negri interpret these lines as meaning that “private property in its capitalist form thus 
produces a relation of exploitation in its fullest sense” (Ibid., 23). I apply this interpretation to 
homeownership, while arguing that contemporary homeownership relies on three overlapping 
phenomena: 1) the hegemonic power of finance (I use this concept as a synonym for neoliberal 
hegemony); 2) the exploitation of labour power through the ownership dream (this is linked to 
increasing global indebtedness resulting from assetization); and 3) the increasing hatred against 
the urban poor. In so far as the capitalist mode of production aims to establish a social order based 
on class domination, it constantly reproduces, and transforms this social order for the continuation 
of class domination. At the very core of this effort to reproduce the social order, there exists the 
defense of property relations. 
Hardt and Negri explain the ultimate desire to defend property relations as the “normalized 
material foundation of social order” (Ibid., 27). Here, the most important part is the concept of 
“normalization.” The normalization of existing property relations also entails the normalization of 
the social order that one lives in. Normalization refers to two key processes in a society: on the 
one hand, the identification of “the normal” as the mainstream of society, and on the other, the 
exclusion (or muting) of “the abnormal” (or the marginal). These two processes are defined in a 
paradigm constituted by the relations of production, socio-political processes, and cultural 
practices. Michel Foucault (1984, 1990), in this sense, defines “the normal” as the accepted social 
norms that circumscribe the general discourses and practices of society. The biopolitical existence 
of individuals in a society relies on the fact that each of them is disciplined, optimized, and 
normalized by the power relations in a given social order. The definition of normal changes from 
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time to time, from geography to geography, and from culture to culture. However, the relations of 
production in a society are the key set of relations that determine the modes of existence. The 
definition of normal is then linked to the modes of existence in a society. The modes of existence 
encapsulate various nodal points of social life, including politics, economics, law, ecological 
relations, gender relations, and technology.  
The modes of existence that people adopt in their everyday lives shape the definition of normal in 
any given society. The normal or normalized modes of existence are those that people are expected 
to adopt; or, the normal conditions of life in the multiplicity of modes of existence are accepted a 
priori. Normalized forms are accepted as the necessary conditions or the mainstream practices that 
one needs to adopt. This does not mean that there exists no sphere outside of the identified normal; 
however, the modes of existence in a society are commonly shaped by the definition of normal. 
The definition of normal is a matter of cultural form that exists in a society, and this culture 
becomes ingrained in the ways of doing things in that society. Culture and normalization thus co-
exist in a social order, with both evolving through lived experiences. The modes of existence are 
shaped within this culture-normalization domain, and the formation of this domain relies on 
relations of economy, politics, production, and law. These categories are constituent features of a 
society.  
As Bruno Latour (2018) puts forward, culture as a mode of existence has been increasingly 
constructed in relation to “the economy” over the last 300 years. The economization of life and 
the so-called domination of “rationality” have been main features that help to explain ongoing 
practices of life from the beginning of the capitalist mode of production. Economization refers not 
only to the economic activities in a given society, but rather to what Karl Polanyi (1971) hints at 
with the concept of “embeddedness.” Economic relations and the subsequent consequences of 
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those relations are embedded in all aspects of social life. The embeddedness of the economy in all 
cells of life has become the prominent mode of existence, not only for people but also for the state. 
Polanyi asserts: 
Instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in 
the economic system. The vital importance of the economic factor to the existence of 
society precludes any other result. For once the economic system is organized in separate 
institutions, based on specific motives and conferring a special status, society must be 
shaped in such a manner as to allow that system to function according to its own laws. This 
is the meaning of the familiar assertion that a market economy can function only in a market 
society. (1971: 57) 
The determinant power of economics has gained momentum over the past 300 years, with the 
advancement of capitalism and with the rise of the market society. In the capitalist mode of 
production, there exists class antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the working class, as put 
forward by Marx and Friedrich Engels (1848). However, the ways of doing things and the 
composition of the capitalist mode of existence have changed over the centuries based on the 
“necessities” of the market economy. The liberal world-system of the 19th century, the period of 
the two world wars, the Keynesian and Fordist periods, the Post-Fordist period, and neoliberal 
hegemony all refer to different modes of existence within the market economy of capitalism. 
Across all of these different modes of existence in capitalism, there exist two common features 
that define the core of the capitalist mode of production: the class antagonism between the 
bourgeoisie and working class and the existence and defence of property as the foundational 
feature of social order. These two features are strongly connected to each other: property relations 
are intrinsic to the class distinction since the capitalist class is the class of owners that possess the 
26 
 
means of production, whereas the working class is the class of workers that do not own property. 
The worker must adapt her life to capitalist working conditions in order to obtain property, if she 
is lucky enough to do so.  
In fact, there existed a period in modern history when working-class people could easily own or 
rent social housing or could build their own houses (which we generally classify as informal 
housing). In the so-called “welfare regime” of the period following the Second World War, the 
states implemented measure to increase access to property ownership in order to address the socio-
economic crisis caused by the war. However, with the rise of neoliberalism, a new mode of 
existence has come into being since the 1980s. This mode of existence is associated with the rise 
of financialization. Polanyi’s concept of embeddedness positions economization as the key 
determinant of social consciousness; from this perspective, financialization has become the new 
embedded mode of existence in capitalism for the last two decades. As Hardt and Negri (2011) 
explain, private property constitutes the foundational origin of each socio-economic order. This 
may be interpreted to mean: each mode of existence (or each mode of doing things) in the 
economic system reproduced the meaning of private property according to its hegemonic purposes. 
I will apply this statement to the new neoliberal hegemony: neoliberalism as a new mode of 
existence has paved the way for the rise of financialization to create a new type of hegemony 
through the reproduction of property relations. Financialization thus operates as the new 
normalized way of doing things in our neoliberal age. In this new normalization, private 
property—including housing—has been reproduced as a financial asset that constitutes the essence 
of neoliberal society. The neoliberal hegemony functions through “competitive assetization,” and 
this competitive essence of neoliberalism leads to increasing income disparity, social segregation, 
homelessness, decline in social provisions, and accumulation of assets in the hands of a few. 
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The current property relations under neoliberal hegemony lead to a housing crisis—a crisis that 
David Madden and Peter Marcuse (2016) define as the lack of proper affordable shelter. Experts 
estimate that more than 330 million people in the world are unable to find proper shelter (Ibid., 3). 
This crisis cannot be solely attributed to a lack of necessary construction projects; instead, it 
reflects the class antagonism that is embedded in the property relations associated with neoliberal 
hegemony. The property relations that determine our current social order have become 
increasingly exclusionary rather than inclusionary. The core reason for the existence of the housing 
crisis is the financialization of housing, a process that aims to convert housing into a pure financial 
commodity dominated by the dynamics of financial markets.  
To make this abstract chain of arguments concrete, I begin in this dissertation by formulating the 
link between financialization and the existing property relations. Capitalism in the 21st century has 
become popularly associated with entrepreneurship; however, in my analysis of property relations, 
I question this association. 
2.2. Financialization as embeddedness: Explaining financialization through Marxist theory 
According to a Marxist explanation, “financialization” has two prominent meanings: 1) a new 
capitalist tool (or strategy) to accumulate more wealth by subordinating labour; and 2) a new 
economic architecture that transforms all industrial capitalist relations. Here, one must recall that 
when we talk about financialization, we are talking about a new process that has had a great impact 
on the modes of existence in the world over the last three decades. That does not mean that finance 
capital did not exist before. In fact, finance capital has been in existence for centuries and has long 
affected economic affairs. When we speak of it today, however, we refer specifically to the 
financialization that was born of the neoliberal turn of the 1980s and 1990s: this refers to a new 
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process, a new mode of existence, and a new type of embeddedness, compared with what came 
before. 
According to Marx: capitalism is a system of commodity production; this system relies on the 
historical fact that two classes in society are in conflict; and this conflict, between the bourgeoisie 
(i.e., the capitalist class) and the proletariat (i.e., the working class), forms the central contradiction 
of the capitalist mode of production. Marx indicates that the capitalist mode of production reveals 
itself in the relations of production which may be examined through the movement of capital. For 
Marx (1977, 1991), capitalism aims to accumulate capital for the sake of acquiring more capital; 
it is a system that extracts profit from the labour of workers, and it constantly reproduces the 
industrial production system to maintain the extraction of surplus value. It is about accumulating 
more capital for the sake of accumulation, gaining more assets for the sake of gaining more assets.  
The movement of capital in this process begins with the ownership of capital and the property 
ownership of productive forces. The capitalist owns the capital needed to launch capitalist 
production. Marx uses the symbol of (M) to represent the capital owned by the capitalist (1977: 
248). M = money, because money is capital in motion. Using this money, the capitalist needs to 
produce a commodity (C) to sell in the market for a profit. The capitalist thereby profits from the 
production process. Marx characterizes this movement of capital as M — C — M’, with M’ 
representing the new money earned by the capitalist (Ibid., 251). M’ is the money that the capitalist 
obtains through profit. The source of profit is a contentious terrain of debate in the history of 
economics. According to Marx’s analysis of class antagonism, the profit derives from the 
exploitation rate of labour power; thus, he explains profit as M’ = M + ΔM, with ΔM representing 
surplus value as the origin of profit (Ibid., 251-2). Marx defines surplus value as the value extracted 
by the capitalist through the exploitation of labour power. The capitalist transforms the worker into 
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labour power—an element of the production process—and buys both the means of production and 
the labour power to organize capitalist production. That is why Marx, when he elaborates the 
motion of capital in the second volume of Capital, redraws the formulation as: M — C {means of 
production + labour power}…P…C’— M’(1992: 118-9). Here, C designates the organization of 
the production system, or in other words, the property ownership of the capitalist. The capitalist, 
firstly, owns the necessary elements to launch production (P), the process through which surplus 
value is extracted from labour power. C’ refers to the finished product, ready to be sold in the 
market (i.e., the commodity). Having been sold in the market, the commodity is transformed into 
new money: M’, i.e., money with profit.  
This profit-making is the main aim of the capitalist—i.e., the entire production system is organized 
to extract as much profit as possible. The capitalist pays the worker as little as possible. That is to 
say, there is socially necessary labour required to produce a product, and the capitalist gets this 
labour from the worker; however, the capitalist employs the worker to work more than the socially 
necessary labour time, in order to profit from the production. Hence, the worker is paid a 
subsistence wage, producing greater value than she is paid. This is the source of surplus value for 
the capitalist (i.e., profit). In a sense, the goal of capitalist production is to normalize the 
subordination of labour power. It reveals the power of capitalism that “normal” is defined in this 
mode of production through the concept of “free labour.” The worker is free to choose the work 
that she wants to perform; however, in reality, she accepts (or is forced to accept) her own 
subordination by capitalist production. In this framework, the capitalist appropriates the surplus 
value created by labour power. The exploitation and subordination of labour power are a priori 
tenets of capitalist society. This sheds necessary light on the economization of society.  
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As noted earlier, the aim of capitalism is to accumulate more capital for the sake of accumulation. 
Therefore, the formula goes: M — C … P … C’ — M’ — C … P’ … C’ — M’ (Ibid., 142). It is 
a motion that aims to keep the movement going, through the reproduction of the relations of 
production. P’ thus stands for the productive nature of capital. Through this formula representing 
the motion of capital in capitalist production, we can understand that the main purpose of the 
capitalist is to achieve this simple means of profit-making: M … M’ is the main motivation to 
launch the capitalist production process. Marx identifies this movement as “the circuit of money 
capital.”2 
Marx identifies this movement as the circuit of money capital because it is industrial capital in its 
money form that constitutes the starting and return points of the whole process. The formula itself 
expresses that money is not spent here but is rather only advanced, and thus it is simply the money 
form of capital, i.e., money capital. The formula also expresses the fact that the exchange-value of 
a commodity, rather than the use-value, is the decisive inherent object of the movement. “It is 
precisely because money is the most independent and palpable form of value that the circulation 
formula of M…M’, which starts and finishes with actual money, most palpably expresses money-
making – the driving motive of capitalist production. The production process appears simply as an 
unavoidable middle term (…), a necessary evil for the purpose of money-making” (Ibid., 137). 
M … M’, or money-making, is the primary motivation of capitalist production. Production is the 
precondition of money-making. However, this regime of accumulation must circulate and expand 
at the level of social relations. The subordination of labour power must be expanded, and a world 
 
2 This part is inspired by Marx’s Capital Volume 2, chapter 1- The Circuit of Capital (1992: 109-143) 
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market must be created to sell commodities and to find the necessary labour power to exploit.3 In 
this circuit of capital, money capital takes different forms during the production process. C’ refers 
to this commodity form of capital: money is transformed into commodity, and hence, absorbed in 
the commodity form. P’ is the productive form of capital, which is used to transform the system 
of production or reproduce the means of production. M’ is the final money form, with profit. M 
… M’ thus provides the start and end points of the circuit of capital.  
To understand capitalist accumulation, it is important to consider the origins of money capital. 
Marx, in the third volume of Capital (1991), attempts to formulate the origins of money capital 
(M) that is needed to launch capitalist production. The theory of primitive accumulation is one of 
the well-known explanations given by Marx. It refers to the detachment of labour power from 
previous artisan and agricultural production. However, there is also another point that can explain 
the existence of M to launch capitalist production. M is bred by the banking system in the form of 
credit. Marx thus changes the formula of M — C — M’ and provides a new formula, shown as: M 
— M — C — M’ — M’. This new formula of motion encompasses one circuit but two profit-
seekers: the lender and the borrower.  
 
3 The expansion of the world market for profit-making has been the subject of intense discussion in the history of 
economic thought. Essentially, followers of Marxian schools emphasize the importance of market expansion for 
ongoing accumulation. According to Rosa Luxembourg (2003 [1913]) capital accumulation cannot be advanced 
without the construction of a world market, i.e., without subordinating other geographies. For Luxembourg, the 
capitalist must realize the surplus value as soon as possible in the market, and for that reason, “in order to realise his 
increased aggregate of products, the individual capitalist requires a larger market for his good” (2003: 17). 
Followers of world-system theory also emphasize the significance of a world market for the potential of the 
capitalist system to thrive and dominate the world economy. Fernand Braudel, in this three-volume masterpiece 
Capitalism and Civilization (1992) showed the difference between local economies and an expansion of capitalism 
that creates a world market. Immanuel Wallerstein (2011) also follow this path and construct a Euro-centric 
historiography, in which they explain how certain countries have created a world-system economy based on a 




Marx thus describes the circuit of an additional type of capital, known as interest-bearing capital 
(IBC). IBC refers to finance capital in the form of money capital that is ready to be lent by its 
owner to commercial or industrial capitalists. IBC is money advanced from A to B: A is the lender, 
and B is the borrower (Marx 1981: 461). What appears in duplicate here is: “(1) the expenditure 
of the money as capital, and (2) its reflux as realized capital as M’ or M + ΔM” (Ibid., 461). This 
does not reflect the existence of two different circuits that extract two different values; rather, there 
is only one circuit of capital but two profit-seekers. The money capitalist is the one who owns the 
property of money, and she lends that money with the expectation of receiving it back with an 
increment in the form of interest. Thus, the role of the money capitalist does not directly involve 
capitalist production. The industrial capitalist is the one who borrows the money, in order to set 
up the capitalist production process to extract value. Here the surplus value (profit) is divided into 
two (but not equally): the money capitalist gets her share in the form of interest on the agreed-
upon loan, whereas the industrial capitalist get her share as the enterprise profit.  
Therefore, Marx’s main concern is the introduction of a new phase to profit-making, based on a 
new structure of production. In this new structure, finance capital attempts to appropriate the 
surplus labour of everyone involved in the production stream:  
Profit thus appears (and no longer just the part of it, interest, that obtains its justification 
from the profit of the borrower) as simply the appropriation of other people’s surplus 
labour, arising from the transformation of means of production into capital, i.e. from their 
estrangement vis-à-vis the actual producer, from their opposition, as the property of 
another, vis-à-vis all individuals really active in production from the manager down to the 
lowest day-labourer. In joint-stock companies the function is separated from capital 
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ownership, so labour is also completely separated from ownership of the means of 
production and of surplus labour. (Ibid., 567) 
Finance capital, in this schema, has a regulatory form that transforms the organization of capitalist 
production into a corporate system. In examining this transformation, Costas Lapavitsas (2013) 
indicates that finance capital appears as the commanding power of the process. The lender cannot 
totally distance herself from the borrower’s project. Rather, she must have considerable 
information about it. The lender is obliged to examine and monitor the business of the borrower, 
precisely to keep herself removed from the production process; after all, if the borrower fails, the 
lender will have to take over the business, which is never her primary intention. The lender must 
also monitor the business of the borrower if the money she lends has in turn been funded by other 
sources, which puts pressure on the lender (Lapavitsas, 2013: 115). The entire process entails 
several risks and inevitably creates a pyramid of disciplining, monitoring, and social value 
assessment.  
2.2.1. Fictitious capital: Transactions of financial assets 
Marx also investigates where finance capitalists’ money comes from. Banks use the deposits of 
people and rentiers, and they turn idle money in their system into active money set in motion. That 
is why for Marx, the number of rich people depositing their money in banks and the amount of 
rentiers’ money determine the volume of potential money capital in a country; an increase in the 
number of rich people, rentiers, or both would thus provide more credit (1981: 483–4). These 
people deposit their money to get annual interest revenue from it, but their deposits also form the 
basis for banks to act as finance capitalists. Additionally, there is also financially-created money, 
which Marx calls “fictitious capital” (1981). Fictitious capital constitutes the speculative form of 
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capital. It is fundamentally a speculative initiative designed to produce profit out of the transaction 
of financial assets. According to Marx, fictitious capital refers to the concentration of financial 
papers in the hands of banks, investors, speculators, financiers, and usurers (Ibid., 526–7). Banks 
have to expand their credit system, so they begin to issue bonds and shares based on the securities 
and future values they have. Banks issue notes to provide more credits, and financiers and 
speculators might buy these papers in a practice that constitutes a new form of capital 
accumulation. This process integrates trade and speculation, since the success of the speculator is 
tied to the success of the borrower’s enterprise (Ibid., 532). It involves the formation of financial 
money markets, through stock exchanges, shares, government bonds, debt obligations, securities, 
and asset-based portfolios. As Ben Fine and Alfred Saad-Filho explain:  
These markets breed upon one another, with financial services being sold as portfolios of 
assets, as in pension funds and investment trusts. Each of these is a paper to claim property 
that may or may not include productive capital that may or may not generate or appropriate 
surplus value, what Marx terms ‘fictitious capital’: paper claims on surplus value that may 
or may not be realised, but which are not necessarily in some sense fraudulent. (2010: 124) 
Fictitious capital, then, refers to the sophistication of finance capital. In order to breed money 
capital, there must also exist a sophisticated financial system that is able to convert assets into 
financial commodities (we know this as “securitization” in current banking terminology). 
Fictitious capital is associated with various forms of capital that have speculative potential. From 
this perspective, as Harvey puts it, even land might be turned into fictitious capital, i.e., a financial 
asset (1982: 367). Fictitious capital reveals the ability of capitalism to transform commodities 
(whether in the form of paper or finished outputs) into financial assets.  
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According to Marx, finance capital is a necessity of capitalist accumulation that functions in the 
forms of IBC and fictitious capital. Fictitious capital does not have to be the source of IBC, but it 
often becomes a source for banks to lend money to enterprises. In fact, banks may even create 
financial capital without showing reciprocal money in their accounts—but rather by presenting 
papers as the equivalent instead, so that they can collect necessary funds to lend from financial 
markets. This integration of fictitious capital into IBC not only increases the risks linked to the 




Figure 1. The circulation of the financial capital 
This diagram illustrates how finance capital circulates through the motion of capitalist production. 
In order to expand capitalist production, there must exist two dynamics: (1) a sophisticated 
financial money market, and (2) capitalist social relations based on the subordination of labour 
power. Finance capital in this framework functions as a new form of discipline as well as profit-
making, through the exploitation of labour power. Since there are now two types of competing 
profit-seekers, this composition puts more pressure on the conditions of the working class. Social 
inequality widens due to the rise of finance capital. According to Marx, this process changes the 
form of industrial capitalist enterprise. The owners of the industrial enterprise become: the 
shareholders of the company; the managers who control production in order to offset the debt taken 
from financial institutions; or both. Hence, finance capitalism also signals the rise of a new 
M — IBC 
M — Fictitious capital 
Credit given to the industrial capitalist by the 
money capitalist 
M — M — C … P’ … C’ — M’— M’ 
Credit put into motion by the managerial 
body of an enterprise 
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managerial stream—a new commanding power of capital over production. The process also entails 
a new type of property relations, as the money given as credit is owned by financial institutions. If 
we think that the bank creates this money by speculating and investing in financial markets, then 
the ownership of property becomes even more sophisticated (this is also the case with the 
financialization of housing, which I touch upon in the coming pages). 
2.2.2. Finance capital as extraction or strategy? 
According to Marx, financialization is a necessary condition for capitalist production. Marx 
himself focuses on industrial enterprises that are turned into joint-stock companies (1981: 510-11). 
Historically, a new managerial body emerged to run these corporations as a result of the impact 
that finance capital had as a key appropriator of surplus value. Finance capital appropriates the 
surplus value extracted in the industrial production process. Marx formulated this aspect of 
financialization to depict the composition of industrial capitalism; however, it remains true about 
the wider exploitation of labour power. Now it is not only the industrial capitalist but also the 
money capitalist that is ready to exploit labour power. Finance capital, thus, deepens the rate of 
exploitation. However, what we mean by financialization in the 21st century goes beyond this 
super-structural framework; rather, it refers to a new type of economization that everyone 
experiences in their lives in one way or another.  
In that sense, Harvey (2004) and Sassen (2012, 2017, 2018) explain the financialization process 
that occurred since the 1990s as one that dispossesses or destroys certain ownerships and qualities 
of life. According to Harvey (2004), neoliberalism functions to restore class power through 
“accumulation by dispossession,” a concept that he uses to describe the changing form of capital 
that functions as a new tool to dispossess certain people or corporations. Neoliberalism has 
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constructed a new global financial architecture, comprising G-7 regulations, the US Treasury 
Department, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and Wall Street financiers. This elite 
coalition aims to spread US hegemony through the ideology of the neoliberal market economy, 
which aims to expand competition and exploitation throughout the world. This expansionist 
coalition operates by opening new markets for the extraction of more value. With or without state 
involvement, the financial system “coordinates the dynamics of capital accumulation through 
uneven geographical development” (Harvey, 2004: 71). This system also operates by “speculation 
on commodity futures, currency values, debt and the alike” (Ibid., 71–2).” Harvey explains: 
Stock promotions, ponzi schemes, structured asset destruction through inflation, asset 
stripping through merger and acquisitions, the promotion of levels of debt encumbrance 
that reduce whole populations, even in the advanced capitalist countries, to debt peonage, 
to say nothing of corporate fraud, dispossession of assets (the raiding of pension funds and 
their decimation by stock and corporate collapses) by credit and stock manipulations—all 
of these are central features of what contemporary capitalism is about…. we have to look 
at the speculative raiding carried out by hedge funds and other major institutions of finance 
capital as the cutting edge of accumulation by dispossession. (Ibid., 74–5) 
Harvey notes that currently, new submarkets are being opened to enable further opportunities for 
accumulation by dispossession. On a socio-spatial scale, he uses this concept to highlight the force 
of finance capital working with the real estate growth machine. People are displaced and 
dispossessed from their neighbourhoods for the sake of further financial wealth accumulation by 
capitalist coalitions. Harvey also uses the concept of “spatial fix” (or spatio-temporal fix) to 
explain the role of financialization in turning fixed assets into financial assets. In the Urbanization 
of Capital (1989), he explores “the secondary circuit of capital,” which refers to the immense 
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production of space to fix the economic crisis; in that sense, the financialization of fixed assets are 
seen as a spatio-temporal fix by many scholars (Aalbers, 2011; Gotham, 2012; Kratke, 2014; 
Soederberg, 2014). However, this explanation relegates financialization to a side role, with the 
circuit of productive capital still playing the main role. 
Sassen (2012, 2017, 2018) also identifies the role of finance capital in our global economy as a 
new financial architecture that operates by extracting and destroying what is needed to accumulate 
more financial assets. Here, property is not defined as a concrete, fixed, and tangible asset; rather, 
it is identified as part of the financial architecture. Following Sassen, finance capital has the power 
to financialize almost everything in the world: finance operates within its own domain that has the 
capacity to transform, extract, and destroy all the necessary social qualities of life. Sassen (2017) 
argues that “high finance” is a predatory form that functions as a looter: it extracts, destroys, and 
leaves behind what is left. Finance thus appropriates the social features of life; i.e., financialization 
entails the appropriation of people’s properties, labour, lives, and necessities by high financial 
architecture. Financialization continuously dispossesses cities, households, and those who live in 
the margins of society. This transformation is a multi-dimensional process that affects multiple 
elements of business and urban life. We must understand how financialization works in this way 
and how financial regulations and strategies are capable of shaping decision-making processes, at 
not only the governmental level but also the corporate level.  
2.2.3. Financialization as a corporate strategy 
Since the late 1990s, a growing body of literature focuses on financialization as a corporate 
strategy. From this perspective, financialization is perceived as an opportunity, an investment, and 
a means of profit-making, not only by financiers but also by corporate business elites, producers, 
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investors, shareholders, and even rentiers. Numerous scholars have addressed financialization as 
it relates to the rise of shareholder value. Shareholder value provides a new tool for firms to 
increase their profitability, but also their risks. This dimension of financialization is worth 
examining here, since it has a direct impact on property relations and more particularly on the 
existence of the housing crisis.  
The emergence of “financialization as a strategy” highlights the changing shape of value creation 
(Stockhammer, 2004; Froud et al., 2006; Ionnou and Wojcik, 2019). This new corporate strategy 
aims to link non-financial firms into finance capital markets, in order to augment their investments 
or perpetuate their capital circulation. Meanwhile, as Julie Froud and colleagues (2006) point out, 
this form of financialization begins to change the meaning of value production. In the classical 
conceptualization of capitalism, the strategy of firms is to produce exchange-value in order to 
secure a competitive advantage in the market economy, where every producer is a potential rival. 
However, with the rise of financialization, this strategy of securing a competitive advantage has 
morphed into “creating shareholder value” (Froud et al., 2006: 29). That is to say, each firm’s value 
is calculated by its potential success in creating shareholder value, measured by the metric of added 
value.4 Attracting shareholders, and using their shares as financial papers, is now a common 
strategy for increasing the value of a firm and concentrating wealth in a particular market.5 
Scholars often overlook the rise of shareholder value while talking about financialization. In fact, 
 
4 The “added value” metric refers to the pricing strategy of firms vis-à-vis the profit of shareholders. It entails the 
measurement of how added value will in some form or another be distributed to shareholders. 
5 Some well-known lists, such as the S&P 500 and FTSE 100, are now used to classify firms. At the same time, 
credit-scoring companies such as Moody’s and Fitch have become important global financial actors. This 
institutionalization reflects not only changing aspects of capitalist value production but also changes in discourse. 
The global criteria of firm profitability and value have been encapsulated in the standards and measurements of 
some global corporations.  
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it constitutes the lion’s share of the process, since it also explains what Sassen means by the global 
autonomy of high finance. Finance capital financializes corporations through the spread of 
shareholder value in the stock market, and this spread of shares enables financiers to apply profit-
making pressure to the boards of corporations. Corporations have thus become managerial entities 
that are obliged to turn a profit at the expense of the essentials of life. The mining and oil industries 
and the construction sector, for instance, have increasingly become tied to financialization, and 
corporations in these sectors are prepared to ruin the ecological balance of the world for the sake 
of keeping their shareholder value as high as possible.  
With specific reference to the housing crisis, real estate investment trusts (REITs), construction 
companies, special funds investing in housing, and rentiers are all embedded in the financial 
system, tied to it through the shareholder value system. This embeddedness in the financial system 
drives the need for profit-making in the housing market, with a discourse of economic growth. In 
a sense, the financialization of the housing market has become a mode of existence not only for 
certain groups but also for the perpetuation of a world capitalist system. Profit-making out of urban 
land, and the extractive economy that increases indebtedness in society, cannot be distinguished 
from the ongoing course of world capitalism. In this framework, financialization functions as the 
new embeddedness—the new modus operandi of capitalism. Financialization has several 
dimensions, but the most crucial dimensions that we witness in our everyday lives are the 
financialization of the housing market and the financialization of the extractive economies that are 





2.2.4. Financialization as governmentality 
To explain the socio-economic framework of financialization, Foucauldian scholars have 
developed the concept of financialization as “governmentality.” Neoliberalism is defined in the 
Foucauldian perspective as a new governmentality that comes into being through the creation of 
competitive human capital. Foucault defines governmentality as “the conduct of conduct” (2007). 
He draws on the writings of Medieval priest Guillaume De La Perrière, who conceptualizes the 
notion of government as threefold: to govern is to govern the self, the family, and the state. This 
reference to Medieval thought inevitably carries a conservative connotation, but what Foucault 
seeks to highlight is the discourses and technologies that promote the practice of self-governing. 
According to Foucault, the essence of neoliberalism fits into this threefold conception of 
government, and the very core of this essence relies on the notion of human capital.  
In The Birth of Biopolitics (2008), Foucault refers to Gary Becker and Theodore Schultz’s human 
capital theory and indicates that neoliberal governmentality is a new governmental technology that 
aims to organize society through the formation of human capital—a notion that highlights the 
abilities, talents, and educational background of an individual. Human capital is a new form of 
capital that must be invested in order to forge a competitive society. Competition defines the core 
of neoliberal thought, and the competitive self can only be engendered in a society through the 
formation of a human capital culture. Thus, even though he does not use this concept of culture, 
Foucault refers to a cultural change in society. The formation of human capital begins with the 
investment of families in their children, with the goal of giving those children a competitive 
advantage in the future competitive society. This investment usually comes in the form of training 
and education (Bourdieu [1986] argues that it is also about social capital). The competitive human 
capital forms a new self—one that regulates herself for the sake of competition. This competition 
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is supported by the discourse of entrepreneurialism. That is why Foucault identifies the neoliberal 
society as an enterprise society. The competitive self is one that regulates herself for the necessities 
of the competitive market, works for the well-being of an enterprise, or looks for new opportunities 
with an entrepreneurial spirit.  
This Foucauldian explanation inevitably redefines entrepreneurial discourse in capitalism. 
Neoliberal thought has created a seismic shift in the course of capitalism, and in that context, the 
redefinition of entrepreneurialism is not only about the formation of human capital; neoliberalism 
itself has created several problems regarding the socio-economic conditions of people. The 
formation of human capital is depicted as a new biopolitical technology of neoliberal 
governmentality—and it is crucial to understand the consequences of that new technology. Pierre 
Dardot and Christian Laval (2013) explain neoliberalization as a new rationality of the world. 
When they use the concept of rationality, they actually refer to a new conduct—a new way of 
doing things and new mode of existence. This mode of existence is that to which the competitive 
self dedicates her career desires, linking her own success with the success of enterprise. The new 
rationality is about taking risks for the well-being of the enterprise. Neoliberal governmentality, 
thus, consists of self-government, enterprise, and competitive “risk-taking.” The neoliberal 
thinker, according to Dardot and Laval, perceives the entrepreneur as not only a simple capitalist 
or producer aiming to valorize capital in an industrial setting—but rather as: 
…an entity endowed with a commercial spirit, in search of any opportunity for profit that 
presents itself, and which he can take thanks to the information he possesses, while others 
do not. He is exclusively defined by his specific intervention in the circulation of goods. 
(2013: 111)  
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Dardot and Laval then refer to Ludwig von Mises and Israel Kirzner, two of the main figures of 
neoliberal thought. They claim that for the main figures of neoliberal thought, entrepreneurship 
does not only encompass the economization of behaviour or rational profit maximization; rather, 
it “also contains an ‘extra-economizing’ dimension of the activity of discovery, of detecting ‘good 
opportunities’” (Ibid., 111). As such, the entrepreneurial self is depicted as one who is ready to 
articulate herself into potential opportunities based on risk-taking.  
Dardot and Laval argue that this articulation of self into a general entrepreneurial spirit enables the 
formation of a new managerial body, in which everyone devotes themselves to the success of the 
managerial body as if to their own success. This new management rationality goes hand in hand 
with the formation of a new human capital configuration. As Dardot and Laval explain: 
Management creates the entrepreneurial society that refers to the society characterized by 
its adaptability and operating norm—constant change. The new management of 
entrepreneurs aims to diffuse and systematize the spirit of enterprise in all the spheres of 
collective action, especially public services, making innovation the universal principle of 
organization. All problems are soluble in the managerial spirit and managerial attitude; all 
workers must view their role and commitment in the enterprise through the eyes of 
manager. (2013: 136) 
This new managerial transformation associated with a new self-government refers to the 
articulation of self into the ongoing course of neoliberalization. The formation of this neoliberal 
enterprise society has been implemented, as Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell (2002) highlight, with 
a series of social policy changes and institutional transformations. The neoliberalization process 
has become dominant through financialization and globalization, with only certain corporations 
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and enterprises dominating the world economy. In a sense, this new managerial transformation 
asks people from all walks of life to accept the risks of the new mode of existence and adapt 
themselves into this mode with an entrepreneurial “creative” motivation. In a sense, risk-taking 
and entrepreneurialism have become the new normal in neoliberal society. According to the 
Foucauldian literature, financialization has also become the new normal that defines the 
normalized forms of life in society.  
Foucauldian scholars have also explored another aspect of this new mode of existence while 
examining the financialization of the housing market. Melissa García-Lamarca and Maria Kaika 
(2016) indicate that the new form of mortgage markets reflects a new type of citizenship that is 
categorized by a new creditor-debtor relationship. The articulation of individuals into the new 
creditor-debtor relationship mostly takes place in the housing market since housing has become 
the most important financial investment that an individual or household can make throughout their 
lives. García-Lamarca and Kaika (2016) emphasize that it is necessary to go beyond a 
macroeconomic analysis that deals with the course of financial transactions in order to comprehend 
how the future labour of people is appropriated through financialization. They also assert that 
mortgage debt refers to a new biopolitics that manages and disciplines the indebted self. 
”Mortgaged lives,” as they say, are constituting a new management strategy, which forms the 
narratives of “homeownership,” “safe investment,” and “prestigious social status.” These 
narratives have reproduced the “citizen” as investor (Ibid., 318). In the case of Spain, García-
Lamarca and Kaika observe: 
From the late 1990s onwards, public administrations, real estate agencies, developers, 
builders and financial institutions alike chanted the same mantra: the price of housing never 
falls, housing is a sage investment…. The “safe investment” message was complemented 
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by the mass media and bank advertisements suggesting a direct link between an elevated 
social status and homeownership. So long as interest rates were low and housing prices 
kept rising, the promotion of housing acquisition through mortgages as a safe investment 
was a winner…. Becoming a homeowner appeared to be an easy affair as 
citizens/customers were presented with tailor-made mortgages to cater for their specific 
needs. (Ibid., 318–9)  
García-Lamarca and Kaika also note that one of their interviewees told them that “becoming 
heavily indebted in order to become a homeowner was something ‘everyone was doing’” (Ibid., 
320). This expression of “everyone is doing” forms the basis of common sense. Therefore, from a 
perspective of disciplinary society, it is possible to interpret the financialization of the housing 
market as both an extension and diversification of governmental rationality and as the emergence 
of new governmental technologies to manage the population. This Foucauldian explanation also 
touches upon the psychoanalysis of citizens that strive for homeownership by accepting the risks 
of mortgaged lives. In other words, it analyzes the psychological engagements of masses while 
dealing with and accepting the new normalized creditor-debtor relationship. The financialization 
of the housing market will be the subject of the next chapter.  
2.2.5. Financialization as a new hegemony 
The question about defining financialization also ends up with the problem of whether or not we 
should define it within the boundaries of a new governmentality, as Foucauldians suggest. In other 
words, is it possible to define financialization through the approaches pertaining to Gramscian 
theory of hegemony rather than the Foucauldian notion of governmentality? 
46 
 
Marx (1991) explains the motion of finance capital as a transformative metamorphosis which 
changes the structure of capitalist production. The functioning capitalist is now under threat from 
finance capital’s greed for profit. The finance capitalist is the one that owns the money circulating 
in production, and this puts more pressure on labour, since the greed to appropriate more surplus 
value becomes greater than ever before. The reduction of the actually functioning capitalist to a 
manager also provides necessary clues about how companies are turned into corporate bodies that 
must meet the targets of financial institutions. Those financial institutions operate as the 
appropriators of surplus value by claiming ownership of circulating capital. Within this 
framework, Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy (2006) depict the current neoliberal economic 
system as a hegemony of finance. This hegemony aims to appropriate the labour of people. The 
question is whether or not this hegemony can be described as the new normalized way of doing 
things. 
The description of financialization as a new normal mode of existence could also be described 
through the concept of hegemony developed by Gramsci (1971). According to Gramsci, the ruling 
classes and their relationship to other social and political forces are organized through the extended 
state, which is to say political society and civil society, including political parties and organic 
intellectuals and their allies. In other words, capitalism’s ruling classes comprise the core of the 
capitalist state, including political parties, bureaucracy, and capitalists (investors, industrialists, 
entrepreneurs, financial institutions, etc.). Gramsci uses the concept of hegemony to describe the 
capacity of these ruling classes to become the leading cultural and intellectual groups in society. 
This leadership is crucial for Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony as it includes the ideological 
basis of a hegemonic system that becomes the measurement point which defines what is “normal” 
in society.  Ideology refers to a specific set of lived experiences in a hegemonic system that 
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everyone adopts as common sense. This normalization is affirmed through what Gramsci calls 
“equilibrium.” Equilibrium is a concept that distinguishes the Gramscian interpretation of Marxist 
philosophy from the Foucauldian perspective that categorizes domination as a rationality aimed at 
disciplining the population. 
Foucault’s late interventions on self-government address how individuals govern themselves 
within different governmentalities by adapting, disciplining, and controlling themselves through a 
variety of discourses and technologies. In contrast, as Stefan Kipfer asserts while comparing 
Gramsci with Henri Lefebvre on the topic of hegemony, Gramsci never reduces social relations to 
the disciplinary effects of micro-technologies of knowledge/power as Foucault does (2004: 131). 
For Gramsci, hegemony is not a matter of simple disciplinary (self-)governance; rather, it is built 
out of dialectical processes between the ruling classes and subordinated classes. Domination 
cannot claim legitimacy without forming moments of balance. Gramsci calls this balance-seeking 
“equilibrium.” It is important to note here that this Gramscian concept of equilibrium is not the 
same as that employed by neoclassical economics. It is not an economic balance formed by the so-
called optimization of demand and supply in the long run, or the so-called balance-finding of the 
market in the course of economic life. Capitalism constantly strives for equilibrium to perpetuate 
its hegemony. Through equilibrium, the interests of the dominant group may become widespread 
up to a certain point (Gramsci, DF, 1971: 206). That is to say, equilibrium may also draw the limits 
of hegemonic domination; what defines the limits of equilibrium is the capacity of ruling circles 
to coerce and to manufacture consent. Hegemony in that sense means both coercion and consent. 
According to Gramsci, hegemonic classes cannot survive without manufacturing the consent of 
subordinated groups. This account of hegemony has been widely applied to the progression of 
capitalism over the course of the last two centuries. The capitalist mode of production has gone 
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through several different trajectories to fix, adjust, and/or reasserts its hegemony. Sustained by the 
exercise of ethico-political leadership,  this state of balance consists of a coalition of classes 
constituting an organic totality, within which the use of force is risky unless there emerges an 
organic crisis that threatens the hegemonic position and the ruling position of the leading class in 
society (Saba, 1981). 
The hegemonic ruling classes manufacture the consensus with the ruled classes in order to 
maintain their hegemony without using physical coercion.6 However, when it is needed, coercion 
is a tool that will be used without hesitation. There is no hegemony without coercion. For Gramsci, 
politics is not only a matter of achieving hegemonic consensus, it is also about prestige. Prestige 
is important for becoming part of the political sphere. It reflects a human desire for recognition by 
others. If we consider consensus to be an act of management—managing society for the sake of 
the hegemonic ruling classes—then being prestigious is one of the techniques of this management. 
This management becomes popular and widespread through the generation of a common sense 
among the ruled classes. According to Gramsci, common sense is the fundamental general 
sentiment among the ruled classes—a sentiment or ideological restructuring that keeps the ruled 
classes approving of and joining the coalition of hegemonic ruling classes. In other words, 
common sense refers to the dominant hegemonic culture that makes society accept class disparity 
 
6 Physical coercion is contested terrain in Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. In principle, Gramsci intends to formulate 
a socio-political theory in which the hegemonic classes do not need to use physical coercion in order to settle their 
rule. However, this does not mean that physical coercion never exists in the establishment of a hegemonic order. 
Capitalist hegemony has always been violent, and as Lefebvre (1991) indicates, this hegemony operates through 
violence (essentially in the production of space). Violence does not only refer to physical repression; rather, it also 
emerges in the form of exclusion and stigmatization.  
49 
 
and social subordination. For Gramsci, this sentiment may come externally from religion and 
folklore, but it may also come from the hegemonic ideology.  
Having analyzed the Gramscian explanation of hegemony, and the ongoing equilibrium-seeking 
of capitalism, I now argue that financialization refers to a new combination of coercion + consent 
and a new common sense that permeates every unit of life. Neoliberal hegemony promotes 
financialization as a new balancing technology to make dominant its agenda of exploitation 
through the manufacturing of consent. Financialization, through the mechanisms of deregulating 
global transactions and providing financial accessibility, establishes a foundation for people to 
take risks. Here, there are two problems: Is it really possible to address financialization as a new 
common sense that permeates through the equilibrium-seeking of capitalism? And how is it 
possible to manufacture the consent of people, when it leads them to accept the very risky choices 
offered by financial markets?  
To address the former question, we must again return to the Foucauldian literature on 
financialization. Foucauldian approaches to financialization delve into the explanation of new 
governmentality or financialization as biopower (Lucarelli, 2010), and as I said earlier, these 
approaches cannot be neglected vis-à-vis the Gramscian approach. Under neoliberalism the crucial 
fact is that there exists, as Lazzarato (2015) explains, a new kind of creditor-debtor relationship. 
Berkay Ayhan (2017) suggests that theories that explain financialization as common sense are 
inadequate for explaining ongoing financialization. He asserts that such approaches produce a 
depoliticized explanation of finance; these approaches situate finance in a grandiose position that 
operates in a specific meta-terrain above society (2017: 57). In his own approach to explaining the 
cultural economy of financialization, Ayhan argues that financialization is a performative concept 
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that must be examined within the framework of performative agency theory. He also refers to 
Goede’s explanation of finance as a performative practice: 
Understanding finance as a performative practice suggests that processes of knowledge and 
interpretation do not exist in addition to, or of secondary importance to, “real” material 
financial structures, but are precisely the way in which “finance” materializes….  It is not 
just the case then that financial knowledge is socially constructed, but the very material 
structures of the financial markets—including prices, costs, and capital—are discursively 
constituted and historically contingent. (2005: 7, quoted in Ayhan, 2017: 56)  
According to this approach, analyzing financialization as common-sense neglects performative 
agency, or in other words, it overlooks the individual articulation of people into financial 
mechanisms. Similarly, Rob Aitkin (2007) focuses on the cultural economy of finance and 
criticizes the representation of finance capital as a global hegemonic force. His main argument is 
that capital is mostly performative rather than hegemonic, and the performative characteristic of 
capital has a cultural foundation. Culture here refers to performative agency and action theory—
in a sense, a sum of experiences and performances. According to Aitkin, explaining finance as a 
grandiose global hegemony mystifies the operation of financialization. Paul Langley (2008) 
contributes to this argument by adding a spatial explanation; he says that finance is becoming 
spatially dominant in global financial networks that are dominated by a few financial centres such 
as New York City, London, Tokyo, Hong Kong, or other global cities. Hence, there exists a spatial 




This theoretical approach to financialization, which draws on the cultural economy perspective 
and performative agency theory, mobilizes the Foucauldian explanation of human capital as the 
new biopolitical feature of neoliberalism. The enterprising subject, as Ayhan argues, reflects the 
formative conception of finance (2017: 57). Here, the crucial focus is how individuals become 
performative towards financialization. Personal finance programs, debt management programs, 
and financial literacy training programs aim to mobilize the performative action of enterprising 
subjects. This performative conception of finance brings about a new culture of everyday life and 
subjectivity that engages with financialization (Ibid., 58). Essentially, financial literacy training 
and the articulation of individuals into processes of learning more about financial tools are 
prominent signs of this performative conception of finance. However, there remains a problem 
that is not adequately addressed by this Foucauldian account of performativity: how are people 
from all walks of life expected to accept the potential risks of a financialized economy? In other 
words, how it is possible to articulate people into the realm of financialization without 
manufacturing a desire for it? Is it sufficient to train people as potential entrepreneurs to perform 
in the realm of financialization? What happens to those who do not have any access to financial 
tools? Finally, what motivates people to take financial risks? Is it possible to explain this 
motivation only in terms of a “mystified” entrepreneurial spirit?  
To answer these questions, I must again highlight that capitalism’s main motivation is to keep M 
… M’ going; in the case of financialization, we can even conceptualize the goal as the perpetuation 
of M — M … M’ — M’ or M — C — M’’ or M — M’’. Critiques of finance as global hegemony 
suggest that perceiving finance capital as a global hegemony and a global common sense puts 
financialization into a mystified position. In fact, the Foucauldian accounts cited above argue that 
financialization takes place as a result of the performative agency of individuals. In other words, 
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financialization refers to a new entrepreneurial spirit7 shaped by educational investments and 
training programs.8 The formation of this entrepreneurial spirit is identified as a simple mechanism 
of investment in training, creativity, and financial literacy. It is a new spirit that is shaped by the 
requirements of current financial market mechanisms. The motivation comes from this spirit of 
the entrepreneurial self, which is shaped by the investments of “good” families and training 
programs.  
Thus, although the theoretical approach to explaining engagement in financialization through the 
rational performative action of entrepreneurialism claims that theories of financialization as global 
hegemony mystify the performative agency of neoliberal subjects, this approach itself 
inadvertently (or advertently) suggests that a “mystified” entrepreneurial spirit—a global spirit of 
 
7 Here, the reference must go to Max Weber (2001), who explains the rise of capitalism in the Western world as part 
of the cultural engagement of Protestantism. Weber refers to a mystified entrepreneurialism intrinsic to 
Protestantism in order to explain the profit-making motivation in capitalism. Weber argues that capitalism has a 
specific spirit, and in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, he writes that “the development of the spirit 
of capitalism is best understood as part of the development of rationalism as a whole, and could be deduced from the 
fundamental position of rationalism on the basic problems of life” (2001: 37). This rationality has a specific cultural 
pattern, based on a Calvinist interpretation of Christianity. Calvinism and related forms of Protestantism (e.g., 
Puritanism) offer a worldly rather than fatalist interpretation of Christianity. Weber sees Calvinism as an ascetic 
Protestantism, in which people need to work hard in this world in order to pursue a good working life and, 
ultimately, realize themselves. This is a basic explanation of the inner-worldly ascetic interpretation of the Protestant 
Ethic, in which dedication to work and productivity plays the most significant role. From this perspective, the profit 
made by the ascetic-Protestant person cannot be used for luxury or for enjoying a sedentary life. This description 
provides an account of a mystified entrepreneurialism stemming from the cultural engagement of Protestantism. The 
problem for this explanation is that it aims to connect worldly socio-economic relations to a divine perception of 
another world. The problem with entrepreneurialism that is explained as the key force of neoliberal governmentality, 
it also tries to form a secular form of mystified culture of being entrepreneur.  
8 Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1995) provides a socio-historical analysis of how education disciplines bodies 
and how standardization takes place in society through a series of disciplinary techniques that create docile bodies. 
In The Birth of Biopolitics (2008), Foucault changes this explanation and uses the concept of “abilities-machine” to 
describe the human capital theory of neoliberalism. The abilities-machine is the child of a family that gets necessary 
training to be entrepreneurial and competitive. This transformation in Foucault’s thoughts on the role of education 
appears to rely on his establishment of the theory of governmentality on the notion of “conduct of conduct”; that is 
why he thinks that investment in abilities will lead to a new conduct of conduct, in which everyone will know their 
own limits. However, this account neglects the disciplinary role of education and basically indicates that education 




entrepreneurialism, a kind of Zeitgeist—mobilizes people to act as rational entrepreneurs and thus 
become ready to take risks.9 These accounts of the mystified entrepreneurial self skip two 
important points regarding the recent history of financialization:  
1) As we know from Negri and Hardt (2011), every social foundation relies on the reproduction 
of property relations. In that sense, the hegemony of finance refers to a new type of property 
relations that is shaped by policy shifts towards privatization and the exclusion of the poor. These 
new property relations constitute the core of this hegemony. They also constitute the equilibrium 
that manufactures consent among at least certain segments of society, to a degree adequate to form 
a common sense. Asset ownership (whether it be liquid or fixed) forms the foundational base of 
neoliberal finance hegemony (Birch, 2015). Property ownership has been reproduced as a 
mechanism that creates consent for accepting risks and engaging in a new creditor-debtor 
relationship. The assets may comprise financial papers, and stock shares, but they may also include 
fixed assets such as housing. Mortgage credits are playing a large role in financialization, 
prioritized by individuals for the sake of asset ownership.  
2) If we return to Langley’s (2007) critique of financialization as hegemony, he indicates that it is 
not possible to talk about a global financial hegemony due to the spatialization of finance capital 
 
9 This approach might be getting close to Ulrich Beck’s explanation of risk society; however, it still does not fall 
within the same trajectory. Beck defines risk as a way of accepting certain potential problems while doing certain 
economic or social actions. This acceptance results from a modern society formation in which risk is defined as “a 
systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernisation itself” (Beck, 
1992, 21). As financialization increases in today’s capitalism, it leads to the formation of new risks. Hence, we need 
to define a new type of risk society, different from Beck’s new modern society (reflexive modernity), in which 
capitalism and its flexible individualism cause hazardous risks for the future. However, Beck in World Risk Society 
(1992) notes that risk becomes more uncertain as long as it has become global with a new uncertain technological 
advancement. The problem here is that when risk become incalculable, the discourse of entrepreneurialism also 
weakens since entrepreneurialism cannot directly be associated with “gambling.”  
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in certain headquarters, such as New York’s Wall Street and Toronto’s Bay Street. However, it is 
important to note that financialization is not only about banking and the stock exchange; i.e., it is 
not only about the computerized systems of financiers on Wall Street. A more sophisticated system 
encapsulates the multi-national corporations (MNC) and extractive sectors through shareholder 
value. In addition, it also includes the off-shore destinations where money is laundered and kept 
for potential asset investments. It also encompasses the recent technological developments related 
to crypto-currency, Bitcoin, and the increasing engagement of shadow banking. Moreover, finance 
is not only represented by large financial institutions. Micro-finance institutions are playing a 
predatory role in bringing the urban poor into financial debt mechanisms (Hembruff & Soederberg, 
2019; Roy, 2010). Interest rates, mortgage credits, pension funds, and hedge funds all have roles 
in this hegemonic mechanism. That is to say, finance is not only about people taking risk as part 
of their entrepreneurial spirit; it is also a sophisticated institutional mechanism that operates by 
manufacturing the consent of subordinated groups through property ownership.  
2.2.6. Financialization as patrimonial capitalism 
As a continuation of the critique of mystified entrepreneurial spirit, we need to briefly mention 
what Piketty identifies as patrimonial capital as the distinctive feature of capitalism in the 21st 
century. His use of the word “patrimony” to describe the composition of wealth accumulation is a 
deliberate choice, since neoliberal hegemony operates by reproducing patrimony. Piketty does not 
associate capitalism in the 21st century with the entrepreneurial spirit, but rather with the rise of 
patrimonial property relations. Piketty also criticizes human capital theory and says that: “many 
people believe that modern growth naturally favors labour over inheritance and competence over 
birth. What is the source of this widespread belief, and how sure can we be that is correct?” (2014: 
237). This is a point of serious interrogation by Piketty, and he devotes his famous book Capital 
55 
 
in the 21st Century mainly to investigating sources of wealth and inequality. Piketty makes a 
comparison based on income inequality. He pinpoints that income from capital (including 
inheritance) is always greater than income from labour (wages). He also points out that “after 
World War II, inherited wealth lost its importance, and for the first time in history, perhaps, work 
and study became the surest routes to the top” (Ibid., 241). However, for Piketty, this period 
represented an interim belle époque, and the essence of capitalism (we can say neoliberalism) in 
the 21st century has renewed the importance of the inheritance of wealth and money-making from 
capital rather than from labour (as was the case in 19th century Europe).  
According to Piketty, this changing form of capitalism accounts for the existence of greater social 
inequality in the 21st century: “Income inequality is the result of adding up two components: 
inequality of income from labour and inequality of income from capital. The more unequally 
distributed each of these components is, the greater the total inequality” (Ibid., 242). In fact, there 
is a crucial point we need to highlight here, which Piketty explains by drawing a distinction 
between the inequality of capital (the distribution of wealth in society) and the inequality of income 
from capital. The latter might be greater than the former in many societies. In other words, the 
return that one is able to get from investing a large amount of capital widens inequality in society, 
since the return of this capital takes place through the exploitation of labour in other spaces, and 
this return usually comes in the form of shareholder value and royalties. Therefore, income from 
capital has a great multiplier effect, and it constitutes the core of inequality in society.  Piketty 
statistically explains the facts about this inequality: 
The upper 10 percent of the labor income distribution generally receives 25–30 percent of 
labour income, where the top 10 percent of the capital income distribution always owns 
more than 50 percent of all wealth (and in some societies as much as 90 percent). Even 
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more strikingly, perhaps, the bottom 50 percent of the wage distribution always receives a 
significant share of total income (generally between one-quarter and one-third, or 
approximately as much as the top 10 percent), whereas the bottom 50 percent of wealth 
distribution owns nothing at all, or almost nothing. Inequalities with respect to labour 
usually seem mild, moderate, and almost reasonable…. In comparison, inequalities with 
respect to capital are always extreme (Ibid., 244).  
Piketty’s point here is that wealth is owned by a minority and is not distributed to the bottom 
percentiles of society. The bottom percentiles of society must labour in order to survive, and they 
comprise most waged workers. Piketty also argues that inheritance could be seen as the keyway of 
garnering wealth: “If one inherits an apartment, it will be easy for her to increase her savings” 
(Ibid.). This explanation by Piketty does not give an account of the creativity of labour or the 
mystified entrepreneurial spirit of human capital theory. Through his analysis of income hierarchy 
and wealth distribution, Piketty juxtaposes social classes based on the concentration of wealth. The 
top 10 percent own the majority of wealth and constitute the upper classes, whereas the lower 
classes comprise the bottom 50 percent of society. Between these two groups, there are the middle 
classes (40 percent of society).  
This explanation is of course a rough attempt to classify societal segments (a limitation that Piketty 
himself affirms); however, it provides necessary clues about economic inequalities in society and 
the widening phase of ownership as a mode of existence. The crucial point here is the difference 
between the top 1 percent of those who make wealth by labour and those who make wealth by 
capital: Piketty says that “the top one percent who earn the most are the same as the 1 percent who 
own the most” (Ibid., 254). Piketty concludes by drawing a strong link to asset ownership. For the 
top 10 percent, real estate is not very important since they already own the houses that they want. 
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Even for the top 1 percent, the most important asset is never residential real estate but rather 
financial and business assets. However, for the middle classes, the most important asset is 
residential real estate. For these classes: “a key role is often played by ownership of a primary 
residence and the way it is acquired and paid for. Sometimes in addition to a home, there is also a 
substantial amount of savings” (Ibid., 260). Piketty finally emphasizes that the growth of a true 
“patrimonial middle class” constitutes the principal transformation of wealth in the 21st century. 
There now exist both a hyper-patrimonial society (a society of rentiers) and a hyper-meritocratic 
society (a society of managers). The latter can always embark on becoming part of the former.  
Therefore, it is a society of asset ownership that explains the essence of capitalism in the 21st 
century—and not the entrepreneurial spirit that theorists of governmentality put forward, with 
respect to human capital approaches. Lastly, there remains one more point that I need to accentuate. 
The new discourse of entrepreneurialism is a fact of our neoliberal age. Flexible work, start-up 
culture, and freelancing are all associated with the new entrepreneurial discourse. This discourse, 
on the one hand, encourages so-called creative works; on the other hand, it produces a cultural 
atmosphere of competition among investors. This discourse is supported by a necessary body of 
literature and promoted through popular media, such as magazines, television shows, and public 
talks, which may lead one to think that entrepreneurialism is the only path to success in neoliberal 
society. The entrepreneur is one that takes risk for the sake of potential creative outcomes. 
However, in fact, reality does not reflect this popular account. The majority of people are still 
working as wage earners, and only a few start-ups or entrepreneurial initiatives succeed in 
accumulating wealth: according to statistics, 90 percent of start-ups fail (Forbes, 2015). That is to 
say, what people seek in our contemporary capitalist mode of existence is to accumulate more 
assets rather than to think creatively all of the time.  
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2.3. Financialization as common sense: Between debt and consent 
There remains one final problematization of financialization to address here. Does financialization 
refer to a new type of common sense? As I explained, common sense (in Gramscian theory) refers 
to a normalized perception, a popular accepted sentiment that circumscribes the socio-economic 
conditions of society. This popular sentiment is not, of course, accepted because people 
democratically and peacefully want it. Instead, it is created through coercion and consent 
manufacturing. This embedded common sense comes into being through the equilibrium-seeking 
of the hegemonic classes. In that sense, as a central argument of this dissertation, I again emphasize 
that financialization refers to the reproduction of social order—meaning that it refers to the 
reorganization of property relations. Financialization as the reorganization of social order is 
accepted as common sense in current neoliberal society. This raises the question of: “how is 
financialization being accepted as common sense?” The answer lies in the reproduction of debt as 
the key foundational feature of neoliberal property relations and the capitalist mode of existence. 
Debt has been reproduced as a fundamental element of neoliberal financial hegemony. 
David Graeber (2014) argues that debt constitutes the key foundational basis of society, not only 
in economic terms but also in moral terms. Debt is a mere obligation in which money plays an 
indispensable role (Graeber, 2014: 21). However, historically, debt has been constructed as a moral 
fact that everyone owes to a superior structure. Therefore, debt should be understood as a social 
fact, and as Graeber (Ibid., 22) puts forward, everyone is in debt to everyone else in a dozen 
different ways. In the economic sphere, to understand debt is to “follow the money.” The 
circulation of money and the foundational basis of the financial system are not necessarily 
dependent on exchange but rather on debt. Graeber challenges the idea that money was invented 
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to facilitate barter and exchange. He challenges the classical claim of Adam Smith (1776) 
regarding the necessity of the market as the key regulator of society.  
In both classical economics and neoclassical economics, the existence of the market is accepted as 
common sense (Graeber, 2014: 46). Money is the necessary intermediary tool that facilitates the 
existence of this market. In classical economics—and more specifically in Smith’s vision of an 
exchange society—the image of a small town in which everyone exchanges their products and 
sells their labour provides a narrative in which money has an apolitical role and serves only for the 
functioning of the market economy. In fact, anthropological studies show that stateless societies 
do not create a market economy that rules on its own. As Polanyi (1971) explains, primitive and 
stateless societies were historically dependent on the practice of distribution rather than exchange. 
In that sense, even in early kingdoms, money was used to keep records of debt and mutual 
obligation. Debt is thus the starting point of economic activities. Through a market mechanism, 
states can maintain a complex military system, supplying the necessities of armies from a range of 
options. It is therefore a governmental strategy to form markets. To create those markets, debt is a 
necessity. Not only does it provide the economic circulation of money, but it also engenders a set 
of moral obligations pertaining to the perpetuation of markets. Debt is also related to the state’s 
judicial repressive apparatuses since anyone who is unable to fulfill their debt may end up in jail 
or face a variety of other judicial punishments. Therefore, debt exists with the state (Graeber, 2014: 
54). The state is the key organization of hegemonic power that constantly reconstructs the markets, 
and it dictates the rules for money markets.  
Graeber also puts forward an anthropological analysis that examines the history of indebtedness. 
Debt in many languages refers to a state of being guilty and in sin. Graeber says that the feeling of 
debt has existentialist roots that stretch back to the very beginnings of humankind, in the belief 
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that we owe everything to others. In a mythological sense, humans historically perceived existence 
to be a debt owed to a divine authority. Humans thought they were in debt to the Gods for their 
existence. However, as time passed, the position of the Gods in this conception of debt was 
appropriated by the state (Ibid., 63). That notion of debt to the state has also changed over time, to 
a debt owed to society or the nation in the modern state structure. The current structure of the 
modern state and society imposes a magnified set of duties: we have a duty to pay the debt that we 
owe to our nation. Tax, for instance, is accepted as common sense; it is a form of debt that we pay 
to the state. This secular conception of debt to society began with the French Revolution and the 
Enlightenment movements and constitutes the contemporary basis of civic duty. Through these 
secular constructions of duty, debt has become a common sense that everyone in one way or 
another accepts as their duty to fulfill. The state then exists as the guardian of debt (Ibid., 71). 
In contemporary capitalism, market logic operates through the assumption that everyone is equal 
in the market. The well-known approach of neoclassical economics, which perceives agents in the 
market as rational choice-makers, emphasizes that everyone begins their journey in the market in 
equal conditions (or in ceteris paribus conditions) (Jevons, 1975; Friedman and Friedman, 1990). 
In this framework, debt is also a result of rational actions; that is to say, it begins as the result of a 
voluntary performative act. When debt appears as part of an exchange, the market conditions 
determine its fate. If the debt comes from an institutional body, such as a banking system, the state 
acts as the guardian of that debt. Failure to pay back that debt will result in legal action. These are 
all accepted as common sense. “One has to pay her debt” is a commonly accepted moral expression 
of this market logic. This constitutes the link between citizenship and the market economy, which 
are both constituted by the state:  
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On one side is the logic of the market, where we like to imagine we all start out as 
individuals who don’t owe each other anything. On the other is the logic of the state, where 
we all begin with a debt we can never truly pay. We are constantly told that they are 
opposites and that between them they contain the only real human possibilities. But it’s a 
false dichotomy. States created markets. Markets require states. Neither could continue 
without the other, at least, in anything like the forms we could recognize today. (Graeber, 
2014: 71) 
The state is the founder of markets and the monetary system. It is also the guardian of these socio-
economic domains, and debt is the key foundational fact of these domains.  
The banking system, monetary system, and all financial market tools have been constructed 
through debt, in an economic and moral sense. The capitalist mode of production and its state 
structure have reorganized this debt mechanism in accordance with the necessities of its property 
relations. Debt exists to facilitate ownership, the wealth accumulation of capitalists, and the 
exploitation of labour power. Then, what is debt in the final analysis? “Debt is just an exchange 
that has not been brought to completion” (Ibid., 121). The neoliberal financial system is built upon 
this simple starting point. Indebtedness must continue—it should never be brought to 
completion—so that the moral obligation of citizens must continue as well. Financial markets in 
the 21st century operate through the creation of the debt loop. One of my interviewees told me that 
the creation of the debt loop is the main strategy of financial institutions: “Debt loop is the key 
strategy to maintain the dominance of finance. Debt loop can only be maintained by offering 
people new tools of indebtedness, and the housing market constitutes the greatest share of these 
tools” (Interviewee 10). 
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Debt then plays a foundational role in the reorganization of the social order. It defines the 
boundaries of citizenry; it reproduces political and social codes. In a moral sense, it functions as a 
disciplinary mechanism through the popular sentiment of duty. That is why in general, debt is 
accepted as a normalized fact of social order. If financialization refers to the reorganization of 
property relations, it takes place through the reproduction of debt by a new global financial 
architecture. The financialization of capital—which usually occurs through the securitization of 
derivatives and the shareholder value of companies in the market—and the new patterns of 
ownership exist hand in hand, in a matrix in which financiers want to articulate everyone into the 
debt loop. Financial debt towards asset ownership, and mainly towards homeownership, is the new 
defining point of citizenship.  
The construction of financial markets and the mechanism of individual responsibility, 
indebtedness for the sake of becoming a homeowner, and the moral obligation of being an asset 
owner are all accepted as common sense. In the meantime, we should keep in mind that the 
mainstream defenders of the market as the key regulator of society also assert that the rise of 
financial markets will be beneficial for everyone since everybody will be able to access the 
necessary financial tools to own assets. They even believe that growing indebtedness is due not to 
the current financial system, but rather to the failures of trusting the spontaneously functioning 
market. Through the necessary credit system, they believe that everyone will find a reasonable 
debt management option to enable asset ownership. Those who advocate a dependence on free 
market for credit systems, such as Niall Ferguson (2009), assert that one of the main reasons for 
poverty is the lack of necessary financial services. They claim that more finance will result in 
increased wealth and reduced poverty: 
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Poverty is not the result of rapacious financiers exploiting the poor. It has much more to 
do with the lack of financial institutions, with the absence of banks, not their presence. 
Only when borrowers have access to efficient credit networks can they escape from the 
clutches of loan sharks, and only when savers can deposit their money in reliable banks 
can it be channeled from the idle rich to the industrious poor. (Ferguson 2009, quoted from 
Graeber, 2014: 389)  
Hence, according to this neoclassical argument, the credit system and reliable banks are operating 
as a democratic “Robin Hood”-style mechanism that provides necessary funding to get rid of 
poverty. Poverty exists because some “bad guys” are corrupting the entire financial system.  
As Graeber responds: 
What is Ferguson really saying here? Poverty is caused by a lack of credit. It’s only if the 
industrious poor have access to loans from stable, respectable banks—rather than to loan 
sharks, or, presumably, credit card companies, or payday loan operations, which now 
charge loan-shark rates—that they can rise out of poverty. So actually, Ferguson is not 
really concerned with “poverty” at all, just with the poverty of some people, those who are 
industrious and thus do not deserve to be poor. What about the non-industrious poor? They 
can go to hell, presumably (quite literally, according to many branches of Christianity). Or 
maybe their boats will be lifted somewhat by the rising tide. Still, that’s clearly incidental. 
They’re undeserving, since they’re not industrious, and therefore what happens to them is 
really beside the point. (Graeber, 2014: 385) 
Hence, the mainstream economic approach to financialization argues that debt can be manageable. 
That is how debt management has also become a common-sense practice, so that everyone 
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becomes responsible with their own personal risks. This is also what Foucauldians claim, when 
they argue that financialization is performative action that accelerates through the improvement of 
debt management skills. Capitalism’s crisis management skills normalize the individualization of 
debt management as an embedded fact of life. Here, debt management refers to the management 
skills of capitalism; that is to say, in a Gramscian sense, hegemony always seeks a balance to 
perpetuate its existence, and we can call this balance-seeking a management skill of capitalist 
hegemony. Why does capitalism always seek a balance? The answer is an intrinsic fact of 
capitalism—that it constantly produces crisis. Crises are an intrinsic fact of capitalism, which 
according to Marx (1867) arise from the internal contradictions of capitalism. As Harvey (2019) 
points out, capitalism constantly produces crises; then it tries to find ways to manage those crises. 
It never solves crises, but it manages them by transforming property relations. Capitalism is also a 
social mode of crisis management, and this management skill operates through the creation of new 
equilibriums.  
Debt management is associated with the socio-political management skills of capitalist hegemony. 
Since the rise of neoliberal capitalism, the social provisions that provided necessary compensations 
for education, healthcare, cultural activities, pensions, and housing in order to facilitate the life of 
workers have become an open target of neoliberal transformation. Peck and Tickell (2002) explain 
the assault on social provisions, worker’s rights, unionization, and social welfare policies as the 
“roll-back” process of neoliberalization. This process is the brutal neoliberal hegemonic coercion 
described by Klein as “shock doctrine” (2007). Following the elimination of social opposition in 
many parts of the world, through either violent military coups and massive detention of opponents 
or social policy change, Peck and Tickell identify a new process called “roll-out neoliberalization.” 
Roll-out neoliberalization refers to the insertion and structuring of neoliberal institutions. 
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Institutions of current global capitalism, such as the World Bank, IMF, and Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), have been reshaped for the sake of global 
competition, and a set of international agreements has been implemented to provide for the 
deregulation of financial transactions. In addition to these processes, Roger Keil (2009) identifies 
a complementary process of “roll-with-it neoliberalization,” by which neoliberalization has 
become widely internalized by the subjects of global capitalism. He posits the emergence of a 
common-sense capitalism, in which people accept the ongoing dynamics of neoliberal hegemony 
as a priori.  
This common-sense capitalism entails the existence of an equilibrium, not only for the 
internalization of dynamics but also to make subjects an active part of this common sense. Debt 
has been reproduced to articulate people into the common sense of neoliberal hegemony. Susanne 
Soederberg (2013) argues that neoliberal hegemony reproduces a new code of debt through state 
policies that normalize debt as an embedded fact. However, this new citizenry code is not an 
innocent economic dynamic that leads to more income. Instead, it refers to the normalization of 
inequality: 
Wrapped in the technical and economistic cloak of the official discourse of debt, states are 
able to represent their policy choices in natural (inevitable) and neutral (classless) terms, 
thereby reproducing the apolitical coding of debt. The economic representation and 
treatment of debt is a social construct, whose role and reproduction must be interrogated 
and explained. This is particularly salient as this narrative also hinders our ability to 
recognize and grasp the continuity, contradictions and changing forms and meanings of 
debt within and between various national and global spaces. The prevalent economic 
narrative of debt…also acts to conceal underlying relations of power: that is, inequality in 
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all its forms, including gender, class, race and caste, exploitation, domination and 
resistance. (Soederberg, 2013: 537)  
Debt is a new social reconstruction that systematically reproduces socio-economic inequalities. In 
that sense, the socialization of debt is encouraged by neoliberal state strategies and the accessible 
existence of financial tools. Debt has become an ordinary dynamic of life, constituting the 
financialization of life under neoliberal hegemony. The financialization of life then becomes 
common sense, with a new creditor-debtor relationship that is predominantly associated with the 
discourse of asset ownership. As I referred to in the work of Graeber, debt to divine authority was 
appropriated by the state and reconfigured as debt to the state, society, or nation. What we are now 
witnessing in the 21st century is a new transition, from debt to society to debt to the global financial 
architecture. This transition does not mean the disappearance of the state in the regulation of 
financial markets; rather, it entails the increased interconnectedness of financial markets through 
intergovernmental agreements and global networks. It is again states (mainly the G-20 countries) 
that form and shape global financial mechanisms.  
As Lazzaratto (2015) argues, the current financial system is constructed on the fact that debt has 
increasingly become a blurred domain since the new form of financial markets eliminated the 
traditional credit-debtor relations. The securitization of derivatives and the financialization of 
capital that function to breed more fictitious capital engender a financial system in which one’s 
debt can be sold and bought by investors. Hence, one’s debt is now a financial instrument in the 
market. This means that when we agree to take risk to obtain credit from a financial institution, we 
inadvertently accept that we are in debt to the global financial system. That is why, according to 
financiers, “people have to be in debt” (Graeber, 2014: 380). Also, this debt must be maintained 
by several financial tools: first and second mortgages, credit cards, student loans, consumer credits, 
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and so-called entrepreneurial loans all aim to keep people in financial debt mechanisms. Neoliberal 
financial hegemony even categorizes citizens in accordance with their ability to manage their 
debts. Credit scoring and dividing society into percentiles based on their ability to pay debts are 
accepted as common sense by subordinated populations. Having a high credit score is perceived 
as a form of prestige among the members of neoliberal society. In fact, these are the different faces 
of hegemonic coercion. 
I thus identify financialization as a form of equilibrium-seeking by the neoliberal hegemony. The 
hegemonic relations of financialization have become common sense in neoliberal societies, not 
only in the sense that finance is everywhere and dominates through stock exchange, shareholder 
value, banking, and hedging, but also in the sense that it is now a societal phenomenon that is taken 
for granted thanks to state policies that prioritize the profit-making of certain financial corporations 
and elites. As a result, financialization has been widely normalized since the late 1990s, and it is 
now tied to the dream of asset ownership. This consent for ownership maintains financialization 
as the hegemonic force of neoliberalism. Thus, it is now popularly accepted that without having 
potential financial power, asset ownership will remain only a dream. In fact, there are also financial 
inclusion programs that provide financial tools for many people to own property. However, all of 
these practices increase the total indebtedness in a society, and the increasing debt creates various 
social problems related to inequality; hence, it poses a global risk to everyone. Once debt becomes 
a prevalent tool, it produces a debt loop.  
2.4. Conclusion 
This chapter identifies financialization with respect to property relations—meaning that 
financialization (in its neoliberal form) cannot be fully understood without deciphering its link to 
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existing property relations. What distinguishes neoliberal hegemony from the previous trajectories 
of the capitalist mode of existence is its increasing association with assetization. As Kean Birch 
(2015: 96) highlights: “[A]ssets provide an income; they are not just a commodity which can be 
exchanged for money from customers. Commodities are produced explicitly for market exchange.” 
The majority of commodities are subject to the demand and supply mechanisms of the market. 
That is to say, the value of a commodity may increase or decrease depending on market conditions. 
However, the value of assets is not directly determined by market conditions. While the demand 
for a product may decrease, the value of an asset may remain the same or even get more valuable. 
That is why commodification and assetization are not necessarily the same thing. However, this 
does not mean that they are not linked to one another; commodification and assetization work hand 
in hand, since assets can only exist with a market in which they can be bought and sold as 
commodities. In other words, assetization cannot happen without the commodification of life 
necessities (essentially, housing, health services, and other social provisions). Assets generate 
income (mainly in the form of rent) and a feeling of security. Assetization therefore remains the 
key object of agents in the market under neoliberal hegemony. 
Although I acknowledge the importance of the discourse of entrepreneurialism that has 
circumscribed the world for more than two decades, a new entrepreneurial spirit or a new 
rationality based on an enterprise society cannot solely explain the composition of capitalism in 
the 21st century. The emergence of a competitive society, the rise of human capital investment, 
and the rhetoric of creative work all exist in a hegemonic spectrum that is linked to new property 
relations. For this very reason, I argue that financialization refers to a new hegemonic technique 
of neoliberalism that aims to bind everyone into the rent-maximization of certain elites through 
new property relations. Assetization and financialization now co-exist, and finance capital aims to 
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appropriate the surplus value created by workers through the streams of assetization. This strategy 
of appropriation has reproduced the meaning of debt, and indebtedness to the financial mechanism 
has become the new normal and new rationality of the world.  
Within the framework of this assetization-finance-debt nexus, housing is now the most important 
asset that drives global financial flows. The next chapter will focus on the financialization of 
housing vis-à-vis the reproduction of indebtedness. The reorganization of the social order begins 
with the colonization of social space by financial markets. 
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Chapter 3: The Financialization of Housing: A New Hegemony Through the 
Transformation of Property Relations 
As I suggest in the first chapter, financialization refers to the reorganization of the social order 
around the notions of asset ownership and debt (whether it be moral or economic). Increasing asset 
ownership brings about a new citizenship that accepts indebtedness as a normalized mode of 
existence. Also, the neoliberal hegemony aims to make everyone indebted and keep them in the 
debt loop. As Manuel Aalbers (2017: 546) points out, there are three major approaches to 
explaining the meaning of financialization: financialization as a regime of accumulation, 
financialization as the rise of shareholder value, and financialization of daily life. I touched upon 
these approaches in Chapter 2. Financialization as a regime of accumulation encompasses a wide 
range of different perspectives, from Harvey’s accumulation by dispossession to Sassen’s high 
finance as a predatory formation. In any case, this approach indicates that financialization leads to 
a new strategy of capital accumulation based upon a new form of property relations. Approaches 
that conceptualize financialization as the rise of shareholder value examine the global impact of 
finance capital by following the money of multi-national corporations. Those that focus on the 
financialization of everyday life observe the impact of finance capital on the daily lives of people. 
This latter approach deals with the normalization of financialization, financialization as a new 
governmentality, and financialization as entrepreneurialism. These approaches have common and 
divergent points, but across all of them, housing plays a significant role. In this chapter, I discuss 
the literature on the financialization of housing, which has increased since the global financial 
crisis (GFC). I argue that the housing market is the primary target of financialization since housing 
constitutes the most crucial element for the reorganization of society through the transformation 




3.1. Situating housing in political economy  
It is necessary to explain the importance of housing for financialization. This necessity stems from 
the direct involvement of financial markets in housing markets. As Aalbers points out, “housing 
is a key object of financialization” (2017: 544). The question is, why is housing significant for 
financialization? Housing is important for financialization because it plays a crucial role in the 
reorganization of society. Since the hegemony of capitalism maintains itself by constantly 
transforming property relations, the transformation of ownership and the politico-economic 
structure that organizes the housing market and dwelling conditions inevitably instigate a new type 
of social order. In other words, financialization brings about a new social order that perpetuates 
the capitalist hegemony by transforming the housing market. 
Housing is not merely a shelter. It is a commodity that stands at the core of property relations. It 
is the product of real estate markets in capitalist economies. Housing has a use-value, a value that 
we attribute by using it, and an exchange-value, a market value that serves to create a stream of 
profit-making for certain people. However, housing has a crucial point that distinguishes it from 
other commodities. It is a fixed commodity that occupies land on earth, and for this very reason, 
its production is limited by several conditions based on land acquisition, judicial regulations, 
climate, and soil condition. Therefore, housing is inevitable subject to the demand and supply 
conditions of the market economy. Under market conditions the value of housing is always 
determined by its externalities such as its location, proximity to business areas and the quality 
infrastructure in the vicinity of its location and these externalities are the key factors that shape the 
demand and supply for housing. (Harris and Lehrer, 2018). Even though the materials used in the 
construction of a house has a considerable impact on its value, in principle the external socio-
economic and physical conditions have greater impact on the determination of value of a house.  
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The literature on the meaning of housing and the housing market is diverse, but the inception point 
that situates housing within discussions of political economy is widely accepted to be the writings 
of Engels. In The Housing Question (1872), Engels investigates the conditions of working-class 
housing during the heydays of 19th century industrial capitalism. This period of industrialization 
was of course linked to the mass dispossession of agricultural producers and artisans from their 
land and artisan works and the proletarianization of these crowds in the cities of England. Marx 
(1976: 875-6) explains this process using his concept of “primitive accumulation,” through which 
the commodification of labour power takes place under the so-called name of “free labour.” The 
crowded living conditions of the English working class in the major cities of the industrial 
revolution attracted the attention of Engels, leading him to examine the origins of those conditions 
under the capitalist mode of production. Engels writes that: “as long as the capitalist mode of 
production continues to exist, it is folly to hope for an isolated solution to the housing question or 
of any other social question affecting the fate of workers” (1872: 73). Therefore, as Madden and 
Marcuse (2016: 6) argue, the housing question, as Engels implies, is embedded within the 
structures of class society. One cannot adequately assess housing without considering the socio-
economic conditions of a society. In the capitalist mode of production, the main motivational force 
that shapes social relations is production and circulation of value in the cycle M … M’. Housing 
in capitalist society is thus generally perceived as a commodity that is reproduced, shaped, and 






3.1.1. Housing, between being a shelter and a commodity 
Housing is, first of all, a form of shelter that satisfies a social need. Everyone wants to acquire 
housing for a safe and comfortable life.10 In principle, housing ought to be considered a component 
of basic human rights since accommodation is a fundamental need of life. Madden and Marcuse 
accentuate the use-value of housing by drawing on a discourse of ontological security: 
[Housing] is a universal necessity of life, in some ways an extension of the human body. 
Without it, participation in most of social, political, and economic life is impossible. 
Housing is more than shelter; it can provide personal safety and ontological security…. 
The built form of housing has always been seen as a tangible, visual reflection of the 
organization of society. It reveals the existing class structure and power relationships…. 
More than any other item of consumption, housing structures the way that individuals 
interact with others, with communities, and with wider collectives. Where and how one 
lives decisively shapes the treatment one receives by the state and can facilitate relations 
with other citizens and with social movements. No other modern commodity is as 
important for organizing citizenship, work, identities, solidarities, and politics. (Madden 
and Marcuse, 2016: 12) 
 
10 The discussion of comfort may divert from housing’s quality of being a safe shelter. In principle, comfort is what 
everyone seeks in their lives, and it constitutes the principal motivation of consumption. Jan de Vries, in The 
Industrious Revolution (2008), examines the role of consumption in the economy, and he argues that one of the 
primary motivations that leads to consumption is comfort-seeking. There are indeed many motivating factors for 
consumption, but comfort-seeking is the leading one. Everyone seeks to enjoy a minimum level of comfort. One of 
the key reasons why households accede to borrowing mortgage credits is to meet their demand for comfortable 
shelter. This comfort-seeking is a significant feature of economic life since the manufacturing of consent for risk-
taking may also stem from the dream of living in comfort. 
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Therefore, there are two sides of housing: on the one hand, it is a need, a universal necessity and 
social and ontological security-provider; on the other hand, it is a politico-economic commodity 
that constantly reproduces the social relations in society. In the capitalist mode of production, it 
serves to reproduce the social relations intrinsic to class society. In a similar vein, Aalbers (2014) 
also points out that “housing is central to the matter of social reproduction, and not only insofar as 
the domestic sphere is where much of the work of social reproduction occurs. The—literally—
vital imperative of housing to social reproduction helps explain, in large part, the persistence and 
power of the discourse of a “right” to housing, as opposed, pointedly, to the “right to buy and sell 
it.” In the capitalist mode of production, housing plays a key role in the continuation and 
reproduction of social relation—not only for the reproduction of economic accumulation and the 
inequalities linked to it, but also for the reproduction and reconfiguration of all kind of social 
relations and inequalities, such as gender inequality, ethnic conflict, uneven accessibility to social 
provisions, and spatial inequalities. 
If we accept that housing plays a key role in the reorganization of society, we need to analyze this 
role. This role may be understood within the framework of Lefebvre’s theory on the production of 
space. Lefebvre’s examination of the production of space focuses on the hegemonic relations that 
produce and reproduce space. According to Lefebvre, the production of space cannot be evaluated 
without an understanding of the dialectical socio-economic relations in a society. The capitalist 
hegemony is the hegemony of one class (Lefebvre, 1991: 10), and according to Stefan Kipfer 
(2008), Lefebvre aims to construct a theory of urbanization based on this problematic of 
hegemony: “In Lefebvre, Gramsci’s problematic of hegemony thus becomes explicitly urbanized” 
(Kipfer, 2008: 198). Lefebvre argues that capitalist hegemony aims to insert the bourgeois culture 
(the roots of which are immersed in commodification) into everyday life. As Kipfer explains, this 
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means that capitalist hegemony constantly shapes everyday life in order to diffuse the bourgeois 
culture: “Everyday life is central to the production of capitalism insofar as it is saturated by the 
routinized, repetitive, familiar daily practices that make up the everyday in all spheres of life” 
(Ibid., 199). Lefebvre does not believe that hegemony refers to a one-dimensional standardization 
of society; rather, the problematic of hegemony encompasses differences, confrontations, 
dialectical processes, and consensus. In other words, the hegemonic transformation of everyday 
life occurs through the equilibrium-seeking of capitalist hegemony. Common sense does not refer 
to the passivity of people; instead, it involves a dynamic relationship of coercion and consent 
manufacturing. 
Lefebvre argues that the produced social space is the one in which we live with many different 
dimensions of life. He explains social space using his concept of the perceived-conceived-lived 
space triad (1991: 40). “Perceived space” refers to the spatial aspect of space. For Lefebvre, this 
space is society's space (Ibid., 38); it is the space where all social relations, in the sense of 
experiencing the public domain, exist. It is a dialectical space that we experience; thus, different 
actors and processes from all walks of life produce the material conditions of social space. 
“Conceived space” is tied to the representation of space. For Lefebvre, this space is conceptualized 
space; it is the space of planners, urbanists, sub-dividers, and social engineers (Ibid., 38–9). This 
space is linked to the procedures of governmental practices and regulations. It is the dominant 
space that we experience. “Lived space” is the affective-symbolic space (Kipfer, 2008: 200).  
The dominant form of space under capitalism is abstract space (Ibid., 200). Capitalist hegemony 
aims to produce space as an abstract entity, i.e., as a commodity. Lefebvre uses the concept of 
abstract space to refer to Marx's theory of capitalism since Marx argues that capitalism work by 
abstracting and alienating labour power to produce commodities with exchange-value. It is 
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possible to say that abstraction is intrinsic to the capitalist mode of production. Lefebvre accepts 
that the capitalist mode of production transforms social space into the abstract space of exchange-
value, and this mode of production has its own socio-spatial configuration. Abstract space is a 
general term he uses to identify this spatial aspect of the capitalist mode of production. He states: 
Capitalism and neocapitalism have produced abstract space, which includes the ‘world of 
commodities,’ its ‘logic’ and its worldwide strategies, as well as the power of money and 
that of the political state. This space is founded on the vast network of banks, business 
centres and major productive entities, as also on motorways, airports and information 
lattices. Within this space the town—once the forcing house of accumulation, fountainhead 
of wealth and centre of historical space—has disintegrated. (1991: 53) 
This shows that Lefebvre uses the term “abstract space” to explain the spaces produced by 
capitalist hegemony. Abstract space is constituted to facilitate the circulation of necessary flows 
of capital and commodities. The production of space, then, is a hegemonic process in which the 
dialectical conflict between the production of abstract space and social space constitutes the 
essence of everydayness. This dialectical process includes various actors, as well as the consensus 
and confrontation that emerges between these actors. Therefore, the production of abstract space 
(as the abstraction of labour in CMP) depends on the class conflict between the hegemonic bloc 
and subordinated classes. However, this class conflict ends up with the consensus of these classes 
under a hegemonic rule. As Kipfer puts forward: “abstract space is hegemonic to the degree that 
it envelops and incorporates the daily aspirations, desires, and dreams of subaltern populations” 
(2008: 200). In other words, capitalist hegemony produces abstract space in a way that diminishes 
class conflict by manufacturing the consent of subordinated populations.  
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The production of abstract space includes various actors, including the state, planners, developers, 
and real estate people, as well as citizens. Space is always associated with the creation of new 
fictitious commodities, as well as capital. In this schema, space could be described as an instrument 
of power functioning with hierarchization. The hierarchization of space is linked to the socio-
economic conditions of the people who are included in or excluded from capitalist society. 
Therefore, space is political, and it is the object of political and social processes, decisions, and 
abstractions (Lefebvre 2009: 170). Neither abstract nor social space is homogenous; rather, they 
specify various sets of relations: “In social space, heterogeneity is characterized by coexistence 
and simultaneity, in abstract space by hierarchies and fragmentation” (Aalbers, 2011: 41). The 
production of abstract space is thereby made possible with new relations of hierarchy, social 
relations as well as social distinction. The construction sector (including real estate investment 
trusts, developers, and planners) operates through a mentality of producing hierarchization. This 
means that the entire construction sector brings about a social product (Smith, 1996: 62). The 
social production and reproduction of abstract space is an indispensable element of capitalist 
advancement. 
Housing plays a crucial role in the production of abstract space. Housing is a social space where 
the dreams and necessities of people meet. As R. Ronald (2008) indicates, housing as home and 
housing as commodity are different categories, but they co-exist together in a social context: 
Indeed, ‘home’ is the centre of individual and family life and forms a spatial domestic ideal. 
Homes provide a refuge from the world, a place of personal investment and play, and the 
backstage of personal life…. The commodification of housing and its circulation in a 
market means that wealth can be accumulated, stored and transferred between individuals 
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and across generations. Houses can thus also constitute assets and investments. They are 
normally the biggest or only investment a household has. (Ronald, 2008: 11)  
As the biggest investment of most households, housing is a key of object of capitalist hegemony. 
Capitalist hegemony aims to extinguish the social space dimension of home and attempts to 
convert it into an abstract space where the necessities of the hegemonic bloc are routinized and 
become everyday practices of life. That is why housing is significant for capitalist hegemony. 
Housing constitutes the most crucial part of the production of space, as it facilitates the 
reorganization and reproduction of everydayness. As a key property of capitalist society, housing 
is an indispensable element of the politico-economic sphere. The housing market is important for 
producing and reproducing everydayness. It is also important for forging a class alliance among 
capitalist groups since housing constitutes an important sector. The state plays the most significant 
role in the construction of the housing market, and currently in many developing and advanced 
economies, the housing market is seen as a stimulus of economic growth as well.  
The production of housing as an abstract space thus represents an abiding strategy of the capitalist 
hegemony for providing jobs, transforming everyday life, and garnering more capital. As Aalbers 
and Brett Christophers point out: “Housing construction and development is an important sector 
in narrow economic terms, whether measured in terms of added labour-value and number of jobs 
created or in terms of contribution to the GDP” (2014: 4). However, this narrative of economic 
growth does not mean that people from all walks of life benefit from the economic growth based 
on the advancement of residential real estate market. In fact, the housing sector operates with an 
incentive of accumulating capital only for the hegemonic classes. Different types of land regimes, 
homeownership mobilizations, use of financial tools for the production of space, planning of space 
in accordance with the existent capitalist relations, and hierarchization of space are all outcomes 
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of political processes. In a similar vein, homeownership is entirely connected to the processes of 
political, social, economic, and spatial (re)production of space. This interconnectedness makes 
homeownership subject to the state politics of juxtaposing and producing space. As Lefebvre 
argues:  
Space has become for the state a political instrument of primary importance. The state uses 
space in such a way that it ensures its control of places, its strict hierarchy, the homogeneity 
of the whole, and the segregation of the parts. It is thus an administratively controlled and 
even a policed space. The hierarchy of spaces corresponds to that of social classes, and if 
there are ghettos for all classes, those of the working class are merely more isolated than 
those of the others. (2009b: 188) 
This analysis draws attention to how the state problematizes space to provide a system of 
capitalistic social distinctions related to the production of space. This type of social distinction is 
not only an object of urban planning and bureaucracy, but also a subject of concern for the 
construction sector, real estate sector, and all other sectors that provide the means and materials 
for the production of houses. At the same time, it is also a matter of economic concern as it relates 
to the use of public sources, privatization, and financialization. Lefebvre also asserts that: 
The critical analysis of the production of space acquires a practical interest, implying the 
study and the role of (private and public) construction as a decreasingly subsidiary branch 
of industry—the understanding of “responsible” institutions and the relations between 
“agents.” The role of construction, of “real estate,” as we call it, is no longer limited to an 
economic function; it goes as far as the elaboration of a space that removes from all (its 
users) the control of their everyday lives, redistributing the workforce according to the 
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(changing) demands of neo-capitalist production, treating labour force as a “reserve” of 
energy, a flow of objects. (2009c: 203) 
Space is transformed into a capitalist commodity, as well as a political tool for imposing 
hierarchical control on everyday life. Housing is then perceived as an abstract space by the ruling 
classes of capitalist hegemony, and this hegemony advances by creating hierarchization, social 
distinctions, and spatial segregation. In the final analysis, it is possible to say that housing is an 
indispensable feature of the relationship between the economic realm and social domain 
(particularly as it relates to welfare systems, which I will discuss further in Chapter 4. On the one 
hand, capitalism aims to transform housing into a pure market commodity; on the other hand, many 
people in the world want to acquire a house to own a shelter. However, as I explained in the 
previous chapter, a new type of property ownership reflects a new type of social configuration and 
equilibrium. This brings us to what we call the financialization of housing.  
3.2. Defining the financialization of housing 
Before defining the financialization of housing and the housing market in light of the production 
of abstract space and the reorganization of social order, it is necessary to look at the existing 
literature that explores financialization through variegated lenses. The literature on the 
financialization of the housing market incorporates a plethora of different perspectives, but all of 
them in one way or another deal with the question of increasing indebtedness. Financialization 
refers to a new type of hegemony that redefines the creditor-debtor relationship and reorganizes 
society based on debt management – and it is the financialization of the housing market that brings 
about the core factor that engenders this social reconfiguration through new property relations. I 
would like to classify the literature on the financialization of the housing market into four key 
categories. These categories designate different approaches to explicating the financialization of 
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housing. There is a tendency to cover the financialization of housing as a phenomenon of the 
Global North; however, there is also a growing body of literature on the financialization of the 
housing market in the Global South. Studies in Brazil, China, and Turkey, in particular, cover 
variegated perspectives on the link between property relations and financialization.  
Different approaches to the 
financialization of the housing 
market 
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Table 2. Various Critical Approaches to the Financialization of Housing 
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All of these approaches to conceptualizing the financialization of housing have significant points 
in common, as well as points of divergence. Crucially, all of these approaches recognize that the 
increasing indebtedness of households has a great impact on the new finance-housing nexus. The 
link between increasing indebtedness and housing constitutes the core of the current 
financialization process, and that is why it is possible to say, with reference to Aalbers (2011), that 
housing is the key object of financialization. The financialization of housing is not an agentless 
process; rather, it entails various actors, including financial institutions, global investors, planners, 
real estate corporations (together with construction companies and developers), states, and 
households. Housing then appears as the key object for articulating subaltern populations into debt 
mechanisms.  
The neoliberal hegemony has constructed a new type of property relations grounded in a new 
perception of profit-making. The entrepreneurial discourses and competitive aspect of neoliberal 
society stem from this new perception. It comprises the transformation of conventional value 
creation into the extraction of rent. Rent rather than industrial surplus value production has 
predominantly become the ordinary business of capitalism in the 21st century. As Kean Birch 
(2019: 4) puts forward, contemporary capitalism operates through the reconfiguration of 
ownership patterns. This reconfiguration derives from the fact that rentiership is commonly 
grounded as a common sense. Birch says:  
The configuration of ownership is an example of rentiership or the capture of economic 
rents. Generally economic rents are the value that can be extracted from economic 
activity—broadly conceived—as the result of ownership and control of a particular 
resource (or asset), primarily because of that resource’s inherent or constructed 
productivity, scarcity, or quality. (Ibid., 4)  
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Therefore, the reorganization of social order through financialization goes hand in hand with the 
reorganization of ownership patterns; ownership (or assetization) has become a source of 
rentiership through which the asset-owner may seek more extractive rent and politico-social 
prestige.  In the meantime, rentiership through ownership may become an investment strategy of 
households or a dream of middle-class patrimony, as housing constitutes the biggest investment 
of households. Many classical economists have examined the problem of rent and criticized it as 
a malady of the market economy. David Ricardo and Thomas Robert Malthus conceptualize rent 
theory as a malady of the market economy. In their time, rent was broadly associated with the 
ownership of land, and from their perspective, land-rent poses an obstacle to maintaining the 
market in a proper order. John Maynard Keynes, in a similar vein, criticizes rentiers. He asserts 
that rentiers must destroy themselves, if they really want a well-functioning market (Keynes 2007). 
By the 20th century, rent had already acquired a new meaning associated with inherited wealth, 
financial asset ownership, and ownership of several houses. However, as Birch (2019) asserts, 
what we have witnessed in the last three decades is the rise of all kinds of assetization and 
ownership as a new type of rentiership based on the extractive and innovative aspects of capitalism. 
This configuration of ownership patterns and assetization leads to the concentration of assets in 
the hands of a few corporations.  
Rent-seeking plays the most significant role in the process of assetization. Rent-seeking refers to 
a special privilege-seeking by corporations or those who own the monopoly of resources and 
scarce assets. It is an outcome of political processes that facilitate speculation through ownership, 
particularly for people close to the political authorities. It encapsulates a hegemonic privileged 
status, wherein the injury to others is greater than the gain to those who obtain rents (Haila, 2015: 
55). In other words, rent-seeking refers to crony capitalism or the ultimate monopoly-seeking of 
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hegemonic classes striving to maintain their hegemony. It takes place not only through land-rent 
but also through the privatization of scientific knowledge, patents, and the pharma industry: 
“Plutocratic corporations are patent hoovers, buying thousands of patents. It is a winner-takes-all 
market created by the regulatory apparatus, not market forces” (Standing, 2016, from Birch, 2019: 
5). Hence, financialization has a regulative impact on market forces for the sake of the 
establishment of new rentiership. Rent extraction, then, constitutes the ground for financialization 
to reorganize the social order.  
In light of this explanation of the changing phase of ownership patterns, it is now possible to claim 
that the financialization of housing entails the shaping and reshaping of capitalist society by the 
dynamics of new ownership patterns—and that housing is now the key asset used to carry out this 
transformation. The extractive facet of financialization leads people to indebtedness, which refers 
to the extraction of economic rent from the future labour of subordinated populations. In a similar 
vein, Hardt and Negri argue that: “capitalist accumulation today is increasingly external to the 
production process, such that exploitation takes the form of expropriation of the common” (2011: 
137). By “common,” they mean all of the material wealth that human societies have, including 
products, materials, fixed assets, and any kind of thing that we produce by changing nature. 
In fact, there is one more contentious point that needs to be put on the table. If the financialization 
of housing is the key object of the neoliberal financial hegemony, how does it pull in subordinated 
populations? As I mentioned, the hegemonic bloc operates through rent-seeking, and by 
constituting an economic domain that extracts the natural resources, technological innovations, 
and future labour of people. The financialization of the housing market encapsulates all of these 
three aspects of extraction. It involves the extraction of natural resources since building massive 
housing projects requires several resources; it involves the extraction of technological innovations 
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since the financialization of housing goes hand in hand with the development of new financial 
technologies; and it involves the extraction of the future labour of people since housing has become 
the key investment of households—and this investment takes place through mortgage debt. As I 
said in Chapter 2, with reference to Graeber, debt is an incomplete exchange that one has to 
complete in one way or another. However, the financial system (through its new innovations) aims 
to extract more economic rent from the future labour of people; that is why this debt is always 
reconstructed through new financial tools. The rent-seeking of the hegemonic bloc stems from this 
innovative composition of finance capital. In the meantime, its hegemony over the production of 
space is a dialectical process, and the common sense to create an indebted society is brought about 
through three strategies: normalization of rent-maximization, promotion of homeownership, and 
exclusion of the poor.  
The rent-seeking of the hegemonic bloc forges rent-maximization as a common sense. When rent 
extraction becomes the normalized way of advancing in capitalism, it inevitably circumscribes 
everyday life. Rent-maximization is the use of properties to acquire the highest possible rent 
(Haila, 2015: 58). It is the way through which individuals articulates themselves into the 
normalization of rent extraction. The housing market, in that sense, provides the necessary 
conditions to form a financial hegemony over society. This hegemony reorganizes everydayness 
through mortgage debt, homeownership dreams, and the struggle to obtain proper shelter. The 
financialization of housing is a process through which the dialectical struggle to reconfigure 
everydayness and ecological conditions takes place. In that sense, this process entails the 
increasing indebtedness of households, and this crescendo of household debt operates within new 
creditor-debtor relations. A variety of key strategies and innovations are used to financialize the 
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housing market, including: asset-based securitization, predatory lending, direct governmental 
strategies to financialize housing, and massive suburbanization. 
3.3. Mortgage-based securitization: How does it work? 
The most well-known strategy to financialize housing is mortgage-based securitization (MBS) (or 
asset-based securitization), which curtails the classical creditor-debtor relationship. Mortgage 
markets used to be very strict and conservative until the 1970s, as governmental housing policies 
historically aimed to provide necessary shelter for everyone—or at least help disadvantaged 
communities through the provision of social housing. At the very least, this was the case in many 
parts of the world. However, beginning in the 1970s, a neoliberal urban policy shift and the 
deindustrialization process brought about a new rationality to produce and reshape urban space. 
This new rationality prioritizes the profit-seeking of financial corporations and real estate 
investment trusts (REITs) through a set of privatization strategies and mortgage deregulation.  
Securitization is a technique invented in the 1970s, which aims to convert fixed assets into liquid 
assets (Gotham, 2012; Immergluck, 2009, Soederberg, 2014; before then, securitization only 
happened between financial paper investments). Securitization subsequently became a widespread 
practice, particularly in the 1990s. It serves to provide the necessary financial liquidity for further 
financial asset accumulation. This expansion of liquidity involves “making traditionally immobile 
contracts, such as mortgages, liquid or mobile and tradable. With mortgages securitized they could 
be traded, leading to the disappearance of the original creditor-debtor relationship” (Bello, 2019: 





companies and trusts that were formerly known just as investment funds (e.g., Goldman Sachs, 
AIG), or REITs, now act as creditors and players in the “gamble” of securitization swaps and 
transactions—now called shadow banking. This dimension of financialization encompasses 
several technical terms from the provinces of banking, investment funds, and financiers.   
Securitization has two main components that enable illiquid assets to circulate as liquid assets. On 
the one hand, it is associated with creative bookkeeping and corporate sophistication. On the other 
hand, it is about leveraging the risk of financial institutions through the investment strategies of 
big funds. Suppose that Company X (bank, government agency, low- or high-risk broker, REIT) 
is a mortgage lender. Company X has capital that is worth $500 million, and it wants to distribute 
that capital in the form of mortgage loans. It sells 500 credits, with each credit priced at $1 million, 
with an interest rate of 5 percent and a loan period of 10 years. If none of the borrowers defaults 
on their loans, all 500 of them will generate a volume of $300 million over 10 years. Company X, 
however, can expect there to be some failure in loan repayment, or it may want to issue additional 
mortgage loans without waiting for 10 years to pass. Since it has already exhausted its huge fund 
of $500 million, it wants to decentralize the risk of its assets and create a new volume of capital to 







Figure 2. The circulation of financial money during the securitization of mortgage credits 
In this case, Company X conducts creative bookkeeping: it founds a new company in its body, 
which is usually called a bankruptcy remote company (BRC). In this example, I will refer to this 
new company as BRC X. Being bankruptcy remote, BRC X has now a special legal status that 
ensures its failure will not have an impact on the corporate body of Company X. In a process that 
is called mortgage pooling, Company X passes its mortgage assets to BRC X in the form of future 
securities and papers. The mortgages in this pool become the originates of BRC X, which converts 
them into special investment vehicles. BRC X then issues the papers for those securities to big 
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long term, but lending with higher risk and a shorter term) to increase its profit. Investment funds, 
mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds, and other banks buy the papers issued by BRC X.  
This process is called the securitization of credit. Mortgage-based loans become an investment 
tool of big funds, and through this financial innovation, the lender securitizes its mortgage loans 
with creative bookkeeping. Through this process, BRC X collects some $500 million-plus in 
financial profit. BRC X shifts that money back to Company X, which begins to lend mortgage 
credits again. If Company X conducts this procedure four times in a given period, it will generate 
a volume of $2 billion-plus in financial profit12. This process changes the traditional meaning of 
credit-debtor relations. People who pay their mortgage debts may think that they are paying their 
financial institutions; however, their money may actually end up in the hands of big investment 
funds as a result of securitization. The system then is composed of a very complicated network, 
which increases the risk for everyone involved since any failure of any major actor creates a 
domino effect. Moreover, as Sassen (2012) notes, all of these operations take place on a digital 
platform, where these papers may pass from one hand to another in just a few seconds.  
This financial innovation provides necessary mortgage funds to maintain demand for the real estate 
sector. The process illustrates a very sophisticated interwoven network, which draws links between 
housing as a social necessity and the different actors of the financial system. Thanks to the 
complexity of this system, housing becomes the most important global asset, and housing prices 
do not drop in most cities. Indeed, the devaluation of housing would signal a crisis. To support this 
 
12 This part has inspired from Peter Linneman’s (see in the references) explanation of securitization. 
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process of financial money-making, housing prices must continue to increase with considerable 
haste. That is to say, affordability is no longer a concern for this network. 
3.4. The financialization of housing through predatory lending 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Piketty and his followers aim to define the contemporary form of 
capitalism as a patrimonial phenomenon based on asset-ownership (mainly real estate). However, 
they disregard three points in their analysis:  
1) Their definition of middle and lower classes is not sufficient to class formation in a society. Not 
all members of the middles classes ultimately own a house,; i.e., in certain countries and cities, the 
number of rental housing units exceed the ownership rate. Also, Piketty and followers’ analysis 
depicts no place for or dream of ownership among the lower classes. Thus, their analysis does not 
account for the conditions of people in global slums (Davis, 2005). Nor does it cover swings in the 
patterns of ownership in different countries, even though Piketty claims that his formulation of 
patrimonial capital is a universal fact. Although I acknowledge the importance of his analysis as a 
cutting-edge approach to explain the ongoing course of capitalism, it overlooks the ownership 
patterns in many parts of the world.  
2) Piketty and his followers do not really delve into the details of how financialization plays a 
crucial role in widening income and wealth inequality. They mention that financialization fosters 
social problems and income disparities, but they do not explain this in detail. In fact, they position 
financialization as an upper- and middle-class issue that has nothing to do with the lower classes 
of society. They thus overlook the practices and literature on financial inclusion and micro-finance 
institutions. Financial inclusion is a new financial invention for articulating the urban poor into 
financial mechanisms by offering them a dream of ownership. Secondary mortgage lenders and 
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micro-finance institutions operate with a motive of drawing the lower classes and immigrants into 
financial debt mechanisms.  
3) They also overlook the fact that housing is not only a form of patrimonial capital, but is also an 
asset for financial institutions, as I explain above through the case of securitization. The asset-
ownership dream of households is actually the subject of investment by big funds. Hence, Piketty 
and followers offer no comment on the changing form of creditor-debtor relations that, rather than 
patrimony, constitute the core of current financialization.  
It is important to emphasize that financial inclusion operates as a key ingredient in the 
financialization of the housing market. Martin Sokol (2013) identifies financial inclusion as 
“exploitative inclusion” because it aims to grab the highest potential share of the worker’s salary. 
This inclusionary (also exclusionary) strategy inevitably leads to the rise of predatory lending. 
Deregulation in mortgage markets has also engendered several financial innovations, including 
predatory lending; as a result, competition has been introduced into mortgage markets that were 
previously tightly controlled (Madden and Marcuse, 2016: 28). For example, NINA (“no income, 
no assets”) loans and NINJA (“no income, no job, no assets”) loans have both been introduced 
into mortgage markets as financial innovations (Ibid., 28–9). Predatory lending has become a 
widespread practice in neighbourhoods where people are not able to qualify for mortgage credit 
from regulatory markets. This predatory lending is commonly encountered under the banner 
“subprime loans,” which scholars have scrutinized as a key driver of the financial crisis of 2007–
2009 (Aalbers, 2012; Dymski, 2012). According to Aalbers (2012: 5), the issue is not only the 
spread of subprime loans but also where that predatory lending leads us: subprime cities. Aalbers 
defines emerging subprime cites as: “cities modeled by the flow of capital in and out of 
neighborhoods” (2012: 6). He explains: “This dynamic of making profits on the production and 
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indeed reproduction (or revitalization or gentrification) of the built environment has resulted in 
suboptimal or subprime cities” (2012: 6). The key driver of this problem is unequal access to 
conventional financial services. 
According to Aalbers, there are four main reasons for the rise of predatory lending in the domain 
of homeownership. Firstly, the current financial system operates through a strategy of redlining, 
which excludes many people based on their economic, social, ethnic, and racial profile. Redlining 
is an exclusionary strategy that aims to create a social scale by which financial services are 
distributed or restricted. It refers to the racialization of space, particularly in economies where it is 
getting harder than ever before to access the housing market. These exclusionary strategies lead to 
the emergence of “secondary” financial tools that allegedly facilitate access to financial systems—
i.e., predatory or subprime loans. Aalbers (2012) writes that: 
Decades of financial deregulation have not resulted in wider access to mainstream financial 
services, but in a two-tier banking system with mainstream finance in most places next to 
a landscape of financial exclusion and predatory lending where banking services and the 
number of banking accounts have declined while fringe banking (pawn, shops, lenders, 
etc.) and predatory lending flourish…. The old geography of place-based financial 
exclusion (redlining) has not disappeared, but has been replaced—and to a large extend 
reproduced—by a new geography of predatory lending and overinclusion…. Subprime 
lenders exploit uneven development that resulted from these earlier rounds of urban 
exclusion. (Ibid., 6) 
The second reason for subprime lending is tied to urban-based class exclusion. Subprime lending 
leads to an urban crisis, and at the root of this crisis there exists what Aalbers calls “the real 
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estate/financial complex (akin to military/industrial complex) that fuelled both (sub-) urbanization 
and financialization” (Ibid., 7). The growth machine (Logan and Molotch, 1987) works with an 
upgraded regime of accumulation, which turns urban life into a domain of rent extraction. The 
extractive motive of the real estate/financial complex (which I will go into in greater detail in the 
next chapter) thus transforms cities into subprime geographies.  
The third key driver of subprime lending is the housing bubble—the sum of REIT construction 
strategies, pricing strategies, and peoples’ dreams and motivations to become homeowners. These 
different strategies lead to more construction projects; the proliferation of more construction 
projects produces a pressure on existing housing prices. As a result, housing prices never go down, 
and people inevitably need financial tools to buy a house.  
Finally, there is the securitization process, which I explained in the previous section. Aalbers 
specifically refers to the literature on global cities (Sassen, 2001, 2004, Langley, 2007) and asserts 
that such financial command centres produce financial innovations related to securitization and 
the send those techniques out to the rest of the world. Wall Street and many other global financial 
districts operate for this very reason. 
These are the key reasons that account for the growth of predatory lending in the financialization 
of housing. This predatory lending was the key ingredient of the financial crisis of 2007–2009. 
Now it is also leading to subprime urbanization.  
3.5. The financialization of the housing market as a governmental strategy 
In many analyses, the financialization of the housing market is also evaluated as a governmental 
strategy. This analytic approach, of course, deals with the role of the state and state institutions in 
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the regulation of mortgage markets and housing markets. There are three key areas of focus related 
to the role of the state in coordinating and managing (or benefiting from) the financialization of 
the housing market: 1) the use of the housing market by American politicians to instigate a global 
leverage system to perpetuate the financial hegemony of the United States (US); 2) the 
developmentalist strategies employed by countries in the Global South to catch up to the West; 
and 3) a new version of growth machine theory—a new coalition in which finance capital plays 
the most significant role.  
3.5.1. The financialization of the housing market as a US strategy 
In his historical analysis of American partisan politics and their links to the discourses of 
homeownership and housing market exaltation, Herman Schwartz (2012) develops the argument 
that the financialization of the housing market serves as a tool for the American state to maintain 
its hegemony on the global stage. According to Schwartz, the American state maintains its 
hegemony through a chain of globalized leveraging created out of the securitization of the housing 
market. In other words: “the US state supported a global leveraging up of the US economy in 
which the US borrowed short term at low interest rates from the rest of the world, while investing 
back into the world on a long-term high-return basis” (Schwartz, 2012: 54). Thus, the American 
state decided to use financial leveraging as a global financial network, in which each step of the 
leveraging process has become globally tied to others. To achieve this, the American state has used 
the securities produced out of American homebuyers’ mortgage loans. The Asset-based securities 
Asset-based securities (ABS) produced in the US mortgage market has become a global leveraging 
product that draws the whole world into the gears of financial mechanisms. This process, on the 
one hand, has improved the global power of the US economy—a hegemony explained by Leo 
Panitch and Sam Gindin in their book The Making of Global Capitalism (2012). On the other hand, 
95 
 
it has tied most of the global financial system into the fates of American debt payers. The idea 
behind this strategy is to construct a housing-led economic boost, supported by the American 
governmental mortgage institution, the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”). 
The purpose is to reassert American global hegemony by injecting mortgage securities into global 
financial markets. Housing has been chosen as the key element for this hegemony; it is easy to 
convince potential homebuyers to go for mortgages, so these mortgages can find a place in the 
global market through securitization. It is once again the promotion of assetization that plays the 
key role in this strategy. 
3.5.2. The financialization of the housing market as a developmentalist strategy 
The financialization of the housing market is also used as a developmentalist governmental 
strategy, in order to articulate a country’s national economy into global financial markets. This 
strategy involves attracting foreign direct investments. Housing plays a crucial role in this 
developmentalism because it can provide a temporal economic boost by producing and 
reproducing the urban space.  
In global discourse, developmentalism is used as an agenda of global capitalism to foster the 
economic conditions of developing countries. It is an agenda supported by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC). This strategy of global developmentalism is often associated with the 
structural reform discourse that came out of the Washington Consensus13. Here, the idea is to 
 
13 Washington Consensus is term invented by John Williamson (1990), and it mainly refers to the expansion of 
Washington D.C. based institutions (e.g. IMF and World Bank) onto to the global economy to promote the so-called 
good governance in order to boost the articulation of late comer economies into the world economy. The term is 
often associated with globalization and neoliberalism. 
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provide so-called sustainable economic growth and reduce poverty. However, as Henry Veltmeyer 
and Raúl Delgado Wise (2018: 42–3) point out, neoliberal developmentalism encompasses the 
strategies of “inclusive development” and natural resource extraction. “Inclusive development” 
entails the well-known rhetoric of neoliberal hegemony, social policy to eliminate poverty, 
investment in human capital, and structural adjustments towards good governance. These 
neoliberal strategies have never actually worked for the purpose of eliminating poverty; instead, 
they have primarily fostered the extraction of natural resources (Ibid., 43). One of the key strategies 
to articulate the developing world into the global economy is to use their natural resources as a 
leverage point, so that necessary capital for the establishment of good governance may in theory 
be shifted to these countries. In fact, what results in reality is the destruction of ecological balances, 
the dependency of developing countries on foreign direct investments, and the detrimental effects 
of the extractive nature of financialization that destroys the resources of the world.  
Institutional economists strongly advocate this governance model. Scholars such as Daron 
Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) argue that the failure of nations in the economic domain 
stems from the lack of inclusive institutions that operate with autonomy. While Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2019) claim that the extractive economic model leads to poverty, they argue that it does 
so because it is not supported by a well-functioning institutional framework and financial markets. 
In fact, in their early writings, they even defend the colonization of new lands through the British 
settler model (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001). According to Acemoglu, Robinson, and 
Simon Johnson (2001), British colonization was successful in founding inclusive institutions and 
financial markets, which enabled the creation of prosperity in countries such as Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, and the United States. They argue that if colonization is supported by a strong 
institutional framework, it can lead to prosperity. They even cite neoliberal guru Friedrich Hayek 
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(1960) and agree with his assertion of the superiority of British common law: “Friedrich A. Von 
Hayek (1960) argued that the British common law tradition was superior to the French civil law, 
which was developed during the Napoleonic era to restrain judges’ interference with state politics” 
(Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001: 1372). They assert that thanks to this British common 
law, former British colonies have better property rights and financial markets (Ibid., 1373). 
Therefore, for these scholars, property rights and the institutionalization of the economy around 
the protection of property rights and financial markets are the primary elements for eliminating 
poverty. They claim that poverty exists due to a lack of strong institutions. In their defense of 
British-style colonialism, they do not offer any fundamental objection to extractive economies; 
they simply assert that the extractive economy must be formulated in a way to protect property 
rights and to prevent rent-seeking. This optimistic sentiment, which suggests that inclusive 
institutions will protect people from the damages of extraction, advertently praises the colonization 
of lands. In other words, the colonization of new lands must be supported as long as it establishes 
a good governance model.  
Institutional economists suggest that at a global scale, there needs to be good governance to reduce 
poverty through the establishment of properly functioning institutions that protect property rights 
and financial markets. Thus, the colonial model has morphed into a global governance model, in 
which global institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF play a crucial role. In principle, 
developing countries open their resources to global extraction, and as long as this process is 
supported by strong institutions, there will be no poverty. Many governments in developing 
countries have embraced this mentality and worked closely with global institutions. However, the 
result has been the increasing indebtedness of these countries together with massive construction 
and extraction projects that are tied to global financial markets. Developmentalism in many 
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countries has turned into crony capitalism, and the housing market currently plays a leading role 
in the perpetuation of this state-driven developmentalist economy. On this front, institutional 
economists suggest that the failure of the good governance model that leads to crony capitalism 
stems from a lack of an institutional legal system, which allows some plutocrats and bureaucrats 
to corrupt the system (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). The problem is that these researchers do 
not grasp the extractive nature of colonialism that exists, regardless of efforts to establish an 
institutional framework. The colonial mentality operates for the purpose of dispossessing and 
settling geographies where many communities and nations already reside. Establishing an 
institutional framework will not curtail this reality. As Raymond Williams (1973) suggests, 
colonizing the land to extract greater economic value is a global imperial project. Hence, 
developmentalism can be considered as a new colonialist project, in which domestic governments 
take the initiative of facilitating rent extraction for the benefit of the global financial hegemony.  
Institutional economists fail to consider that developmentalism does not only occur in developing 
countries, where according to them there is a lack of institutional governance. Following rapid 
deindustrialization in many mature capitalist economies, economic growth through 
(sub)urbanization and the housing market has also become widespread in developed countries. 
Financialization of the housing market has become a developmentalist model to provide a stream 
of wealth accumulation for the sake of economic growth. The purpose of developmentalism in that 
sense is to prioritize economic growth above all other necessities of the economy. Many 
developing countries and mature capitalist economies have adopted this developmentalist strategy 
over the last three decades, and crony capitalism also exists in these countries. In many parts of 
the world, massive housing projects, particularly in the form of massive suburbia (Güney, Keil and 
Üçoğlu, 2019), have become a tool for rapid economic growth. In China (Shen and Wu, 2017, Zhu 
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and Wu, 2019), suburbanization has become a new tool of capital accumulation. In Turkey, urban 
gentrification projects (Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2011; Türkün, 2016) and massive suburban projects 
(Güney, 2019; Üçoğlu, 2016, 2019) have become key governmental strategies for economic 
growth. A similar process is also underway in Manila in the Philippines (Ortega, 2016) and in 
Johannesburg, South Africa (Rubin and Charlton, 2019). In a parallel vein, the developmentalist 
strategy to boost the economy through housing has also become a priority of provincial or local 
governments in many parts of the world. In Canada, Toronto’s local government and Ontario’s 
provincial government have supported an economic boosting policy that prioritizes the capital 
accumulation of certain elites in the realms of construction and finance14.  
3.6. The financialization of the housing market and its global impact 
The financialization of the housing market thus refers to a direct strategy by finance capital to 
articulate homeownership into financial markets. Through this articulation, the extraction of rent 
(through either indebtedness or land colonization/resource extraction) can become a global 
investment tool in global financial markets. Therefore, the hegemonic relations that create a new 
social order instigate an everydayness based on mortgaged lives, new ownership patterns, and 
rentiership. The result is the accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few and the accumulation of 
debt by the majority in society. In the meantime, wealth has increasingly become concentrated in 
real estate. Real estate capitalism is now the primary investment strategy, particularly for 
 
14 In order to understand the global perspective of the financialization of housing, it would be necessary to give a 
credit Raquel Rolnik’s latest book Urban Warfare: Housing Under the Empire of Finance (2019), Rolnik in this 
book focuses on how the financialization of housing has become a global problem and how this problem has led to 
the rise of global housing crisis. In fact, to her, the globalization of the Anglo-Saxon homeownership model (which 




households. Several indicators demonstrate that real estate is now the key-way to park money in 
fixed assets, such that accumulates wealth for the sake of certain groups in society.   
According to Credit Suisse’s latest report on global wealth (2018), aggregate global wealth has 
reached 317 trillion USD. This aggregate number includes both financial assets and non-financial 
assets. Global wealth counts all of the accumulated savings of individuals and households, 
including housing and other fixed assets (e.g., office space, agricultural land, and vacant land; 
hence, real estate in principle) and financial assets (e.g., treasury bills, stock papers, and other 
financial investments). In many countries, this wealth exists in the form of real estate (there is no 
specific indicator on the type of real estate in this case, but most exists in the form of residential 
real estate), and the percentage of real estate is generally higher than the share of financial assets 
in aggregate wealth (except in the United States). In the meantime, the total value of real estate in 
the world reached 280.6 trillion USD by 2017, according to data provided by Savills Global 
Property Experts (2018). The value of residential real estate in this tally is 220.6 trillion USD, 
while agricultural real estate (27.1 trillion USD) and commercial real estate (33.3 trillion USD) 
account for the rest. The value of total financial instruments is 183.3 trillion USD, with 105.3 
trillion USD existing in the form of debt securities and the remaining 83.3 trillion USD existing in 
the form of equities. 
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Figure 3. The total value of real estate compared with other investment and resources (USD trillion). This excludes 
the flow of currencies. The “Real Estate” category includes: residential real estate value (in blue), commercial real 
estate value (in orange), and agricultural real estate value (in grey). The “Financial Instruments” category includes: 
debt securities (in blue) and equities (in orange). Source: Savills Global Property Experts: 
https://www.savills.com/impacts/market-trends/8-things-you-need-to-know-about-the-value-of-global-real-
estate.html 
Figure 3 also illustrates the importance of the valuation scale of real estate in the global economy. 
This valuation scale leads to an increase in total debt since ownership of real estate occurs through 
debt mechanisms (if the property is not inherited). Hence, the total debt of societies is increasing 
at a global scale. In mature economies, the ration of private credit to GDP has been rapidly 
increasing since the early 2000s and developing countries have been experiencing a parallel 
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10 high income countries 10 developing countries 
Australia 121.71 Bangladesh 45.53 
Belgium 91.59 Brazil 66.50 
Canada 126.56 Chile 72.68 
France  114.30 China 128.53 
Germany 96.81 India 49.41 
Italy  123.51 Panama  67.54 
Ireland 168.06 South Africa 68.52 
Japan 108.36 Thailand 115.88 
Netherlands 195.86 Tunisia 69.28 
United Kingdom 157.96 Turkey 57.75 
United States 176.85 United Arab Emirates 60.32 
Table 3. Ratio of private credit to GDP (percent) in high income and developing markets in 2013. Source: Global 
Financial Development Database, World Bank, and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
The data in Table 3 shows the ratio of private credit by deposit banks and other financial 
institutions to GDP in designated countries. According to this data, the economy in already 
developed countries is now anchored by financial debt mechanisms. In the meantime, emerging 
markets are also increasingly connected to the financial credit system. This data also shows that 
credit volume is expanding at a much higher rate than GDP growth in many developed countries, 
while the development of private credits is also gaining momentum in developing markets. For 
example, in Turkey in 2003, this ratio was around 13 percent; in 2013, it had reached nearly 58 




Figure 4. The ratio of household debt to disposable income (percent). Source: OECD Database for Household Debt: 
https://data.oecd.org/hha/household-debt.htm 
Figure 4 illustrates another important indicator: the ratio of household debt to disposable income 
in selected countries. These countries are considered to have the highest quality of life, as rated by 
the OECD Better Life Index. This ratio is also increasing day by day in developing countries. For 
instance, in the emerging economy of Turkey, the household debt to disposable income ratio rose 
from 7.5 percent in 2003 to 48.8 percent in 2012 (Ayhan, 2018: 7). Mortgage credits constitute a 
considerable share of household debts. According to the data provided by the Bank of Canada, 
71.4 percent of Canada’s household debt was comprised of mortgage credit in 2018. Therefore, 
mature economies have been accumulating debt (mainly through real estate) for a very long time, 
and developing economies are now following in the footsteps of these mature economies at a rapid 
pace. The accumulation of wealth and debt leads to the emergence of an economy in which wealth 
inequality is highly felt, as socio-economic inequality causes the extreme enrichment of the top 10 
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2019, the richest 10 percent of the world population owns 82 percent of global wealth (Credit 
Suisse, 2019). 
  
Figure 5. The share of the national wealth owned by the richest top 10 percent in selected countries. Source: Credit 
Suisse Report 2018 and World Inequality Report 2018 
As Figure 5 shows, wealth inequality is increasing in many parts of the world, with most wealth 
accumulating in the hands of the top 10 percent within societies. In fact, within the top 10 percent, 
the top 1 percent owns much more than the subsequent 9 percent, as the World Inequality Report 
2018 puts forward (Piketty et al., 2018). A similar chart could be drawn for national income as 
well. National income refers to the annual revenue of households minus debt. National wealth 
refers to the financial assets plus real assets (principally housing) owned by households, minus 
their debts (Credit Suisse, 2019). “Minus debt” is important for understanding the calculation of 
wealth because even though a household may own a house, it may not be counted as part of their 
wealth if they are paying mortgage debt. That is why the top 10 percent owns the majority of 
wealth, since in principle, those wealth holders do not have the stress of paying debt. The 
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debt in the hands of the remaining 90 percent lead to a huge income disparity, not only at a 
domestic level but also at a global level. Since the majority of accumulated wealth is garnered in 
real estate, it is possible to say that real estate has become the key object of global wealth 
accumulation. Hence, global financial flows and the dominance of the global financial system in 
turning these fixed assets into liquid assets accelerate with the purpose of asserting a hegemony of 
top classes.  
3.7. The housing crisis and social segregation 
One of the key problems related to the financialization of the housing market is the increasing 
existence of a housing crisis at a global level. Madden and Marcuse (2016) define this crisis as a 
lack of proper affordable housing in many cities. The unaffordable housing market structure is 
now a widespread problem in major cities, and at a global level, it contributes to a chain of social 
problems, including homelessness and social segregation. The ongoing greed of financial markets 
to maintain financial flows through residential real estate leads to the propagation of massive 
construction projects, which are used to speculate assets by investors or households that seek rent-
maximization. For this very reason, housing prices constitute a crucial point for understanding the 
impact of financialization. In order to perpetuate this speculative economy, housing prices must 
be kept at a level that at which people may be convinced to join this financial game. That is why 
the increasing rate of housing prices is a crucial indicator for showing the volume of speculation 
in a city or region. This speculative side of financialization is also supported by a narrative of 
“negative future,” which according to Graeber (2014) is a key narrative for convincing people to 
enthusiastically participate in the speculative economy. This narrative suggests that “in the near 
future capitalism will collapse and everything will be upside down”. This pushes subordinated 
populations to act as rapidly as possible to invest in assets. It also illustrates one of the main 
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motives of people for taking risk for asset ownership and for becoming potential rentiers. In 
parallel, one of my interviewees told me: “even though there would be many alternative policies, 
the media is capable of convincing people that there is no alternative to existing housing market 
model” (Interviewee 2). The speculative housing market increases housing prices, and the 
existence of the housing bubble decreases affordability. According to the popular housing price 
index prepared by Knight Frank, housing prices increased by 11.2 percent in Turkey and 8.9 
percent in Canada by the end of 2017, compared with the previous year (Knight Frank, 2018). This 
level of increase also signals the potential value and volume of speculation, and this calculation of 
speculative rent-maximization constitutes the manufactured consent for the finance-housing 
nexus. 
However, there exist several socio-ecological costs of this hegemonic process. In many global-city 
regions, the homelessness rate is increasing due to the prioritization of tax money to boost the 
economy for further real estate projects. The collected tax is utilized to fund speculative projects 
rather than make affordable housing available. Currently, there are 8,200 homeless people in 
Toronto, and 3,200 of them are still waiting for supportive housing (Homefirst, 2019). In the 
meantime, the increase in the number of low-income families also means that in many global cities, 
the rate of homeownership remains steady or is decreasing (I will deal with this situation in the 
chapter on Istanbul). Another key aspect of this process is neighbourhood-level segregation. More 
and more gated communities are being built in cities, particularly in suburban areas. These gated 
communities exist either in the form of ethnic community mass housing or as housing projects that 
are gated by security units and surveillance systems (I will deal with the rise of gated communities 




3.8. Conclusion: The financialization of the housing market as common sense? 
The bodies of literature that I discussed in this chapter all describe a new reorganization of social 
order, a new kind of society, and also a new kind agency with a new type of class structure. While 
acknowledging the importance of diverse approaches, I argue that the financialization of the 
housing market constitutes the basis of neoliberal hegemony. This hegemony operates as a mode 
of existence that circumscribes all units of life through its mechanisms of exclusion, inclusion, 
normalization, and consent manufacturing. However, unlike the Foucauldian literature, which 
places great emphasis on the emergence of a new culture of agency with an entrepreneurial spirit, 
I argue that the normalization of financialization occurs through the normalization of new property 
relations. It is not possible to evaluate financialization without taking new property relations and 
urban dynamics into consideration. In fact, Piketty also forwards an explanation focused on the 
emergence of a new middle-class culture associated with property ownership, while placing crucial 
emphasis on the agency of class culture.  
As I touch upon in the next chapter, neoliberal urbanization is a violent process of hegemony 
construction. In fact, the key problem here is whether or not a hegemony can manufacture the 
consent of subordinated populations by violence. In the case of neoliberalization, the 
manufacturing of consent happens through changes to the welfare system and the promotion of 
homeownership as the ultimate fact of life. As Gramsci (1971) highlights, hegemonic relations are 
also associated with prestige-seeking. Asset-ownership is presented as a source of social status and 
prestige. The new ownership patterns and the presentation of housing as a sign of prestige are 
reflected in the suburban developments of the 21st century. The next chapter will deal with the link 
between financialization and suburbanization. 
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Chapter 4: The Suburban/Financial Nexus: Suburbanization Has Become the Key Driving 
Force of Financialization 
In this chapter, I will deal with two key points that are significant for understanding the ongoing 
process of the financialization of housing. The first point relates to the agents that bring about the 
finance-housing nexus. As I said before, the financialization of housing is not an agentless process; 
hence, it is important to mention in a concrete sense the agents of this process. The second point 
relates to the increasing link between financialization and suburbanization. The financialization of 
housing massively occurs through a new phase of suburbanization, which we can identify as a 
global reconstruction of the periphery (Güney, Keil and Üçoğlu, 2019).  
The argument that I put forward in this chapter is that the current suburbanization process has 
become the key target of financialization, and financialization instigates a new suburban reality 
that is circumscribed by massive housing and mega infrastructure projects. Therefore, this chapter 
discusses the link between the neoliberal financial hegemony and suburbanization. Critical 
scholarship on suburbanization has proliferated over the last decade. Inevitably, the debate on how 
to define the current global urbanization process brings to the table a variety of discussions related 
to regional economy, suburban expansion, suburban infrastructure, and the suburban housing 
market. Although I acknowledge the importance of these diverse discussions, I explain the current 
suburbanization process by focusing on its relationship to wealth accumulation and the “debtfare” 
regime. The financialization of the housing market is the key dynamic in a reconfiguration of 
society that occurs through the societal transformation of ownership and rentiership — and this 
reorganization of social order takes places in a suburban-financial nexus. In this chapter, I explain 
the composition of this suburban-financial nexus. 
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I begin by describing a new approach to explaining the role of financialization in shaping human 
geography. This approach is called “financial geography.” Hitherto, I have attempted to construct 
the theoretical background of this dissertation by developing the linkage between financialization 
and property relations. It is now necessary to examine the actors and processes that financialize 
housing, as well as to demonstrate the role of suburbanization in the financialization of housing. 
On this point, financial geography constitutes the literature to which this dissertation aims to 
contribute. 
4.1. A financial geography approach to the financialization of housing 
As I illustrated in Chapter 2, critical scholarship on the financialization of the housing market 
touches upon diverse points of the process. One of the most important themes on this matter is the 
securitization of mortgage credit, which is seen as a key process in the financialization of the 
housing market. The chain of leveraging and converting housing into a global financial liquid asset 
is not only a matter of financial money-making; it is also a matter of the changing role of actors in 
the creditor-debtor relationship (Aalbers, 2017; Lazzaratto, 2015; Soederberg, 2018). At the same 
time, it is important to keep in mind that the financialization of capital, particularly as it relates to 
shareholder value, also has great importance. The financialization of capital, which I explored in 
Chapter 1, is a process that breeds financial money out of the investments of firms or households. 
The rise of shareholder value is tied to the financialization of capital since the capitalization of 
non-financial firms and their operations are now subject to the metrics of financial market 
dynamics. In other words, the rise of shareholder value provides a means of articulating into 
financial markets to enrich the volume of economic rent extraction. The rise of shareholder value 
allows firms to accumulate more financial wealth since they can issue their shares in financial 
110 
 
markets, and those who seek to make a financial investment may join the economic rent-extraction 
process through shareholder value production.  
Here I emphasize that actors in the housing market are predominantly tied to the financial system 
through either shareholder value or debt mechanisms. Real estate investment trusts (REITs), 
construction companies, shadow banking financial institutions, and global risk management 
corporations are all tied to the shareholder value system. Multi-national corporations (MNCs) that 
operate in mining, construction, and other sectors related to housing are also tied to the system of 
shareholder value production. Residential capitalism (a term that I use to refer to the segment of 
real estate capitalism that encompasses only residential units or houses) is thus one of the key 
targets of financial markets since the shareholder value production of firms entails investment in 
economic rent extraction. 
One of the key problems for studies on the financialization of housing relates to the identification 
and categorization of the agents of this process. The agents and politico-legal processes associated 
with the financialization of housing may differ from one country to another or from one global-
city region to another. As researchers strive to understand the agents and politico-legal structure 
of this process, a newly growing body of literature on financialization has gained prominence in 
recent years. Specifically, the literature on financial geography has been drawing the attention of 
critical scholars working in the field of economic geography. Financial geography, as a sub-
discipline of human geography, aims to bring together studies on the spatiality of finance capital 
under an umbrella of variegated global approaches to financialization. Aalbers (2019) identifies 
financial geography as the intersection point of economic and urban geography. Financial 
geography represents a new attempt to illustrate the impact of financialization on human 
geography; it also investigates the flows of finance capital in a global spatial context. In particular, 
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after the financial crisis of 2007–2009, the literature on the financialization of daily life, of housing, 
and of household indebtedness has proliferated. Financial geography, as a field of study, aims to 
encapsulate this diverse literature, drawing together different approaches to examine the link 
between spatial configuration and finance capital. This umbrella approach has provided a 
prominent tool for describing and criticizing the financialization of the housing market, changing 
aspects of financial creditor-debtor relations, and the rising indebtedness of households through 
mortgage credits (Aalbers, 2011, 2014, 2016; Lapavitsas, 2013; Moos and Skaburskis, 2010; 
Walks, 2013, 2014; Simone and Walks, 2016; Wu, 2015; Ionnus and Wojcik, 2019). These studies 
not only explore rising indebtedness, they also expose the changing forms of financial relations 
that emerge through the financial commodification of household and social use-values. In other 
words, this umbrella approach attempts to comprehend the metabolic processes through which 
finance and urbanization interact and transform each other.  
The purpose of this new approach is to grasp how financialization brings about a new socio-spatial 
configuration through the spread of financial profit-seeking and the conversion of use-values into 
financial exchange-values. This literature has a wide portfolio since it deals with different 
intersections of the finance-space configuration. For instance, the configuration of tax havens for 
the financial accumulation of non-financial firms through onshore and offshore transactions is a 
crucial subject of analysis in this approach (Haberly and Wojcik, 2014; Crofts and Sigler, 2018). 
The prominent role of global financial centres and shadow banking in the global financial crisis 
has also been analyzed intensely (Wojcik, 2013; Bassen and van Meeteren, 2015; Ioanou and 
Wojcik, 2018). The financialization of the housing market and everyday life have also been 
essential topics of inquiry for financial geography (Fields, 2015; Soederberg, 2018; Walks, 2016). 
In sum, financial geography aims to explain the processes, actors, social conditions, and existing 
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realities of the finance-space configuration—and it includes all studies that examine such topics 
through a similar methodology.  
The financialization of housing constitutes a crucial part of the subject matter of financial 
geography. Not only is the financialization of housing a process that can help one understand the 
role of finance capital vis-à-vis property relations, but it also gives necessary clues for investigating 
how different actors participate in the financialization of life with different motives. From the point 
of view of financial geographers, the financialization of the housing market encapsulates six 
interwoven processes that reveal the ongoing commodification of social use-values and life:  
1. The financialization of housing reveals the variegated forms of neoliberal urbanization and 
the roles of various actors in that urban process (e.g., the state, firms, REITs, shadow 
banks). These actors play a crucial role in sustaining neoliberal capitalism through urban 
growth by converting urban use-values into financial exchange-values (Aalbers and 
Christophers, 2014; Bourdieu, 2005; Weber, 2010). 
2. The financialization of housing reveals how people are being articulated into a regime of 
indebtedness (Lapavitsas, 2013; Soederberg, 2013). 
3. The financialization of housing is perceived as a new regime of accumulation that leads to 
social segregation in urban areas (Aalbers, 2016; Rolnik, 2013; Walks, 2014, 2016). 
4. The financialization of housing is associated with the rise of problems that pertain to the 
neoliberal production of space, i.e., increasing unaffordability, housing crisis, neoliberal 
gentrification, and the assault on social housing (Fields, 2015; Madden and Marcuse, 2016; 
Rossi, 2017). 
5. The financialization of housing is linked to the investment strategies of individuals and 
rentiers; hence, it involves speculation as a mode of making profit. 
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6. The financialization of housing functions as a state strategy that ties real estate mechanisms 
into the growth machine. It is a developmentalist strategy that is becoming widespread in 
developing economies through the implementation of large-scale residential projects and 
mega infrastructure projects (Flyvbjerg, 2014; Guney, 2019; Zhu and Wu, 2019). 
One of the challenges of examining the agents and politico-legal processes that circumscribe the 
financialization of housing is identifying those agents in the first place. The agents of this process 
may differ from country to country. Although there might be similar actors across cases, such as 
the REITs and banks, there are also divergent actors, vis-à-vis the national urban systems of 
countries. Hence, when studying the financial geography of housing, it is important to understand 
that the financialization of housing across different contexts involves both similar and divergent 
processes. By the same token, Aalbers emphasizes that: “Housing financialization… is not 
primarily about showing which place is more financialized; it is about understanding the process 
by which financial actors, markets, practices, measurements, and narratives are increasingly 
becoming dominant” (2019: 5). Elucidating the agents and processes involved in the 
financialization of housing requires investigating different cases. Case studies are necessary to 
identify the similar and divergent agents and processes that financialize housing. In fact, case 
studies present a lot of socio-economic differences for consideration since the socio-economic and 
politico-legal structures of mature capitalist economies and developing countries diverge. 
However, the existence of such differences does not mean that these two categories of 
development—mature capitalist economies vs. developing economies—present no points in 
common for understanding the financialization of the housing market. In fact, the developed world 
and developing economies learn from each other, and they use inter-referencing in urban planning 
and in regulating the economy of space production (Roy, 2011).  
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Most case studies on the financialization of the housing market focus on the production of space 
through financialization in mature capitalist economies since there is a general assumption that 
mature capitalist economies have more sophisticated financial systems for articulating people into 
financial leveraging mechanisms. Recent works on the financialization of the housing market 
predominantly deal with the cases of New York City, Toronto, Vancouver, London, Milan, 
Amsterdam, and Sydney. These studies are crucial since they reveal the sophisticated composition 
of the financialization process, as well as the actors that aim to financialize the housing market at 
the cost of creating an indebted society. However, after the global financial crisis of 2007–2009, 
the focus on financialization has shifted to the developing world, where a developmentalist 
mentality is driving a massive rebuilding of urban space in many developing countries. Various 
scholars from the developing world are now studying massive urbanization and suburbanization 
projects in various Chinese cities, Dubai, Istanbul, Johannesburg, and Sao Paolo. However, as Isil 
Erol (2019) asserts, these studies are still not sufficient for developing a generalized theory of the 
financialization of housing in developing countries. Erol suggests that, “to gain a broader 
understanding of the variegated nature of housing financialization, it is important to carry out more 
case studies in developing countries and define the financialization process in different national 
and local contexts” (2019: 724). In other words, more case studies are needed to explore the 
variegated forms of financialization. These case studies are important not only for defining how 
housing is financialized, but also for comprehending how financialization reproduces a new social 
order in different local contexts.  
For this very reason, this dissertation deals with the cases of Toronto in Canada and Istanbul in 
Turkey. From a financial geography perspective, I assert that it is helpful to conduct more 
comparative studies to draw out the similarities and differences in cases from developing vs. 
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mature capitalist economies. From this perspective, my comparative analysis of Toronto and 
Istanbul offers a significant contribution to the literature of financial geography. However, before 
I draw this comparison, I must highlight a few points to make that comparison more meaningful. 
I begin in the next section of this chapter by developing a general theoretical framework for 
identifying the hegemonic bloc of the financialization of housing. Then, I explore the metabolic 
relationship between the financialization of housing and contemporary suburbanization process. I 
focus on this metabolic relationship from the perspective of hegemonic relations. 
4.2. Defining the real estate/financial complex (REFCOM) 
From the perspective of financial geography, it is important to categorize and identify the agents 
and processes involved in the financialization of housing. This is not an easy task, since the agents 
and processes vary depending on the specific country and city that one looks at. In fact, what is 
needed is a general theoretical framework for exploring the similarities and differences across 
variegated cases of housing financialization. To develop this framework, I will build upon Aalbers 
concept of the real estate/financial complex (REFCOM), which he coined to describe the ongoing 
connection of real estate and financial markets. Aalbers defines REFCOM in two ways: (1) He 
indicates that REFCOM is akin to what Harvey (1985) describes as the military/industrial 
complex—a strategy of capitalist hegemony to fix the economic crisis through industrial 
investment in military equipment and armaments. The military/industrial complex even refers to 
the military actions taken by states (wars and operations) to defer economic crisis. (2) He positions 
REFCOM as a concept to be used by researchers in the fields of critical urban studies and urban 
political economy to analyze the hegemonic bloc constituted by the state, housing real estate 




Figure 6. The real estate/financial complex (REFCOM). This diagram illustrates the key role that housing real estate 
capitalism, the state, and finance play as actors in the financialization of the housing market. Together, they constitute 
a new form of political economy, which scholars of critical urban studies must examine. Source: 
https://ees.kuleuven.be/geography/projects/refcom/index.html 
 
Drawing on Aalbers, I use the concept of REFCOM to refer to a hegemonic bloc that aims to 
configure a new social order that enables wealth accumulation for the top deciles of societies. I 
acknowledge that this concept does not fully capture the composition of contemporary housing 
market dynamics in every country or regional landscape. However, it does provide a general 
theoretic framework for explaining how certain agents convert housing into a global financial 
asset. 
Before developing this theoretical approach to explaining the financialization of housing 
(particularly through suburbanization), it is important to touch upon a crucial debate on the 











theory? This debate is salient because many national and local governments currently strategize 
housing projects as tools of economic growth. When Harvey Molotch (1976) first introduced his 
conception of the city as a “growth machine,” he was referring to the planning practices that 
prioritize certain local growth coalitions. According to Molotch, certain growth coalitions lobby 
for investment and planning projects in their cities in order to gain an advantage from potential 
development projects. For him, this is a local process that includes developers, business people, 
and the media sector, as well as neighbourhood communities. Hence, potential growth coalitions 
and their rival coalitions compete with one another to have a say in the production of space, 
particularly at a local planning level. Within this framework, Molotch explores the local growth 
motives of American cities (mainly small or medium-size cities) before the sharp neoliberal turn 
of the 1980s.  
The question, here, is whether or not we can categorize REFCOM within the framework of growth 
machine or identify REFCOM as a hegemonic growth model that transforms property relations? 
Molotch’s theory of growth machine and other similar approaches to analyzing urban regimes may 
be classified within the Fordist tradition of urban managerialism. Urban managerialism refers to a 
set of practices through which local business actors and politicians generate an economic matrix 
that enables them to produce a volume of economic growth (Williams, 1976). To carry out this 
economic growth management, privileged roles are assigned to (local) politics and (elite) agencies 
(Jessop, Peck and Tickell, 1999: 143). Urban regimes thereby concentrate on local flows and the 
behaviour of business elites. Within this schema, the political body acts as a managerial body that 
aims to provide a local business domain that can function autonomously. Hence, local governments 
act to manage the autonomy of the market for producing space. Once an urban regime is 
established by a growth coalition, it becomes the ordinary way of doing business, akin to the liberal 
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utopia of the self-functioning market with a hidden hand. Therefore, according to theorists of urban 
regimes (Molotch 1976, Logan and Molotch, 1987), such regimes for economic growth may 
function as distributive bodies; or as Bob Jessop, Jamie Peck, and Adam Tickell (1999) claim, 
urban regimes are seen by such theorists as mediating bodies in the distributions of urban fortunes. 
Urban regimes theorists seek to construct a bottom-up theory, in which local businesses and local 
politicians play predominant roles in capital accumulation, a process that in turn determines the 
national-level economic growth. However, Jessop, Peck, and Tickell argue that: “[this] bottom-up 
methodology tends to assign causal power to local political networks and thereby suggest, 
unintentionally perhaps, that spatial variations in urban fortunes are merely a by-product of the 
geographies of charismatic city leadership or effective urban networking” (1999: 144).  
In fact, growth machine theory is crucial for explaining the growth motives of North American 
cities, particularly during the Keynesian-Fordist period15. However, to explain the current 
urbanization process that we tend to formulate under the names of “neoliberal urbanization,” 
“global urbanization,” and “planetary urbanization,” we must develop a new approach for 
analyzing new growth motives based on capital flows. Jessop, Peck, and Tickell (1999) 
acknowledge that growth machine theory might be peculiarly applicable to the case of American 
cities since the American political structure and party system allow the rise of urban boosterism 
networks more readily than many other systems. Local governments and their power to collect a 
huge amount of tax also enable the formation of elite-based urban boosterism in North American 
 
15 This does not mean that growth machine theory is no longer applicable to what is going on in many parts of the 
under neoliberal urbanization. In fact, what I mean here is that the growth machine practices have morphed into a 
new structure that encapsulates the global competition of the cities, the rapid flows of global financial capital into 
the urban growth projects and the increasing indebtedness of households. The growth machine practices are now 
working as a debt machines.  
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cities. A broader theoretical approach to urban political economy is now needed since we can no 
longer identify place-making or the reconfiguration of built environments without also considering 
the changing role of the state in the globalization process and the impact of global financial 
markets. This need for a broader approach does not mean that local politics and actors no longer 
play important roles in reconfiguring capital accumulation patterns through boosterism; rather, a 
new approach that might engender a linkage between existing growth coalitions and the hegemony 
of global financial markets is necessary. 
The Gramscian approach that is asserted by Jessop, Peck and Tickell to put a conceptual fix on the 
table suggests a novel formulation for finding a linkage between growth machine theory and the 
changing patterns of global accumulation regimes and new urban/suburban governance. Jessop, 
Peck, and Tickell suggest that: 
In line with Gramscian analyses, we suggest that growth machines can be fruitfully 
analyzed in terms of strategically selective combinations of political society and civil 
society, government and governance, or “hegemony armoured by coercion” (Gramsci, 
1971: 271). This approach emphasizes the interdependence of ethico-political and 
economic-corporate forces (political society + civil society), allows more weight in the 
exercise of political power to non-state forms (government + governance), and stresses the 
importance of values, norms, vision, discourses, linguistic forms, popular beliefs, and so 
on, in shaping local accumulation strategies and their related modes of growth…. Growth 
machines may be linked to a local hegemonic bloc. (1999: 148) 
From this perspective, we need a stronger approach to growth machine theory. The Gramscian 
concept of hegemony is helpful for developing this approach, particularly in the context of the 
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changing state structure, rise of neoliberal political economy, and globalization process: “The 
regulation approach and neo-Marxists state theories can together provide an appropriate theoretical 
basis for a reinvigorated and analytically more powerful growth machine approach” (Ibid., 158). 
According to Jessop, Pick, and Tickell, the neoliberal mentality aims to change the state structure 
from a managerial body that handles local elites by distributing wealth, to an entrepreneurial body 
in which the state plays the primary role in forming growth coalitions (or hegemonic blocs) to 
further projects that can provide capital accumulation. Hence, local elites can no longer be seen as 
direct actors of the growth machine; rather, only those corporations that are “licensed” by the state 
can join this growth coalition, in what is no longer a local issue but rather a broader political 
system: “The political power of local business elites does not derive from some form of 
autonomous political capacity on the part of the business community, but is in this case ‘licensed’ 
by the state” (Ibid., 159).  
To effectively define REFCOM as a new globally functioning hegemony with insight from growth 
machine theory, we must take into account the neo-Marxist explanation of the shift from “the city 
as a property-developing growth machine to a more entrepreneurial role” (Ibid., 152). This neo-
Marxist account from the late 1990s warns those who study the financialization of housing to 
distance themselves from a focus on property-led economic growth policies. However, it is 
essential in this case to recall that the growth machine plays a deep-seated role in financial markets, 
and the linkage between the growth machine and financial markets is orchestrated by the neoliberal 
state structure. The neoliberal state is an entrepreneurial organization that aims to prioritize public-
private partnerships, through which private sectors garner greater advantage than public. 
Therefore, in a neoliberal context, property-led economic growth has never waned; rather, it has 
gained a new form in which financial markets and property markets are globally interwoven.  
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In a parallel vein, Aalbers argues that the financialization of housing was firstly designed to fuel 
the economy. He also argues that stimulating the housing market by expanding mortgage markets 
has enabled the expansion of the growth machine (Aalbers, 2016: 55). Such approaches 
demonstrate that there is (and needs to be) a link between the financialization of housing and 
growth machine theory. That being said, I argue that the financialization of housing needs to be 
examined through the hegemonic relationship created by neoliberal financial markets and their 
convergence with the use of urbanization as an economic growth machine, which serves to 
legitimize the hegemony of ruling classes. From this perspective, it is possible to say that 
REFCOM is a hegemonic bloc that transforms the urban growth machine from local boosterism 
into a global tool for financial flows. This transformation must be analyzed with reference to the 
role of the state in REFCOM and growth machine theory.  
Peck and Heather Whiteside (2016) offer a new definition to highlight the role of the state in urban 
boosterism: according to them, neoliberal financialization brings about a network of debt machines 
rather than growth machines. Debt is again the key determinant for reconfiguring economic growth 
based on property relations. Financialization and its credit mechanisms slow down economic 
growth, as austerity policies prioritize the public-private partnership, which is based on debt 
creation for the actors of urban development. Peck and Whiteside indicate that: “the state is an 
agent and arena of financialization” (2016: 237). Moreover, they note that local and municipal 
governments are the targets of financialization as well. Within this new urban machine 
understanding, what makes financialization the driving force is no longer growth but rather debt: 
The political economy of urban governance is animated by the pursuit of growth and, 
internally, by growth-elite dynamics. Increasingly though, it is debt as much as growth that 
shapes and drives the system, while the locus of power and control has been shifting from 
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growth coalitions to debt machines and from local business leaders to more distant finance 
markets interests. For many cities, the new urban governance is concerned with the 
structural challenges of debt management and exigencies of credit market relations, under 
persistent conditions of budgetary constraints and fiscal stress. (Ibid., 239) 
Therefore, REFCOM may be described as an urban machine that is commanded by finance capital, 
and this hegemonic financial command accelerates by creating indebtedness not only for 
households but also for institutions. Austerity policies lead governments and municipalities to seek 
credit from financial markets to support their public-private partnership projects. Many 
municipalities are already articulated into the credit rating systems, thanks to the austerity policies 
of central governments. The result is slow economic growth but increasing indebtedness for 
everyone. Hence, the hegemony of REFCOM acts under the image of a growth machine, while 
actually functioning as a hegemonic debt creation machine. Debt-driven growth is now the priority 
of urban governance in many parts of the world. 
This debt-driven urbanization is an outcome of changing state structure, as austerity policies have 
radically transformed welfare regimes. Critical scholarship on the neoliberal state commonly 
accepts that the state now functions as an entrepreneurial entity (Brown, 2005; Harvey, 1989, 2005; 
Jessop, 2002). This neoliberal state structure may even act brutally in order to assert (or restore) 
market fundamentalism, as Naomi Klein claims in The Shock Doctrine (2007) while referring to 
the cruel ideological engagements of Chicago School scholars. Public-private partnerships, 
military expenses, and the shock doctrine account provide a conceptual framework of the 
neoliberal state in which the state acts as an entrepreneurial entity to shape socio-spatial reality. 
The challenge is to understand the limits of this entrepreneurial entity.? How does the neoliberal 
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state act in a hegemonic way to create a common sense (or mass loyalty) through the production 
of space?  
We again need to return to Marx’s explanation of the laws of capital in motion: M — C — M’ 
refers to the motion of capital, in which the goal is to organize the system of production and the 
social relations peculiar to that system in order to create surplus value. As Claus Offe (1984) 
indicates, all of these elements in capitalism are necessary for the creation of surplus value. In 
Offe’s account, the important thing is the word “necessary”: all politico-social elements that are 
intrinsic to the capitalist production system are necessary for the creation of surplus value. In this 
case, the problem arises in determining “necessities.” Who determines what is necessary and how 
those necessities are strategized in such a way as to keep M — C — M’ going? The necessary 
conditions for the extraction of surplus value and for the wealth accumulation of capitalist classes 
may change from time to time, and the internal contradictions of capitalism—mainly the tendency 
of the profit rate to fall—entail the transformation of necessities in capitalist societies. The current 
necessities for capital accumulation may become unnecessary over time. In the meantime, the 
necessary conditions may construct anti-capitalist practices (e.g., social housing) that may become 
irrelevant in the future for the well-being of capital accumulation. Offe points out that: “the 
movement of capital systematically, cumulatively and irreversibly produces social phenomena and 
structural elements which are functionally irrelevant and of no value for the continuation of 
capitalist development” (1984: 40). In that case, what is necessary for the perpetuation of capitalist 
accumulation is that the state must take an entrepreneurial role in determining the necessities and 
unnecessities. Certain unnecessities must be eliminated through “selective” public policy choice. 
Offe then points out that:  
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The capitalist state can no longer be characterized as an instrument of the interest of 
capital… rather, this state is characterized by constitutional and organizational structures 
whose specific selectivity is designed to reconcile and harmonize the ‘privately regulated’ 
capitalist economy. (Ibid., 51).  
Hence, in this account, the economy has its privately regulative system, as liberal hidden hand 
theory would suggest; however, it relies on regulative entrepreneurial action from the state to fix 
the problems of capital accumulation.  
From a Gramscian point of view, it is important to understand the approach taken by Offe. His 
account of a state-generated balance provides important clues on the balance-seeking pursuits of 
the neoliberal hegemony. Offe argues that there are two forms of subordination: positive and 
negative subordination. The former refers to the positive contributions of political-administrative 
systems (mainly the state) to the reorganization of the economic sphere, whereas the latter refers 
to the limits of the state in that economic sphere. The state is, therefore, limited by the organization 
of the economic life in which it actively works to establish new conditions of accumulation (Ibid., 
39). Hence, there must be a balance in state action: on the one hand, the state must regulate and 
reorganize capitalist accumulation in the market economy; on the other hand, it must also be 
limited by the same market economy. The question here is, why does the state need this limitation? 
The answer relates to the manufacturing of consent; i.e., this balance must be forged in order to 
generate a mass loyalty (or common sense) to the political system.  
Offe offers a threefold-system account, involving the economic system, political administrative 
system (the state), and normative (legitimation) system. By regulating the economic system, the 
state facilitates capital accumulation; in return, it collects tax to compensate the welfare system. 
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The welfare system plays an intermediary role in legitimizing capitalist accumulation in the 
economic system. Hence, if there is a transformation in the economic system, it must also lead to 
a change in the welfare system to restore mass loyalty (or consent) (Ibid., 52–3). Therefore, the 
state is an active constructive and hegemonic agent that aims to strike a balance between 
supporting capitalist market actors and manufacturing the consent of the masses. Manufacturing 
consent (or legitimacy) is a planning matter for the state; at least, that was historically the case 
before the deep rooting of neoliberal financialization.  
John Friedmann (1987), for example, describes the balance between the capitalist market economy 
and social welfare as a planning issue:  
Because in capitalist societies most people gain their livelihood principally through private 
business, the proper functioning of the private sector is essential. State planning is therefore 
generally supportive of business, and it usually includes general economic guidance, the 
provision of public services (which account for a large part of the costs of reproducing the 
labour force), major infrastructural investments, business subsidies, and the protection of 
property rights. (Friedmann, 1987: 27) 
In the meantime, Friedmann also indicates that the state uses planning practices to regulate and 
restrain certain points of market rationality, as “its legitimacy depends on the political mobilization 
of the people acting in defense of their collective interests” (Ibid., 29). For Friedmann, state 
structure reflects territorially organized societies, and these societies exist with a geographical 
hierarchy of nation-state, federal provinces, and cities. The state may operate at all levels of these 
politico-spatial domains. Friedmann indicates that this hierarchized but amorphous structure of 
governance relies on planning to perpetuate the capitalist rationality for multiple crucial reasons. 
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Among these crucial reasons, Friedman counts 10—of which I cite three as the most important for 
planning purposes: 
- Guiding overall economic stability and growth in national societies (monetary policy, full 
employment planning, international trade policy, etc.). 
- Providing public services to meet the general needs of the population (national defense, 
public housing, education, health, etc.)…. 
- Restraining market rationality in the name of social interests (coastal planning, job 
protection, wilderness preservation, etc.). (Ibid., 31) 
The difficult task, then, is how to describe REFCOM with respect to these balance-seeking 
formulations. This raises the question: Is there really an equilibrium based on social welfare under 
neoliberal financial hegemony? 
In response, I argue that: 
1) If neoliberalism is characterized by entrepreneurialism leaning towards rentiership, then 
housing has been reproduced in such a way as to generate normativity around the notion of 
rentiership. The linkage of the housing market into financial markets and the expansion of 
mortgage credits has paved the way for the construction and regulation of novel property markets. 
This novel reconfiguration of the economic sphere has been accompanied by a consolidated effort 
to legitimize welfare provision based on property ownership. That is why Alan Walks’s (2016) 
definition of asset-based welfare perfectly covers the transition towards total commodification 
(and assetization) of housing. 
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2) Social housing systems provide a means of decommodifying a social necessity. Historically, 
social housing served the well-being of capital accumulation for a while, particularly in the post-
war period. However, from Offe’s point of view, we can say that social housing systems have 
become an obstacle to capitalist wealth accumulation, as capitalism entails the commodification 
of life necessities. As a result of the shift in welfare policy towards ownership and rentiership, 
social housing systems have declined in many parts of the world or have been articulated into 
market conditions through regulative entrepreneurial state actions (Madden and Marcuse, 2016). 
The ruling classes have produced consent for this transition by facilitating access to financial tools 
and/or by reproducing the norm of ownership. Asset-ownership is currently regarded as the highest 
sign of prestige in many countries (Graeber, 2014). The rise of REFCOM as a hegemonic bloc 
signals that the commodification of housing has distorted the social welfare system for the benefit 
of capitalist classes. 
3) REFCOM then acts as a growth model and accumulation regime that operates by prioritizing 
the assetization of housing. Within this framework, the financialization of housing no longer takes 
place in a single political/administrative system. Rather, the financialization of housing is now a 
global economic process. Therefore, it is important to recognize the limits of the state in the global 
financial system. Sassen (2017) asserts that states are acting as the facilitators and regulators of 
global financial flows. This state role has been consolidated by international agreements, World 
Trade Organization (WTO) decisions, and G-20 regulations. Certain states are actively regulating 
and shaping the global financial system in such a way as to facilitate wealth accumulation by 
corporations (mainly MNCs) and their shareholders. Up to a certain point, states then let the system 
function on its own in a global (technological) domain. The self-operating presence of the financial 
hegemony provides the necessary conditions for global corporations to participate in the rent 
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extraction process; thus, all the necessities of the market are now designed to extract more 
economic rent rather than surplus value.  
As a consequence, we can identify REFCOM as a debt machine that is tied to global financial 
flows. This debt machine acts as a hegemonic bloc, in which the state facilitates the 
commodification of housing by regulating and enabling the impact of financial markets on 
property relations. REFCOM acts in such a way as to perpetuate rent extraction and provide 
legitimation through ownership. That is to say, the growth machine can no longer be identified 
within the boundaries of local elites and national policies of boosterism. It is a hegemonic bloc 
that articulates households into financial mechanisms and makes them active agents of the rent 
extraction process. 
The new growth model, which acts as the global hegemonic norm, is an economic rent-extractive 
formation that has great impacts on socio-ecological realities. Rather than having the motivation 
of profit-making and profit distribution, contemporary capitalism is primarily extractive. Rent is 
the key determinant of the accumulation process, and it motivates the neoliberal privatization of 
social provisions. Privatization gives necessary opportunities to capitalists to extract rent from the 
common. The privatization of social housing systems, affordable rental housing systems, health 
services, school services, and many other social provisions is undertaken to enable rent extraction 
from the common accumulation of societies. 
Finance capital, in this schema, is the economic form that “spreads over, expropriating and 
privatizing the common-wealth embedded in the accumulated knowledges, codes, images, 
affective practices, and biopolitical relationships that they produce” (Hardt and Negri, 2011: 145). 
The financialization of housing (or real estate in a broader sense) operates as a conflict between 
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capital and labour, but this time, the conflict takes place on the terrain of finance (Ibid.). The 
conflict is no longer focused on industrial efforts to extract more surplus value, but rather on efforts 
to extract as much rent as possible from labour and land, as well as natural resources. Real estate 
and the financialization of real estate are now prominent factors in the extraction of rent. 
A key trait of the relationship between finance and real estate relates to what Lefebvre (2009) 
describes as a characteristic of the production of space in the capitalist mode of production: 
abstraction. According to Hardt and Negri: “Finance capital is an enormous engine of abstraction 
that simultaneously represents and mystifies the common as if reflecting it in a distorted mirror” 
(2011: 157).  Sassen (2012) signals the existence of finance capital as an extractive and predatory 
form. According to her, the current global financial hegemony is ruled by a logic of extraction 
rather than mass consumption. Finance aims to extract rent through the development of new 
financial tools intended to financialize all aspects of life, from the traditional company structure to 
the modest household. In other words, finance does not have any intention of producing social 
value or providing a social welfare regime. Rather, the goal is to link all existing values, and all 
actors of socio-economic life, into financial mechanisms. In a sense, this makes each actor in the 
economy feel obligated to increase the financial value of the things or elements of life.  
REFCOM is a new concept for explaining the extractive hegemony based on property relations. 
The role of the state in REFCOM is to facilitate financial accumulation, as well as the assetization 
of housing since assetization helps to drive the debt machine. The key problem here is that the 
balance-seeking of this hegemonic system seems to be distorted for the sake of capital 
accumulation. The financialization of housing is carried out predominantly by market actors. 
Hence, the state has predominantly left the housing market in the hands of market actors and only 
regulates this market to keep rent extraction going. Suburban housing dreams and the prestige of 
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ownership are used to legitimize the dominance of financialization. The two leading market actors 
in this process are MNCs and REITs, to which I turn my attention now. 
4.3. Suburban-financial nexus: REFCOM as a predatory form 
Hitherto, I have emphasized that in order to understand the hegemonic balance-seeking of 
neoliberal capitalism, we need to attend to the manufacturing of consent through new property 
relations. REFCOM’s manufacturing of consent predominantly occurs through a massive 
reconfiguration of the suburban housing market. REFCOM and suburban development 
increasingly converge, in what I call the suburban-financial nexus. The suburban-financial nexus 
refers to the convergence of all dynamics that bring together the hegemonic bloc of REFCOM and 
actors of suburban development. As I have asserted above, REFCOM is a debt machine that aims 
to extract the highest possible rent for finance capital accumulation, rather than provide a volume 
of growth for economic progress; it is important to note that REFCOM mainly operates through 
the commodification of suburban development. There are various components of this suburban-
financial nexus, but I want to focus on one fundamental aspect associated with the sophisticated 
financial system: the rise of MNCs.  
MNCs are motivated by the need to produce shareholder value (Froud et al., 2006) in a system in 
which their corporate value is calculated by the rent-maximization value that they produce for their 
shareholders. The stock exchange serves as the realm in which they put their value into competition 
with others. In this financial architecture, the prominent goal is to keep financial shareholder value 
as high as possible. This loop of financial value creation puts pressure on the boards of 
corporations, the members of which strategize to extract as much value as possible and as cheaply 
as possible. The rise of shareholder value as one of the key components of the financial hegemony 
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has led corporations to mobilize more aggressive strategies against the socio-environmental facts 
of life. This form of capitalism is often presented as developmentalism in discourses that legitimize 
an obsession with growth. Shareholder value cannot be maintained at a high level without the 
domination of commodity and property markets. Commodity, property, and financial markets have 
thus become fully tied to each other, thanks to the importance of shareholder value, and most 
corporations have become accountable to their shareholders rather than their clients. 
Financialization as a strategy for producing shareholder value leads corporations to act as cruelly 
as possible vis-à-vis natural resources. This strategy reveals the extractive form of financialization: 
it extracts whatever it needs and leaves behind destruction because it needs to extract the highest 
potential rent to keep its shareholder value high in global competition. 
As an example of such extractive destruction, Mark Whitehead reports that most of the sensitive 
forest areas of the world are now threatened by timber and mining industries. He attributes this 
development to two main driving forces: the increasing violent greed of MNCs and the 
globalization of financialization. Whitehead argues: 
At one level, MNCs, like the fast-food outlet McDonald’s, operate in a number of different 
countries in order to expand the consumer population that can purchase its fast food 
products. Other MNCs, like the energy giant ExxonMobil, operate globally because the 
source of materials upon which this company relies (in this case gas and oil) are 
concentrated in certain countries and regions throughout the world. MNCs such as the 
clothes manufacturer GAP, have, by contrast, sought to globalize their production of 
apparel as a way to exploit the lower labour costs that can be found throughout different 
parts of the world. While MNCs are diverse, their significance as agents within the 
Anthropocene [the era in which human activity has become the primary influence on 
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climate and the environment] should not be underestimated…. Some argue that the size 
and power of MNCs now means that they are able to create virtual price monopolies for 
the goods and services they provide, and thus ultimately reduce competition and choice for 
consumers. (2014: 87-88)  
We should consider the critical role that MNCs play in socio-environmental processes, as these 
corporations operate in accordance with an agenda of extraction—whether it be to extract natural 
necessities of life or extract cheap labour power. As I noted above, it is also necessary to consider 
how the recent global hegemony of finance puts pressures on these MNCs to maintain their 
monopoly power for the sake of further accumulation and to prevent decline in shareholder value.  
Whitehead (2014) uses the term “jungle capitalism” to highlight how forests have been subjugated 
to the ultimate target of financial value extraction by MNCs. He emphasizes the role of the home 
decor and furniture industries, which are indispensably linked to urbanization and the housing 
market as extractive sectors. He claims:  
[IKEA] offers over 9000 timber-based products to their customers and consumes 
somewhere in the region of 7 million cubic metres of wood per year. With its 301 stores in 
37 different countries, IKEA is the example par excellence of the globalization of timber 
retail. But IKEA is not alone when it comes to the growing impact of big box retail on 
global timber transactions. Walmart, Home Depot, King Fisher (B&Q), Staples, and 
Lowe’s are all significant players in the global trade of timber…. They have flooded home 
improvement and furniture markets with products that are so cheap that it is impossible for 
smaller, local retailers to compete. (Ibid., 95–6) 
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Similarly, the oil industry also aims to dominate markets for energy usage. They maintain a 
monopoly on energy production, and under that monopoly, alternative energy streams have 
become a market strategy rather than a political choice necessary for our planet. The actors that 
dominate energy markets thus play a primary role in determining the rise of alternative energy 
systems. MNCs operate as rent-seekers; i.e., they lobby to foster their monopoly position in rent 
extraction. In their book Global Warming and the Sweetness of Life (2018), Matt Hern and Am 
Johal explore the case of the Canadian tar sands. They argue that capitalism has a tendency to 
extract accumulation from each form of life (2018: 24). Thus, global warming and ecological 
destruction may themselves serve as opportunities for capitalist exploitation. The tar sands in 
Alberta is estimated to be the largest industrial mega-project in the world, and according to Hern 
and Johal, it might be the largest contributor to pollution, contamination, and hence global 
warming. Although many indicators suggest that it might now be the developmentalist strategies 
of countries in the Global South that constitute the most detrimental practices to the world’s 
environments, the tar sands stand as a significant example in the Global North. Local and global 
mining and oil corporations all have a great interest in the tar sands, and they all provide necessary 
finance for the urbanization process, not only in Alberta but across all of Canada. Even in 
developing countries, many of the activities of extraction are carried out by MNCs with 
headquarters located in the Global North. 
In this schema, it is quite clear that most of the actors of REFCOM are also tied to the global 
mechanisms of shareholder value assessment. For the actors of REFCOM, rent extraction and the 
production of shareholder value are ingrained in further mega construction projects and massive 
housing projects, which are backed by the mining industry that provides necessary raw materials 
for construction. In this case, REFCOM perceives suburbanization as one of the key opportunities 
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for abstraction and extraction. REFCOM transforms the urbanization process into a predatory 
formation, which is now becoming much more explicit in developing countries.  
The grammar of developmentalism contributes to two crucial problems: On the one hand, 
developmentalist discourse serves a governmental growth strategy of extracting urban fortunes 
from suburban/urban land relations. On the other hand, when discourses of fast development or 
“catching up with the West” prevail, then citizenship rights, labour rights, and environmental 
concerns may be disregarded. Although we increasingly see these practices proceeding in 
developing countries, they may also take place in certain mature economies. We should not forget, 
moreover, that many MNCs that are based in the Western world try to abuse the developmentalist 
strategies of developing countries.  
MNCs see the new growth-based coalition of REFCOM as creating opportunities for easy 
exploitation in many developing cities and countries. Agatino Rizzo (2019) identifies this new 
phenomenon as “predatory cities.” He provides the example of the Persian Gulf Region—mainly 
Doha and Dubai—and emphasizes the role of the mega-project model as an exploitative predatory 
form. Similarly, in China, massive suburbanization through the building of new towns with large-
scale housing projects also functions as a predatory form (Zhu and Wu, 2019). Meanwhile, Turkey 
is following a similar developmentalist strategy, which is fundamentally based on the 
implementation of large-scale suburban housing and mega-projects on the periphery of Istanbul. 
Many of the construction corporations in Turkey also operate mining businesses (Ercan and Oğuz, 
2015). As these examples demonstrate, massive suburbanization usually takes place through two 
mechanisms: large-scale housing projects and infrastructural mega-projects. These projects have 
wide-reaching socio-environmental consequences, including the emission of greenhouse gases in 
the production of cement and other components of the construction process, the exploitation of 
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forests and other natural resources for construction materials, the spoiling of clean water sources, 
and the clearance of slums and displacement of people. It is no coincidence that countries with the 
largest cement usage, displayed in Figure 7 below, have recently launched large-scale suburban 
housing projects and infrastructural mega-projects. 
  
Figure 7. Volume of cement production in 2018 (metric tonnes). Source: USGD Minerals Information: 
https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/cement/mcs-2019-cemen.pdf 
This figure illustrates just one of the ways in which countries that embark on rent extraction 
through mega-projects and massive housing projects are tremendously exploiting the world’s 
natural resources. This exploitation is now open to global financial flows. For example, the 
Chinese ambition to construct a geographical landscape that is connected through large 
transportation networks and the construction of new towns has boosted the global consumption of 
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Table 4. REFCOM: Actors, beneficiaries, and sectors related to the financialization of the suburban housing market 
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Table 4 shows the actors, beneficiaries, and sectors that are linked to the financialization of the 
housing market, mainly the suburban housing market. Some of these actors have not directly joined 
the hegemonic bloc of REFCOM, but they do benefit from the rent-seeking and maximizing 
strategies of REFCOM. That is why the construction-driven hegemony is supported by various 
business sectors in the economy; it provides a point of consent manufacturing for an entire 
economic system. Agents of massive suburbanization aim to manufacture the consent of 
subordinated populations by generating a new norm of ownership dreams. 
4.4. Suburbanization through financialization 
Suburban development and the peripheral production of space have been objects of REFCOM 
since the early 1990s. As Lorenzo De Vidovich points out: “suburbs can be considered as the core 
component of 21st century urban growth” (2019: 2). Suburbanization in a general sense may be 
defined as: “the non-central growth of population and economic activity combined with the spatial 
expansion of urban areas” (Addie, Ekers and Keil, 2019). Suburbanization is primarily a way of 
producing space (Keil, 2013; Keil, Güney and Üçoğlu, 2019). That is why we should consider it 
within the framework of Lefebvre’s account of the production of space. The production of space 
is an outcome of hegemonic social relations. Therefore, suburbanization is a process that includes 
the dialectical processes that form the capitalist hegemony. Suburbanization is the key driving 
force of urbanization in the 21st century, and its articulation into the neoliberal hegemony has taken 
place within a regional context of property relations. Hence, suburbanization cannot be excluded 
from the property relations that neoliberal hegemony instigates through financialization.  
Suburbs, then, cannot be defined without reference to the new financialized property relations 
based on increasing indebtedness and asset-based welfare. There is an increasing tendency to 
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define suburbs within regional contexts, as suburbanization refers to a new type of regionality that 
includes a multiplicity of variegated governance (Hamel and Keil, 2015). From that perspective, 
we must emphasize that suburbs can no longer be categorized as the extended semi-urban form of 
cities. Rather, suburbs dynamically constitute their own forms of everyday life (Keil, Güney and 
Üçoğlu, 2019). As Arnisson Andre C. Ortega (2018) suggests, it would be a mistake to essentialize 
suburbs under the classical image of a white middle-class North American lifestyle. Suburbs in 
many parts of the worlds are home to people from many different classes, as well as terrains of 
hegemonic power relations, neoliberal capital accumulation regimes, and networks of capital 
flows. Around the world, suburbanization is increasingly associated with capital accumulation 
(Shen and Wu, 2017), and this new financialized suburban development is not necessarily 
connected to the dynamics of classical urban growth theories. Suburbs are now a leading terrain 
of neoliberal hegemony construction because the majority of populations in many countries now 
reside in the areas categorized as suburbs.  
Neoliberal hegemony construction in the suburbs makes the suburban housing market as the key 
object of financialization. Critical scholarship broadly theorizes neoliberal urbanization as a 
process of producing space to expedite capital flows and establish a spatial context in which capital 
accumulation advances in a facilitated way for certain classes (Brenner and Theodore, 1999, 2005; 
He and Wu, 2009; Le Gales, 2016). Neoliberal urbanization must also be theorized as a hegemonic 
process that aims to produce space through social segregation. As Lefebvre (1991) indicates, the 
production of space carried out by the capitalist hegemony is a violent process. Lefebvre stresses 
that: “hegemony implies more than an influence, more even than the permanent use of repressive 
power” (1991: 10). Hegemonic balance-seeking thus includes a violent aspect, which does not 
have to take the form of direct repressive physical violence but may rather exist as social 
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distinction, direct exclusion, or mass hatred toward certain groups of society. As Julie-Anne 
Boudreau, Roger Keil, and Douglas Young (2009) highlight, neoliberal urbanization often occurs 
through a violent strategy of segregation, exclusion, and dispossession. More specifically, 
neoliberal urbanization refers to a process that protects the interests of financial corporate elites 
and the top 10 percent of the social scale at the expense of others. The neoliberal urbanization 
process thus instigates an urban reality that is segregated based on income, social status, and ethnic 
identity.  
Many scholars have examined this violent process of neoliberal urbanization through analyses of 
revanchism (Smith, 1996), gentrification (Lees, Shin and Morales, 2016; Zukin, 1987), slum 
clearance and mass eviction (Desmond, 2012; Karaman, 2013; Kuyucu and Unsal, 2010; Roy, 
2017; Soederberg, 2018), and urban austerity (Mayer, 2013, Peck, 2012). Essentially, the mass 
eviction of residents from informal or formal housing in many parts of the world has become a 
widespread neoliberal practice to enable the building of new housing projects. Urban austerity, in 
the meantime, refers to the prioritized allocation of tax money collected in neoliberal contexts to 
facilitate capital accumulation for certain hegemonic groups. Due to the violent dimension of 
neoliberal urbanization and its austerity policies, critical scholars have also analyzed the neoliberal 
urbanization process in terms of changing security perceptions, segregated socio-spatial settings, 
and increasing social income disparity in cities. Mike Davis’s famous explanation for the 
displacement of the urban poor remains crucial in this context. Focusing on the example of Los 
Angeles, Davis (1990) argues that neoliberal urbanization aims to build two types of urban forms: 
“pleasure-domes” for the rich and imprisonment for the poor. Theresa Caldeira (2000) similarly 
asserts that the neoliberal city is built on a strategy of social enclaves. In many parts of the world, 
enclaves and gated communities are key results of neoliberal urbanization. 
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Therefore, to analyze suburbanization as a terrain, we need to examine its link to selective urban 
austerity policies. These policies prioritize capital accumulation for certain groups, while in the 
meantime creating a vulnerable segregated social reality that is shaped by the perception of 
security. In order to explain this violent urban process, which mainly takes place in the suburbs, 
Ortega (2016) uses the concept of “neoliberalism through suburbanization.” He specifically uses 
this phrase to describe the recent suburban real estate boom in the Philippines. However, what 
makes this general definition important is how it applies to research on different cases of 
urbanization under neoliberal financial hegemony. As Ortega asserts, the neoliberal urbanization 
process accelerates through a mentality of security, segregation, and urban fortification (2016: 28). 
Gated communities, according to him, are key outcomes of this process. Neoliberalization through 
suburbanization is gaining momentum in many parts of the world, where luxurious suburban gated 
communities, large-scale suburban housing projects, and newly constructed towns emerge at the 
heart of this process. 
Neoliberalization through suburbanization is also subject to, and generative of, norms that 
configure everydayness in the production of peripheral space. Hence, suburbanization as a 
hegemonic process generates its own everydayness vis-à-vis urbanized everyday life. The crucial 
point of consideration here is what kind of life is being brought into existence via neoliberalization 
through suburbanization. Gated communities, or housing projects that resemble gated 
communities, represent one of the primary ways in which suburban space is produced in many 
parts of the world. As Renaud Le Goix and Elena Vesselinov (2012: 2130) assert, there are two 
main approaches to defining gated communities in the research literature: (1) gated communities 
are part of a larger, more general class of planned communities organized around collective tenure 
(McKenzie, 1994; Gordon, 2004); and (2) gated communities are distinguished by the existence 
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of fences, walls, and other security features (reference here). This segregated form of life fosters a 
perception of security, which enables the neoliberal hegemony to manufacture consent for living 
or moving into gated communities. Gated communities commonly exist in the form of high-rise 
condominium buildings (vertical segregated planning) with security units, as well as mass housing 
projects with special security and surveillance systems. The latter are commonly seen in suburban 
areas. However, that does not mean that gated communities all have strict security systems with 
fences and walls. Certain suburban neighbourhoods also resemble gated communities, in so far as 
they accommodate only people from certain ethno-social classes, thereby reproducing a similar 
logic of exclusion. 
As Fulong Wu (2010) illustrates for the case of China, suburban gated communities are often 
presented in a Western-style built form. They are generally presented as the latest form of modern 
life that offers a privileged status and family life. In a conventional sense, suburbs have been 
known as spaces of middle-class families. However, while this does describe a particular image of 
the American suburban dream that emerged in the post-war period, we can no longer define 
suburbanization as being essentially middle-class and white. Suburbs are dynamic and currently 
accommodate diverse socio-economic activities (Harris, 2010) that emerge through the 
transformation of suburban land. As such, we need to understand that several ways of producing 
suburban land exist, and each reflects and reproduces a different socio-spatial reality. Thus, the 
conventional image of North American white suburbs organized around middle-class norms of 
automobility can no longer serve as the sole model of suburban reality.  
Throughout the history of suburban landscapes, variegated forms of suburban development have 
emerged. In the decades following the Second World War, the North American suburban 
landscape became a powerful symbol of ownership dreams. In developing or latecomer economies, 
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suburban development in the neoliberal epoch is now advancing through urban fortification 
projects that take the form of either new suburban towns or luxurious gated communities. As Walks 
indicates: “perhaps no other neighbourhood form is more clearly associated with contemporary 
neoliberal times than gated communities” (2006: 469). Such communities are now the primary 
form of suburban housing markets. Hence, as Peck argues: “Gating is the most visible 
manifestation of a much wider and deeper privatization of (sub)urban governance in the United 
States, yielding an expansive complex of homeowner associations, quasi-private community-
management regimes, and ‘association-governed communities’” (2015: 142).  
As Karl Schmid (2019) indicates in the case of Cairo, these segregated suburban projects often 
have Americanized names, such as Evergreen Compound. In Istanbul, gated communities built 
over the last two decades have followed a similar branding trend, with names such as Kemer 
Country, Uphill Residences, Mashattan, and Capital Hill. Likewise, gated communities in Manila 
bear monikers such as Greenfield Residences (Ortega, 2016). The branding of many of these 
projects connotes “greenness,” promising a so-called built environment that links nature with an 
idealized, securitized, and sterilized lifestyle. These projects are either fortified or they are 
constructed far from other built environments and accommodate people of certain social and ethnic 
groups. In the suburbs of the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), they are not always gated, but they 
nonetheless exist in the form of exclusive communities or segregated subdivisions. 
Suburbs exist in a multiplicity of produced spaces throughout the world. The neoliberal 
suburbanization of land takes place through three key strategies: the shift of certain businesses into 
suburbs (particularly in the form of warehouses), the construction of mega infrastructure projects 
(usually transportation-based projects), and the construction of massive gated communities, either 
in the form of Americanized affluent lifestyle communities or mass high-rise buildings. Urban 
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fortification is a widespread way of producing suburban space. As Wu (2010) points out, this 
growth in suburban gated communities has not created any widespread concern in Chinese society. 
Similarly, in Istanbul, the proliferation of gated communities is not generally seen as a problem 
for urban life. Rather, many of these gated sites are accepted as given because many people want 
to live the “privileged life” that they promise.  
Neoliberalization through suburbanization yields the dream of rentiership for households. 
Exercising active agency to acquire property converts people into active and potential rent-seekers 
(or maximizers), at least in countries where real estate speculation is at a peak. In order to 
reconfigure this new society of ownership, there needs to be a real estate boom that is presented as 
a locomotive of economic growth. The real estate boom, in the age of financialization, is generated 
through various ways. As I point out above, the state, as part of REFCOM, regulates the financial-
housing nexus and the reorganization of social order; hence, the state is not a neutral actor in this 
process but is rather widely influenced by the logic of financial markets. This dialectical 
relationship between the state and financial markets has led states to foster favourable conditions 
for the construction of speculative property markets (Sokol, 2017: 680). The speculative 
composition of property markets is exacerbated by the massive construction of new suburban 
housing. The real estate booms that we have been witnessing over the last decade in many different 
parts of the world are mainly suburban. Hence, as Ortega (2018) emphasizes, there is an increasing 
relationship between the current suburbanization process and capital accumulation. Jie Shen and 
Wu (2016), in a similar vein, argue that suburbanization in many countries has become a means 
for accumulating capital. Hence, suburbanization is helping to create a new real estate boom that 
is tied to global financial markets.  
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Another dimension of the suburban-financial nexus can be explained through an examination of 
other key actors of the process: REITs. Richard Waldron asserts that: 
A Real Estate Investment Trust is a publicly listed company whose main activity is the 
ownership and management of income-producing real estate and allows investors to hold 
property through shares rather than direct investments. REITs are typically exempt from 
tax on rental income and capital gains subject to certain restrictions on ownership, 
borrowing, and distributions of earnings. (2018: 209) 
REITs are key private sector actors that transform spatially-fixed properties into tradeable, income-
yielding financial assets (Ibid., 209). REITs are huge networks that hold properties and connect 
several actors, such as financiers, developers, investors, homeowners, secondary mortgage lenders, 
and tenants. These corporations act as the bridge between financial markets and property markets. 
In certain countries, as is the case in Turkey, REITs can even offer their own mortgage credits to 
potential homeowners (Erol and Tirtiroğlu, 2008). The suburban-financial nexus reflects how in 
recent decades, REITs have tended to invest in suburban land. Thus, neoliberalization through 
suburbanization takes place by key REFCOM actors, and the narrative of growth articulates other 
actors into the investment greed of REITs.  
REITs have a great interest in transforming suburban fixed assets into liquid financial assets, and 
the financialization of housing thus primarily takes place in the suburban housing market. To 
understand why REFCOM has targeted the suburban housing market, it is helpful to consider 
Richard Harris and Ute Lehrer’s description of the essence of suburban land. Suburban land has 
become a favourable site for developers, speculators, and investors because it is easy to convert it 
into commercial land or investment. Harris and Lehrer (2018) indicate that land is associated with 
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its usage externalities such as proximity to infrastructural investments, locational position and 
commercial investments in the vicinity. Land is also strictly tied to the legal system since it is 
limited and cannot be moved. The ownership of land, then, refers to a monopoly over a space on 
earth. Land, however, is also linked to its externalities with respect to its valuation. The value of 
land is often calculated by its externalities, such as its proximity to public facilities or business 
opportunities, neighbourhood profile, local crime rate, government investment in the area, 
surrounding natural landscape, and so on. In fact, location plays the most crucial role in the 
valuation of land and housing. The location of housing is a matter of regional development since 
the housing market is now composed of several sub-markets on a regional scale. Regional 
submarkets may vary in their composition, including neighbourhood demographics, immigration 
trends, and near-by facilities. Other relevant factors include a region’s employment growth rate, 
as well as its unemployment rate (Linneman, 2013: 104).  
The actors of real estate capitalism tend to analyze regional growth strategies in order to calculate 
housing prices based on marginal utility. A house cannot be evaluated as a market commodity 
without considering its location and without estimating the potential utilities that might come into 
being through local investments and demographic dynamics. On that front, the expansion of 
peripheral land is cheaper than the transformation of an already inhabited central neighbourhood. 
In other words, the potential speculative wealth that might be extracted through the conversion of 
agricultural or green land (sometimes greenbelt) into suburban residential land is higher, as well 
as easier to generate, than the wealth offered by the gentrification of central neighbourhoods.  
According to Lehrer (2013), another important aspect of suburban land is that it is much more 
flexible in how it may be used, compared with centralized locations. Lehrer proposes the concept 
of “FlexSpace” to describe flexible land control in suburbs. This quality helps to account for the 
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ease of land development in suburbs, as FlexSpaces may be composed of corporate business 
headquarters, banks, gas stations, warehouses, airports, and suburban residential housing, often 
located near a highway. Harris and Lehrer explain that:  
Suburban space… lies between city and country, the urban and the rural. By “urban” we 
refer to territory that is fully built up at relatively high densities; “rural” consists of a 
variable mix of agriculture, wasteland, and wilderness. In the past, when many urban areas 
were strongly monocentric, suburbs occupied a zone that was broadly circular…. Suburban 
territory is a transitional territory and is often associated with the visible infrastructures 
related to the transitional form including self-storage facilities, transmission towers, and 
pipelines, but overwhelmingly to transportation of people and goods: highways, parking 
lots, rail lines, freight yards, truck terminals, warehouses, storage tanks, and airports. Much 
of this infrastructure serves the city, linking it to the region and places beyond: it is, 
precisely, what visitors, commuters, and truckers need in order to get to and from the 
centre. (Ibid., 7-8) 
Suburban land is thus transitional land: “suburbs are transitional in space, in time, and in their 
cultural aspects” (Harris and Lehrer 2018: 5). This time-space axis may be elucidated through the 
changing morphology and expansion priorities of suburban development and investment in 




Figure 8. An example of FlexSpace in Brampton, Ontario. This new Toronto Dominium (TD) Bank headquarters in 
Brampton is located in between Brampton and Mississauga, in the Peel Region of the GTA. It is located close to Ray 
Lawson Boulevard in Brampton, where many members of immigrant communities reside. The production of space in 
this example shows how the suburbanization process produces its own socio-spatial dynamics. Photo credit: Murat 
Üçoğlu  
Suburban land control is flexible, and it enables variegated morphologies of infrastructural and 
residential facilities to emerge. The flexibility of suburban land control is decisive for the 
formation of the suburban-financial nexus. Suburban mega-projects, massive residential projects, 
and massive gated communities are constructed within the confines of this flexible suburban land 
usage. This flexibility is relevant not only for the construction of massive projects, but also for 
auto-constructed suburbs (Caldeira, 2016). In many parts of the world, particularly in developing 
countries, suburban reality consists of houses constructed by the residents themselves (e.g., slums, 
gecekondu, and favelas). In most cases, the residents of these houses do not acquire a tenure license 
for legal dwelling. This legal ambiguity opens these suburban areas to flexible land usage and 




4.5. The suburban-financial nexus as debt machine 
Flexible suburban land use in the 21st century is open to global financial flows from all around the 
world. China’s massive new towns, Brampton’s large-scale detached housing projects, and 
Istanbul’s gated communities are all linked to global financial systems. These projects are 
constructed within the context of flexible land governance and planning. That is why capital 
accumulation through flexible suburban land use has become a global inter-referencing point. Shen 
and Wu write that: “capital accumulation has become a major driving force for suburbanization” 
(2017: 762). The opportunity for capital accumulation by REFCOM creates the opening for future 
cities in waiting. For instance, in the Chinese case, capital accumulation through suburbanization 
occurs through a mixture of market logic and state authority, in what Shen and Wu describe as a 
widespread strategy of public-private partnerships (Ibid.). They assert that the Chinese case cannot 
be conflated with post-war North American suburbanization; rather, it entails its own dynamics 
based on suburban land relations.  
As I note above, massive suburbanization encompasses many different regimes of governance and 
relations. Michael Ekers, Pierre Hamel, and Keil (2015) identify the suburbanization process with 
a new form of governance that encapsulates three modalities: the role of capital accumulation, the 
role of the state, and private authoritarian governance. These three modalities are closely 
interconnected. On the global periphery, we thus see suburbanization working as a key force of 
capital accumulation, financialization, and private-level residential authoritarianism.  
Development and real estate industries play crucial roles in this new suburbanization process (Shen 
and Wu, 2017: 763). Mega-projects on suburban land, in the case of Turkey (Güney, 2019), Dubai, 
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and China (Harvey, 2018), have now become a normalized means of producing space to increase 
land value and to maintain the speculative housing economy. Harris points out: 
Huge profits are made from suburban development, especially around rapidly growing 
cities. They attract big investments in a world of global capital flows. Some money goes 
into mere speculation, but massive amounts support useful investments in infrastructure. 
Suburban development, and the millions of people who benefit from it, is vulnerable to 
anything that stems or redirects such flows, including hiccups in the financial system. At 
the same time, property speculation has helped precipitate such crisis, as it did during the 
Great Depression, in the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s, and the global meltdown of 
2008. (Ibid., 38) 
As Harris puts forward, suburban development may be easily linked to global financial flows. The 
metabolic relationship between property development and finance capital investment is not 
necessarily associated with the remaking of downtown localities. It is true that the financialization 
of the housing market may lead to the expansion of downtown localities for further rent-
maximization by REFCOM; however, this is not always the case. Rather, suburban development 
is often the agenda and more profitable option for this new growth coalition because suburban land 
is typically cheaper in value and larger in size compared with already developed urban centers. 
Suburbanization and financialization of the housing market are now completely tied to each other. 
That is why I assert the existence of a suburban-financial nexus that is shaped by the capital 




Figure 9. Real estates as a share of aggregate wealth in Canada and Turkey. Sources: https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-
626-x/11-626-x2019003-eng.htm; http://www.tuik.gov.tr/  
There is one more indicator that we must examine for the purposes of this study: real estate as a 
share of aggregate wealth, in Canada and Turkey. Figure 9 shows that regardless of each country’s 
international economic outlook (i.e., whether or not the national economy is classified as 
developed or developing), real estate offers the primary means of accumulating wealth. This 
wealth accumulation comes with the price of increasing indebtedness, social segregation, urban 
poverty, and homelessness. Most housing projects are currently located in the suburbs, which have 
become ultimate terrains of wealth accumulation in both countries. However, suburbs are also 
terrains of debt accumulation. In these two economies, Toronto and Istanbul are leading global-
city regions that indulge a considerable amount of finance capital flow through housing. Suburban 
housing projects constitute key elements of this wealth accumulation through financialization. 
Thus, the suburban-financial nexus is not only a matter of REFCOM actors playing financial 
games for further projects; rather, it is also a socio-economic fact that has great impacts on 
communities. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, I will examine how the suburban-financial nexus 
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operates as a debt machine in the GTA (particularly Brampton) and Istanbul (particularly 
Göktürk). 
4.6. Conclusion 
Throughout the first chapters of this dissertation, I have discussed the link between financialization 
and new property relations. In doing so, my aim has been to construct a theoretical approach for 
defining and examining the financialization of suburban housing. It is not a simple matter of saying 
that people need more affordable housing and that is why we must expand the suburban housing 
market. In fact, housing as an asset will never become affordable when the market dynamics are 
controlled by private market actors. For now, the state acts as a facilitator of these private market 
actors, enabling their capital accumulation.  
Suburbanization is an important process that financialization situates as a key target. 
Suburbanization historically refers to a conservative lifestyle composed of patriarchal family 
relations, sharply gendered roles, and isolation from urban life. Under neoliberal hegemony, 
suburbanization has become a key driving force of urbanization; this hegemony embraces 
conservative suburban values, primarily as a way to promote suburban housing projects. 
Neoliberalization through suburbanization thus proceeds through the promotion of conservative 
family values, patrimonial capital investments, and gated segregated lifestyles. The suburban-
financial nexus entails a confluence of financialization and suburbanization, in which REFCOM 
actors (mainly the state, MNCs, and REITS) operate as a debt machine. The financialization of the 
suburban housing market thus instigates an indebted society, as suburbanization has been 
reproduced in accordance with the new property relations configured by financialization.  
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Suburban housing markets are also regional matters. Through suburban housing markets, regional 
housing markets become growth (debt) machines. The regionalization of housing markets also 
leads to the regionalization of housing crisis. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, I will present the 
empirical components of this dissertation research in order to demonstrate through specific case 




Chapter 5: From Agro-Industrial Complex to the Real Estate-Financial Complex: The 
Suburban-Financial Nexus in Toronto and Brampton 
In this chapter, I focus on the financialization of housing in Toronto and Brampton in Ontario, 
Canada. The key argument that I develop here is that the financialization of housing in the Greater 
Toronto Area (GTA) refers to a new hegemonic restructuring, in which the growth model of 
REFCOM has become the dominant way of wealth accumulation for certain growth coalitions. 
This restructuring mainly takes place in downtown Toronto and in the suburban towns of Peel 
Region, including Brampton. I first discuss the rise of Toronto as a global financial hub and the 
regionalization of a new political economy in the GTA. Then I shift my focus to Brampton, sharing 
the findings of fieldwork that I conducted in this suburban city. Interviews with a variety of key 
informants helped me develop the necessary background knowledge to understand the ongoing 
economic restructuring of the region vis-à-vis the housing market in the GTA and Brampton. I 
attended meetings with the Brampton Vision Team to discuss their new vision plan. Using 
snowball sampling, I was also able to interview many people on the housing economy in the GTA. 
I will share more details about these interviews in the next sections of this chapter. 
This chapter deals with the housing market dynamics in Toronto and Brampton. It offers a regional 
perspective, with a special emphasis on suburban governance. When we talk about suburbanization 
in the Canadian context, we should keep in mind that we are, as Keil (2016) puts forward, talking 
about colonization of indigenous land. In Canada, colonization of indigenous land has played an 
essential part in suburbanization, and it remains an important feature of regional economic 
expansion. In Toronto, suburbanization began with the immigration of colonial settlers into the 
area. Those settler communities started to build their own living environments by displacing 
indigenous peoples from their territories. The huge amount of colonized land provided ready 
opportunities for expansion, ownership, and accumulation by newcomer communities. Currently, 
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suburbanization continues to occur as a practice of land colonization. Land colonization is now a 
competitive essence of the regional economy and is proceeding hand in hand with massive 
capitalist accumulation by actors in the construction and financial sectors.  
5.1. The changing economy and the financialization of housing as a new growth model 
The transformation of Ontario’s economy (but mainly Toronto region) from being constructed 
upon a growth model based on manufacturing industries and agriculture to a new model that is 
depended on the financialization of housing is the theme of this part. The neoliberal transformation 
in Ontario (and particularly in Toronto) has been similar to what has happened in many parts of 
the world under the well-known topic of “neoliberal turn”. 
Neoliberalism first appeared in the 1970s as a project to break working-class resistance to 
the restructuring of capital and the state. Its economic policy regime can be summarized as 
“market-expanding” in its regulatory focus on the market determination of distribution and 
allocation of output, the internationalization of capital, the monetization of the public 
sectors, and self-regulation by market dependence for economic agents. As with any 
economic policy regime, neoliberalism forms within particular political strategies and is 
institutionally mediated within states. Neoliberal policy regulations is always, therefore, 
uneven and differentiated across political jurisdictions and governance scales, or 
“variegated” in the terminology of urban geography (Albo and Fanelli, 2018: pr. 7).  
In Ontario, therefore, we can see the transition from a traditional social welfare regime to a new 
neoliberal-financial project as a massive restructuring based on market fundamentalism, 
financialization and the subordination of the working-class. This transition can be named as a shift 
from the agro-industrial complex to the real/estate financial complex (REFCOM). The rise of 
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REFCOM in Ontario, and particularly in Toronto is not only a strategy that we can attach to the 
Progressive Conservative (PC) party policies, but it is a general consensus of party politics.  
One of the parameters that we must consider to understand this transition of socio-economic 
conditions in Ontario is that the party politics in this province has been in parallel with the 
transformation of property relations and the rise of neoliberalism as a new capitalist hegemony. 
The solidity of Canada’s national party system has been built, it is argued, on the 
overwhelming electoral dominance of the Conservative and Liberal parties, with their 
overlapping system of support from Canada’s business elites. The social democratic New 
Democratic Party (NDP), with its historical links to the labour movement, occupies a 
subordinate place within the system. But the NDP is equally committed to building a 
market economy (if balanced by a measure of social supports), and offers an alternate 
channel for political integration. None of the sub-national political systems in Canada have 
replicated this pattern more closely than Ontario, the second largest province by geography 
and largest by population. (Albo, 2019: 3). 
Hence the strategy of Ontario since the 1990s has been built on the shift from being the Canadian 
economic hearthland to a North American economic region state (Ibid.). If we scrutinize the history 
of Ontario, it is not a surprising strategy since Ontario has always followed the widespread North 
American growth model. “The North American growth model is constructed around the equal 
shares of intensive (agro-industrial growth) and extensive (demographic) growths. We can say that 
their shares are approximately 50-50%. Ontario is one of the leading regions that follows this 
model of 50-50% growth model alongside with California” (Interviewee 8). Hence, Ontario’s 
economic model is akin to the American growth model, and is also linked to the industrial growth 
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related to American market as well as immigration. Extensive growth is a crucial part of growth 
since immigration streams have been a significant factor in the North American economic system 
since the time of colonization. Extensive growth is then not only about bringing new immigrants 
into Ontario but also displacing the indigenous people from their land.  
The displacement of first nation people provided an easy way of primitive accumulation 
for colonizers. The consequence of this process was the rise of single farmers owning huge 
lands and appropriating the lands of first nations. New immigrants and displaced first 
nation people then went to the cities to find job. That is to say a rural proletariat has never 
been the case in Ontario, instead urban proletariat grew so rapidly in the late 19th century 
with the rise automobile industry, bicycle production as well as small industries like 
shoemakers, textile workshops and distilleries (Interviewee 8).  
In Ontario, the growth model, then has been constructed on easy primitive accumulation by 
expropriating the lands of first nations and by using immigration as a way of proletarianizing the 
new immigrant working classes. This growth model has put Toronto into the center of gravity 
since the very beginning. Toronto, with its financial centre hosting one of the largest stock 
exchanges in the world, stands as the financial hub of Canada and the demographic attraction point 
of Ontario.  
Ontario’s economic growth model then prioritized the demographic restructuring to boost the 
intensive growth. Immigrants from many different streams (in the late 19th century they were 
usually from English Isles, Germany and Italy) came to the cities and the countryside was 
appropriated by the rich and agricultural producers mainly by dispossessing and marginalizing the 
first nations. This ongoing process has resulted with the rise of an agro-industrial complex that 
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was supported by the governmental body in Ontario. In Ontario’s politics, the state has never been 
the key constructor of politico-economic distribution. Rather, it aims at letting the market function 
and see where to support market actors. Therefore, we always need to take account that even the 
party politics in Ontario have always been pro-market and the 50-50% growth model has been a 
key itinerary for the governments (Albo, 2019). 
In fact, in recent years, the economic growth model in Ontario has been configured by the rising 
shares of the services sectors and construction/real estate economy. In Canada, a considerable 
share of annual GDP is produced in the construction and real estate sectors; in contrast, industrial 
manufacturing’s share of GDP has steadily fallen since the 1990s. As of 2019, Canada’s GDP was 
1.988 trillion CAD. Table 5 provides a breakdown of total GDP by sector—and shows that the real 
estate and construction sectors constitute the largest pieces of this pie. It is important to note that 
the greatest share of Canada’s economic activities take place in Ontario, as Ontario produces 37–
39 percent of Canada’s total GDP (based on data from 2012–2019). Therefore, Ontario is the 
economic centre of Canada. 
Total GDP of Canada  
Real estate  
Manufacturing  
Mining, oil, and gas extraction 
Construction 
Finance and insurance 
Professional, scientific, and technical services 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting 
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In Ontario’s economy, manufacturing sectors have played a crucial role since the early 1900s. 
Before then, in the late 19th century, farming, hunting (fur industry), and lumbering were the main 
economic sectors in the province, along with small urban industries. During that early colonial 
period, much of the economic growth in Ontario derived from the appropriation of land from First 
Nations. This colonial economy, based on the displacement of First Nation people, provided an 
easy source of primitive accumulation for agrarian and colonizer capitalists. It resulted in the rise 
of farmers owning huge lands appropriated from First Nations. New immigrants and displaced 
First Nations peoples then traveled to cities to find jobs. As such, a sizeable rural proletariat never 
existed in Ontario; instead, the urban proletariat grew rapidly in the late 19th century, with the rise 
of the automobile industry, bicycle production, and small industries such as shoemakers, textile 
workshops, and distilleries (Interviewee 8).  
In Ontario, then, growth models have been built on primitive accumulation driven by the 
expropriation of First Nations lands and the use of immigration to proletarianize the new 
immigrant working classes. Toronto has served as the centre of Ontario’s historically divergent 
growth models, since the very outset of First Nations land expropriation. Land appropriation, 
farming, lumbering, and mining have always played a crucial role in Ontario’s economic growth. 
Many economic sectors grew around this appropriative colonial mentality. Now in neoliberal 
times, land appropriation continues through a neoliberal urbanization process that aims to generate 
capital accumulation for the top centiles of society. When we look at the sectoral breakdown of 
Ontario’s GDP in Table 6, we find striking similarities to the national GDP of Canada. This table 
shows the importance of the production of space, as the real estate sector currently leads the 
provincial economy and the construction sector also has a considerable share. Together, the real 
estate and construction sectors constitute 19.79 percent of Ontario’s total economy, which is 
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similar to their share at the national level (these two sectors account for 19.25 percent of Canada’s 
national GDP).  
Total GDP of Ontario 744.44 (bn. CAD) Share of GDP (percent) 
Real estate, rental, and leasing 97.57 13.01 
Manufacturing 89.15 11.98 
Finance and insurance 68.11 9.15 
Professional, scientific, and technical services 55.23 7.42 
Healthcare and social assistance 54.86 7.37 
Public administration 54.58 7.33 
Construction 50.47 6.78 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting 0.68 0.92 
Other 268.14 36.04 
Table 6. Breakdown of Ontario’s total GDP by sector, Source: 
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3610040201 
 
The rise of the real estate and construction sectors does not represent a simple transition in the 
production of space; rather, it is a part of a complex strategy to create a new growth model based 
on the financialization of real estate. Since the 1990s, the REFCOM growth model has become a 
key economic strategy in Ontario, combined with the conservative austerity program introduced 
by Mike Harris’s provincial government. With these shifts, we see a transition from a 
manufacturing-based economy to a growth model focused on real estate and financial and technical 
services.  
The rise of the REFCOM growth model has been accompanied by the decline of manufacturing in 
Ontario. Historically, manufacturing served as a locomotive of the Canadian economy since the 
1900s. Although agriculture also played an important role, helping to create an agro-industrial 
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complex, the manufacturing industries produced 25 percent of Canada’s GDP between 1916–1924. 
We can see that the share of manufacturing in GDP reached its zenith from 1940–1970. In 1940, 
the share of manufacturing was 28 percent, the highest seen in Canadian history. From that point 
until 1970, this percentage fluctuated between 28 and 25 percent. In the 1980s, a decline in 
manufacturing began, in parallel with the neoliberal restructuring of the world. Between 1988–
1992, the share of manufacturing fluctuated between 16 and 18 percent. Between 1992–1996, it 
fluctuated between 17 and 22 percent. From the passage of the NAFTA agreement in 1994 into 
the 2000s, the share of manufacturing decreased every year. In 2007, manufacturing accounted for 
15 percent of the nation GDP. By 2019, it had dropped to 10 percent. From 2000 –2005, 
manufacturing declined by 4.6 percent, and from 2005–2019, it declined by 5.54 percent.16 
Along with the decline of manufacturing in Canada, we witness the rise of real estate, service, 
finance, construction, and mining sectors over time. Ontario stands as the leading site of this 
economic transformation in the country. Ontario accounts for 46.1 percent of Canada’s industrial 
manufacturing and 44 percent of the country’s manufacturing employment. By examining Ontario, 
we may gain insight into how the larger Canadian economy has evolved. Ontario has always been 
the centre of the country’s socio-economic development, and trends in the province’s economic 
development have more or less paralleled those of the national body. Ontario, particularly Southern 
Ontario, has been the site of an important agro-industrial complex that began to emerge in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries (Interviewee 8). Over time, manufacturing industries have become 
less important than newly rising sectors in this region. The leading manufacturing industries in 
 
16 All of the data in this section has been retrieved from two sources, unless otherwise indicated: 1) Statistics 
Canada; and 2) labour market reports from the Ontario Government. 
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Ontario include the appliance, beverage, chemical, computer, electronics, metal, paper, plastics, 
printing, textile, transportation, and wood industries. In 2000, the number of people employed in 
such sectors was 937,370. By 2011, that number had fallen to 712,060. This decrease in 
manufacturing continued throughout the 2010s. For instance, from May 2018–2019, employment 
in manufacturing in Ontario declined by 14.4 percent; over the same period, employment in sales 
and service sectors increased by 67.7 percent (Ontario Labour Market Report, 2019).  
It is important to explore the reasons for this decline and the corresponding rise of the real estate, 
construction, and finance sectors. One key factor comprises historical shifts in human capital. In 
other words, one reason for declining employment in the manufacturing sector is that 
manufacturing jobs increasingly require high-credited skills. Credentials, particularly university 
and college degrees, are now important for getting a job working with new manufacturing 
technologies. However, this alone does not account for the ongoing economic transformation in 
the province. Another factor is the increasing global demand for primary commodities, such as 
petroleum, natural gas, and other primary commodities (we can even classify housing in this 
category) that have gained importance with the rise of the global population and globalization. 
Canada is rich in natural resources, and its mining and oil sectors have profited from increased 
global demand for primary commodities. This has resulted in the appreciation of the Canadian 
exchange rate. In turn, the increased strength of the Canadian dollar has driven up Canadian 
manufacturers’ prices, while in the process decreasing the sector’s international competitiveness 
(McKitrick and Aliakbari 2017: 17). Thus, global demand for primary commodities has elevated 
the Canadian currency relative to the US dollar, which has lowered the competitiveness of 
Canada’s manufacturing sectors. In this case, mining and oil extraction have become particularly 
important. Global money flows for primary commodities have helped to increase the drive to 
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replace declining manufacturing industries with new sectors. As part of the neoliberalization 
process, cultural industries and service sectors have gained importance. However, it is the real 
estate, construction, and finance sectors that now dominate the Ontario economy.  
This chapter aims to analyze the rise of the REFCOM growth model in Ontario, particularly in the 
GTA, as a leading strategy of capital accumulation, particularly for large-scale developers, REITs, 
financial institutions, and other actors of the housing market. Housing and urbanization have 
become the driving forces of economic growth. Before diving into the details of why and how 
housing has become a key source of capital accumulation, it is important to touch upon another 
dimension of economic growth in Canada: immigration. Immigration has always played a crucial 
role in Canada’s economic growth, and Ontario has always been the central destination of 
immigrants to the country. Between 2000–2005, Ontario received around 57 percent of all 
incoming immigrants in Canada. Between 2005–2010, this number declined to 45 percent. From 
2010–2015, 38 percent of all immigrants coming to the country landed in Ontario. Thus, although 
its share of immigration has declined over the years, Ontario remains the leading destination for 
immigrants to Canada. Another important trend to note with respect to immigration and the 
housing market is that each year, more immigrants enter into the mortgage markets in Canada. In 
principle, most immigrants begin their lives in Canada as tenants; however, as time passes, they 
also enter mortgage markets. One third of new immigrants directly attempt to access financial tools 
to buy a house. This articulates a considerable amount of people into the mortgage pool of the 
housing market. Among recent immigrants, 38.1 percent own a house (Edmonston and Lee, 2013).  
Until the late 1960s, immigrants to Canada mainly came from European countries, Commonwealth 
countries, and the United States (US). In 1967, however, Canadian immigration law was amended 
to alter the process of immigrant selection; while the previous system of selection granted to 
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preference to certain immigrants based on their place of birth, the new points-based system focused 
on skills and credentials. Since then, we have witnessed a more diversified immigration stream. In 
the 1970s, immigrants from India, China, and other developing countries began to come to Canada 
in larger numbers. In the 1980s and 1990s, we see the rise of people coming from post-Soviet 
countries. In the last two decades, people from developing countries have accounted for a large 
share of immigrants to Canada. Thanks to Canada’s point-based system, these immigrants have 
primarily been well-educated and middle-class members of their countries of birth (see the criteria 
for Express Entry: Federal Skilled Worker Stream).  
Since the 1900s, the average number of permanent-residence immigrants that have come to Canada 
is 120,000 per year (Edmonston and Lee, 2016). Since 2016, this average has increased to 300,000 
permanent-residence immigrants per year. The number of incoming permanent-residence 
immigrants that arrived in 2016 was 295,000. In 2017, it was 300,000. In 2018, it 330,800. In 
addition to these permanent residents, people have also come to the country as international 
students and workers; in 2017, their contributions to Canada’s economy came to 31.8 billion CAD 
(Canada Immigration, 2018). Within this economic and demographic transformation, Ontario 
stands as the nodal point of financial investment and immigration streams. Within Ontario, Toronto 
is the key attraction point of immigration and investment. In Arrival City (2011), Doug Saunders 
focuses on how Toronto has become such an important destination for people looking for a new 
life in another country. Immigrants bring their savings with them, and for many, living in a house 





5.2. The financialization of housing, neoliberal urbanization, and affordability crisis in 
Toronto 
As indicated above, the manufacturing-based growth model, together with a Keynesian 
consumerist society, are on the decline in Canada, including in Ontario. For this very reason, a 
choice has been made in Canada to replace the old growth model with a new growth model that is 
connected to global financial flows, the commodification of urban land, the rise of the housing 
market as part of neoliberal urbanization, and new immigration patterns. One of the key 
considerations for understanding the Canadian transition from a manufacturing economy to a 
construction- and finance-led economy is the role that governmental policy has played in this shift. 
The financialization of housing serves as the new economic growth model in the country, 
particularly in Ontario. This growth model, which I call REFCOM, has been on the agenda of 
Ontario politics since the 1990s. It became the ultimate way of doing business after 2004, when 
housing prices made a significant jump, and following the global financial crisis in 2008. Since 
then in the GTA, the housing market has become the key driving force of economic growth.  
The financialization of the housing market occurs through a changing business model, the rise of 
shareholder value, and also contingent governmental policies that support the real estate economy 
and financial liquidity. In other words, unlike the case in Istanbul that I explore in Chapter 6, the 
new growth model in the GTA has not appeared as a direct and vulgar intervention by the state; 
rather, private sectors and growth coalitions have been functioning as drivers of the 
financialization of housing in Ontario. In the case of Istanbul, the central government has served 
as the key actor in creating a growth model based on the housing-finance nexus. In Canada, local, 
provincial, and federal levels of government have never directly engaged in creating a new growth 
model based on the financialization of the housing market; however, they have in one way or 
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another supported the new growth coalition of businesses and/or prioritized the allocation of tax 
money collected from citizens in such a way as to boost the commodification of land and housing 
prices. As Gideon Kalman-Lamb highlights, financialization in Canada has developed “as the 
result of government-insured mortgage programmes that socialized financial risk and transformed 
the mortgage market into the basis of finance capital profitability and liquidity” (2017: 299). This 
new socialization of risk has been associated with increasing household indebtedness, the rise of 
social inequality, and the transformation of the welfare system, specifically through the erosion of 
socialized public programs and the rise of asset-based welfare (August, 2019, 2020; Simone and 
Walks, 2019; Walks, 2016).  
As such, what we are witnessing in Canada is a development that runs in parallel with neoliberal 
urbanization in many parts of the world. As manufacturing industries and related sectors have 
declined in urban areas, urbanization, land commodification, and the housing market have gained 
economic importance in many countries (Aalbers 2011, Brenner and Theodore, 2002). In the 
Canadian case, this transformation has taken place under the leadership of private growth 
coalitions, with strategic political support from multi-scalar governance. The financialization of 
housing in this country became a dominant strategy of economic growth in the late 1990s (August, 
2020). Business and financial elites viewed this economic growth model as a suitable economic 
replacement strategy. Its rise was also linked to the passage of austerity policies at multiple levels 
of government. 
In 1993, the liberal federal government declared that the provision of housing for the poor was no 
longer a responsibility of the Federal Government (Hackworth and Moriah, 2006: 515). This 
responsibility was thus passed down to provincial governments. Shortly afterwards in Ontario, a 
conservative provincial government came to power in 1994 under the leadership of Mike Harris, 
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who keenly followed a policy of neoliberal austerity that he named “the common-sense revolution” 
(CSR). This austerity plan is seen by many scholars as the ultimate introduction of roll-back 
neoliberalization in Ontario (Boudreau et al., 2009; Fanelli and Evans, 2018, Keil, 2002). It 
initiated an assault on the urban poor, working class, environmental programs, and social welfare 
structures (i.e., unionized rights and social housing). 
The seductive simplicity of the CSR made dramatic incisions into the everyday lives of many 
people in Toronto and Ontario. Overall, the local neoliberal project in Toronto appeared as a mix 
of half-hearted market reforms (including the privatization of Toronto’s collective consumption, a 
leaner local state, and so forth) and frontal attacks on the poor, the left, labour, and so on. These 
are among the provincial policies established since 1995 that have most directly affected the urban 
population: drastic welfare cuts, starting with a 21 percent cut in benefits in September 1995; the 
“Safe Street Act,” directed against squeegee kids and panhandlers; the reduction and redesign of 
local government (Boudreau 2000; Keil 2000), including the amalgamation of hundreds of local 
governments (Sancton, 2000); the reduction of provincial full-time social service positions by 
21,000 (Mallan, 2001); the introduction of “workfare” (Peck, 2001); the legalization of the 60-
hour work-week, based on total intransigence towards the concerns and demands of public- and 
private-sector union; strategic attacks on public-worker unions, the dismantling and systematic 
underfunding of the education system, the curtailing of school boards and their rights, and the 
monitoring and harassment of civil society organizations (Keil, 2002: 588–9); the deregulation of 
the province’s environmental regime (Winfield and Jenish, 1998);  the loosening of planning 
restrictions and pursuit of an aggressive (sub)urban growth strategy, which has only recently been 
reined in through a “smart growth” strategy with doubtful credentials; and of course, the 
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elimination of all public housing programs and downloading of responsibilities to the local level 
(Urquhart, 2001). 
Reminiscent of many roll-back neoliberalization programs (Thatcher in the UK , Reagan in the 
US, and Özal in Turkey), Harris’s neoliberalization strategy was based on the restructuring of the 
social welfare system to introduce the workfare system, cut working-class benefit budgets, and 
make way for easy capital accumulation by business elites. Thus, many business elites, white 
middle-class people, and members of the newly growing urban bourgeoisie supported Harris’s 
CSR agenda (Ibid.). His strategy was based as well on a restructuring of urban space; through 
neoliberal urbanization, provincial governance was restructured in such a way as to dismantle 
many of the provincial government’s responsibilities and relegate certain responsibilities, such as 
social housing, to local governments (Abruzzese, 2017).  
Following this agenda, amalgamation was undertaken to create a mega-city out of Toronto. This 
move was not undertaken to create a global-city region, as Harris was not in favour of that kind of 
regional economy discourse. Rather, the idea was to create a mega-city under the name of Toronto 
Metropolitan Municipality, by merging six local municipalities. The amalgamation came into 
effect at the beginning of 1998, and since then, the ambiguity between local and regional 
governance has never been resolved. The Harris government favoured suburban growth rather than 
urban thriving, and as such, it never created a coherent system of urbanization; rather, governance 
in the mega-city of Toronto remained unclear and contingent. However, business elites and other 
local and regional governments acted in such a way as to create a global-city region out of the 
amalgamated Toronto area. In this global-city region context, governance often proceeds 
unclearly, with limited contributions from many actors; regional space-making occurs through the 
ad hoc decisions of certain government bodies, agencies, and business elites:  
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As the city-regions expand geographically, they either outlaw existing local government 
boundaries, resulting in a fragmentation of local authority in relation to the city-region, or 
they undergo periodic boundary changes—as evidenced by the long history of municipal 
incorporations, annexations, amalgamations, and other boundary shifts. (Horak, 2013: 314)  
This leads to a complicated governance regime at the regional scale, which consists of inner-city 
areas, suburbs, and in-between places. As Jason Hackworth and Abigail Moriah (2006) put 
forward, this form of governance often works contingently. Thus, in the GTA, new massive 
suburbanization and its governance are often guided by contingent decision-making and 
collaborations among political actors, market actors, and civil society. 
Within this framework, three crucial developments have turned the GTA into a regional growth 
machine based on the financialization of the housing market. The first was the relegation of social 
housing programs to local municipalities. This strategy led to the elimination of the social housing 
system in Toronto. The second comprised the cuts in funding to local municipalities. These cuts 
rendered local municipalities reliant on property taxes as their sole source of income, thereby 
increasing their dependence on new property constructions. (Keil et al. 2015). The final 
development is linked to the first two: massive condofication and suburbanization as part of the 
neoliberal urbanization process.  
The relegation of social housing programs to local municipalities occurred in parallel with the 
federal government’s abdication of responsibility for the issue in 1993. Following this move, the 
provincial government of Ontario also abdicated responsibility for building social housing. At a 
local level, the city of Toronto has pursued a very weak social-affordable housing program, which 
has never fulfilled the demand of its people. As of 2010, only 1.5 percent of all built housing 
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existed in the form of social housing in Toronto. Between 2007 and 2017 in Toronto, this number 
declined to a dramatic low; only 33 co-op units were constructed during this time (Toronto 
Housing Market Analysis, 2019). 
 
Figure 10. Social housing as a share of total built housing in Canada. Source: CMHC Housing Outlook Reports, 2017 
 
 
Figure 11. Number of affordable rental housing units constructed in Toronto since 1960. Source: Toronto Housing 
Market Analysis, 2019 
The decline of social housing in Ontario was accompanied by the decline of affordable rental 
housing. The affordable rental housing model was an essential component of the social welfare 
regime of the 1960s and 1970s.  However, it began to decline in the 1980s and particularly the 
1990s. Eventually, the affordable rental market was supplanted by the condominium boom. Hence, 
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rental units (also known as primary rental units). From the 1990s onwards, condos began to 
dominate the housing market in the GTA. Rental housing has become more reliant on 
condominiums as social housing and affordable rental unit construction have declined. In 1996, 
86,279 condo units were built in Toronto, with 33.7 percent taking the form of rental units; in 
2018, there were 288,115 condo units completed, with 35.3 percent of them on the rental market. 
The reliance on limited condo options in the rental market has also increased rental prices in 
Toronto. The rent for condo units surged by 30 percent from 2006 to 2018. As of 2018, the average 
rental price of a condo unit was 2,337 CAD. For primary rental units (affordable rentals), the 
average rental price was 1,372 CAD. However, the vacancy rate is very low, and there is a long 
waiting list for such housing, as new affordable rentals are not being built.  
Condofication, therefore, describes one of two crucial aspects of neoliberal urbanization in 
Toronto. Condominium construction has generated a real estate boom, particularly after the crisis 
of 2008. Now, the municipal government and actors of the REFCOM growth model have begun 
to use condofication and massive suburbanization as strategies of spatial fix, not only to create 
temporal economic growth but also to increase financial liquidity, mortgage credits, and household 
indebtedness.  
Total units 161,161 100 percent 
Homeowner (freehold) 18,119 11.2 percent 
Rental 11,632 7.2 percent 
Condo 131,377 81.5 percent 
Co-op 33 0.01 percent 
Table 7. Number of units built in Toronto between 2007–2017. Source: Toronto Housing Market Analysis, 2019  
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Thus, Condofication has become symbolic of the creation of a competitive global city-region in 
the GTA (Lehrer and Wieditz, 2009). What is distinctive about condofication is that: 
“condominium building is a housing form that allows the maximization of individual ownership” 
(Lehrer, Keil and Kipfer, 2010: 74). Hence, the proliferation of condo buildings relies on a strategy 
for creating a society of ownership that is shaped by financial flows for mortgage credits. Together 
with the deregulation of mortgage markets, condofication aims to increase access to assetization, 
in a move that has nothing to do with providing affordable shelter.  
As Gillad Rosen and Walks put forward, “urban development trends in Toronto over the last 20 
years have increasingly been structured around what we term condo-ism” (2015: 229). They write:  
Condo-ism has become the overarching strategy for fulfilling multiple official 
development objectives. Of course, it is important not to reify condo-ism here. Condo-ism 
should be understood as a concept for understanding and delineating the nexus of interests, 
financial practices, forms of governance, tenure shifts, and social preferences that have 
come together in the current conjuncture to promote condominium development over the 
alternatives, and around which public policy is increasingly organized. Condo-ism 
represents the crystallization of a set of intersecting factors characterizing the post-Fordist, 
postindustrial restructuring of the city, including financialization, deindustrialization, and 
gentrification. (Ibid., 229) 
That is to say, condo-ism, or condofication, is a strategy for replacing the former social welfare 
regime with the new growth model of REFCOM. Therefore, it is important to note that 
condofication is an extension of a cumulative transformation of social order. This transformation 
of social order relies on the squeezing of rental markets, the elimination of social housing systems, 
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and the establishment of homeownership as the key pattern of housing. Assetization through the 
use of financial tools and the attraction of foreign financial investors are employed as strategies of 
housing commodification, land-rent speculation, and economic growth. In 2016, the percentage of 
foreign buyers in the housing market was 8 percent in Toronto and 7 percent in Brampton. In 2017, 
Toronto legislated a foreign-buyer tax, but this has not really altered this composition.  
In the condominium market and also the suburban housing market, immigrants play a crucial role. 
Many immigrants are coming to Toronto as young professionals and middle-class residents. 
According to data, at least 30 percent of these immigrants are entering the housing market as 
potential homeowners. The rest come as renters, which helps drive up the prices for condo rentals. 
Immigration is thus one of the driving forces of this new housing market structure.As Table 8 
illustrates, the majority of immigrants arrive in the city as young professionals and students, who 
represent a segment of the population that constitutes one of the engines of the housing market 
now dominated by condo projects in Toronto.  
All ages 104,440 
1–14 years old 18,730 
15–24 years old 20,615 
25–44 years old 46,115 
45–64 years old 12,990 
65 years and over 5,990 
Table 8. Number of immigrants that arrived in Toronto, 2015–2016. Source: Toronto Housing Market Analysis, 2019 
As I have indicated above, what distinguishes this new socio-spatial reality from previous socio-
economic orders is that this new hegemony operates by increasing assetization and ownership. 
This hegemonic maneuver is completed not only by motivating people to own assets as a life 
guarantee, but also by eliminating other options for social and ontological security. The increasing 
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homeownership rate in Ontario is one of the key indicators of this assetization process. Table 9 
illustrates an increasing tendency towards homeownership since the 1990s. This reflects the 
decline of social housing and rise of assetization. In 1971, homeownership rates were higher in 
other parts of Ontario compared with Toronto, which historically had the largest stock of social 
and affordable rental housing in the province. However, as we see, the provincial and municipal 
homeownership rates in 2011 were very similar. This illustrates the role that ownership and 
assetization are playing as the driving social factors of the new growth model.  
Year Homeownership rate in Ontario 
(percent) 
Homeownership rate in Toronto 
(percent) 
1971 62.9 55.4 
1981 63.3 57.3 
1991 63.7 57.9 
2001 67.8 63.2 
2011 70.1 68.3 
Table 9. Homeownership rates in Ontario and Toronto, from 1971 to 2011. Source: CMHC Ownership Report  
 
5.3. The key actors of REFCOM  
As indicated above, the rise of a new economic growth model based on the financialization of 
housing constitutes an extension of the neoliberal production of space in Ontario, particularly in 
Toronto and the wider GTA. The elimination of social housing and affordable rental housing 
options in Toronto have contributed to the rise of market actors that benefit from the 
financialization of the housing market. These actors have begun to use the production of urban 
space (not only in the form of housing, commercial stores, or office spaces, but also in the form of 
infrastructural networks that facilitate the flows of things into and out of urban areas) as the new 
dominant strategy for accumulating capital and providing financial liquidity. This new housing 
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market structure is supported by local governments, as city councils in Toronto and the wider GTA 
generally act in such a way as to enable construction projects; it is significant to note here that 
property tax is the key income source of those municipalities.  
Condofication and the proliferation of high-rise buildings through processes of neighbourhood 
gentrification are key strategies in Toronto for instigating the domination of the housing-finance 
nexus and increasing assetization. However, they are not the only strategies used to generate profits 
for developers and REITs, along with other business elites. Another important strategy in this 
process is massive suburbanization. In many parts of the GTA, suburbanization has become the 
key driving force of the financialization of housing. The rediscovery of suburbanization has also 
enabled rapid assetization and indebtedness, while providing an easy source of primitive 
accumulation for the actors of REFCOM through the transformation of greenfield and erstwhile 
agricultural and forest areas.  
Before delving into the details of suburbanization as a key driving force of the new growth model, 
I will touch on the key actors of the REFCOM growth model in the GTA. The emergence of 
REFCOM in Toronto is rooted in numerous financial and political regulations on both the 
movement of finance capital and housing policies. The six key actors of the neoliberal real estate 
market restructuring here are: the federal government, local government, developers and REITs, 
banks and other financial institutions, the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), 
and the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) (Replaced by Local Planning Appeal Tribunal - LPAT 
in 2019). Residents, mortgage payers, landlords, and tenants also play a role, but I will discuss 




5.3.1. Banks, other financial institutions, and the Canada Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation 
The financialization of housing in Canada is mainly reliant on mortgage credits issued by the 
banks. Banks in Canada received the authority to issue mortgage credits in 1967, as a response to 
a housing boom in the post-war period (Kobrak and Martin, 2018: 234). After the Second World 
War came to an end, a large number of returning veterans spurred a demand for mortgage 
financing. At that time, banks were not allowed to lend money for mortgages. Life insurance 
companies were the major source of mortgages, followed by trust companies. As a consequence 
of the increased demand, the government created a new crown corporation, a state-owned 
enterprise called the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, later renamed the Canada 
Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC).17 Its basic function was to: “provide discounting 
facilities for loan and mortgage companies” (Kobrak and Martin, 2018: 233). However, when the 
CMHC proved to be inadequate for meeting market demands, the Federal Government allowed 
banks to enter the mortgage game. 
After banks were granted the authority to issue mortgage credits, they became the key financial 
institutions distributing mortgage credits in the housing market. As shown in Figure 12, the 
Canadian mortgage market is now dominated by banks, “which together hold approximately 75 
percent of the value of outstanding mortgages” (Crawford et al., 2013: 53). More specifically, 
Canada’s mortgage market and entire financial sector are dominated by the country’s five largest 
 
17The CMHC (founded in 1946) is a key institution in Canada for regulating certain housing-related policies. 
According to its website: “CMHC exists for a single reason: to make housing affordable for everyone in Canada” 
(CMHC website, 2020). In fact, as Walks and Clifford (2015) indicate, the agency now serves mainly to facilitate 
the financialization of the housing market, as it generally manages the securitization process.  
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banks—TD, Royal Bank, CIBC, Bank of Montreal, and Scotiabank—although a number of 
smaller institutions, including credit unions, trust companies, non-depository institutions, credit 
intermediaries, and insurance companies, also originate mortgages (Walks, 2012: 261).  
 
Figure 12. The share of lenders in the Canadian housing market by type of financial institute, 2018 Q3. Source: Canadian Bankers 
Association; CMHC calculations based on Statistics Canada custom request; fundamental research and CMHC calculations based 
the Non-Bank Mortgage Lenders Survey, taken from the Residential Mortgage Industry Report of CMHC, 2019 Q3. 
In addition to the right to issue mortgages, two other developments also helped to position 
Canadian banks as key actors in this process. The banks were allowed to buy trust companies and 
were also allowed to issue mortgage-based securities (MBS) freed by the National Housing Act 
(NHA).18 In 1987, the Federal Government introduced the MBS market in Canada to provide the 
 
18 The National Housing Act (NHA) was introduced in 1938 to form a federal planning strategy for housing. Before 
that, housing policies and urban planning pertaining to housing were contingently designed and/or housing was left 
to market conditions and the industrious works of communities. In the text of the NHA, it is written that: “The 
purpose of this Act, in relation to financing for housing, is to promote housing affordability and choice, to facilitate 
access to, and competition and efficiency in the provision of, housing finance, to protect the availability of adequate 
funding for housing at low cost, and generally to contribute to the well-being of the housing sector in the national 
economy” (National Housing Act, 1985). Hence, the purpose of this federal initiative was to finance housing 
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necessary liquidity for the real estate market. It was originally introduced with a strategy that 
differed from other countries; however, it was restructured in 2001. The system is now constructed 
around a strategy that does not require banks to hold a huge amount of capital as a reciprocity of 
their risks; instead, the system is designed to allow banks to keep lending (Walks and Clifford, 
2015: 1628). To this purpose, the Federal Government has assigned the CMHC to insure MBS. 
Since June 2001, through a special purpose trust of the CMHC called the Canada Housing Trust 
(CHT), the Canadian state has created special purpose vehicles to purchase and pool mortgages 
into MBS. The CHT sells non-amortizing bonds called Canada Mortgage Bonds (CMBs) to large-
scale investors, and it uses the funds raised to directly purchase NHA-MBS conforming mortgages 
from banks, moving them off banks’ balance sheets and onto the books of the CHT/CMHC. Thus, 
the CHT is a public body that absorbs credit risk and reduces the amount of capital that banks are 
required to hold in reserve, allowing them to ramp up their lending. Because CMBs are 100-percent 
guaranteed by the government, there is no risk to investors (Walks and Clifford., 1628).  
As this pattern of multiple regulations and creative bookkeeping demonstrates, there is a 
configuration in place that facilitates increased lending and positions banks and their subordinated 
companies19 as the chief locomotives of financialization, through the provision of a governmental 
guarantee of future profit. In fact, the government guarantee also helps to create a new social order 
since banks use it to lend more mortgage credits to borrowers. It is important to note here that this 
system of guarantee is mainly set up to protect lenders and investors rather than borrowers. 
 
19The banks have several subordinated companies in their bodies. In their bookkeeping and balance sheets, these 
companies are seen as autonomous corporations that can lend money or insure certain products. For instance, TD 
Canada is the known name of one of the country’s largest banks; however, TD Mortgages, TD Insurance, and TD 
Trust Investment also exist as autonomous companies that act in the financial markets. 
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Securitization allows banks to lend more mortgage credits, in such a way that may even lead to 
over-lending. When the government backs the securitization process, the banks do not hesitate to 
lend whatever they have in their reserves.  
Hedge funds, investment funds, mining corporations, REITs, and pensions funds are all investing 
in these securities. With the rise of real estate sectors in Toronto following the elimination of 
affordable housing policies, huge pension funds and mining corporations started to invest in the 
housing market through either securities or shares of REITs. For instance, pensions plans such as 
the Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System and Ontario Teacher’s Pension Plan invested 
in real estate shares of the Oxford Properties Group and Cadillac Fairview Corp. Ltd. (Melnitzer, 
2018). In addition, the Alberta Pension Fund invested in apartment buildings in the Toronto 
neighbourhood of Parkdale.20 As Interviewee 20 told me: “In Toronto, we can now definitely say 
that pension funds and some union funds can be counted as major players of the housing market.” 
Pension plans and other major funds invest in this market through NHA MBS or REITs. In order 
to understand the investment strategies of those large funds, we also need to examine REITs in the 
GTA and Hamilton Area to gain greater insight into the strategies of different actors in the 
financialization of housing.  
 
 
20This investment has generated multiple controversies. In 2017, tenants in the Parkdale district of Toronto engaged 
in a rent strike against rent increases issued by the property management corporations. When the management 
corporations applied above-guideline rent increases (AGI), more than 300 tenants refused to pay rent for months. 
The reason for implementing AGI’s was that The Alberta Investment Management Corporation (AIMCO), Alberta’s 
pension fund, had invested in property managements to run the buildings together. The effects of financial fund 
investment led to resistance from tenants, who successfully stopped the rent increase through striking. More than 
300 households in twelve buildings asked for a reduction in the AGI, a rent decrease for tenants in financial 
hardship, and a maintenance program for the buildings (Parkdale Organize, 2017). 
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5.3.2. REITs, developers, and the Ontario Municipal Board 
As I mentioned in previous chapters, REITs are not solely developers. Rather, REITs may act as 
developers, or different developers may come together to form a REIT, or developers and REITs 
may act together as business partners. According to Samita Pachai: 
A REIT is a trust that passively holds interests in a portfolio of real estate properties. It 
does not conduct an active business in the traditional sense, but rather engages in earning 
income from property. Instead of selling goods or services out of its property, it owns 
income-producing property that is leased out to third party tenants who, in turn, operate a 
business. (2016: 11–2) 
There are three main types of REIT: equity REITs, mortgage REITs, and hybrid REITs. Peter 
Linneman explains: 
Equity REITs, the dominant format, own and operate income producing real estate, while 
mortgage REITs lend money directly to real estate owners, or extend credit directly through 
the acquisition of loans or mortgage backed securities. The revenue from mortgage REITs 
primarily derives from interest on the mortgages they own, while equity REITs derive their 
profits from rental streams. Hybrid REITs pursue a bit of both strategies. (2013: 296)  
In Canada, the majority of REITs are equity REITs, but some act as Hybrid REITs that acquire 
MBS. These REITs put their properties, assets, and securities into financial markets, and their 
shares are processed in the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX). The TSX has a special index for 
REITs, which shows the major players in Canada’s REIT market. Martine August and Walks 
(2018: 124) suggest that together with private equity funds, financial asset management firms, and 
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other funds, REITs are financialized landlords. Many mining corporations also invest in these 
REITs, or some form REITs to financialize their savings through real estate investment.  
In Canada, REITs were legislated in the early 1990s as a neoliberal remedy against the ongoing 
recession (Power and Risager, 2019: 82). As I mention above, this response was part of a 
neoliberalization process based on the withdrawal of the Federal Government from the domain of 
affordable housing. REITs began to emerge in this time period as a key actor of competitive city-
building. In fact, REITs are now essential for the financialization of decision-making and city-
building.  
Name Market Value (CAD) Weight (Percentage) 
Canadian Apartment Properties 
REIT 
166,302,195.16 16.14 
Allied Properties REIT 126,684,397.06 12.30 
Riocan REIT 117,941,834.5 11.40 
Choice Properties REIT 76,707,151.12 7.40 
Granite REIT 72,435,967.39 7.03 
HANDR REIT 58,888,152.74 5.72 
SmartCentres REIT 55,453,071.96 5.38 
Northview Apartments REIT 45,559,281.52 4.42 
InterRent REIT 37,207,093.44 3.61 
Killam Apartments REIT 35,520,669.54 3.45 
Table 10. S&P/TSX Capped REIT Index: Top 10 REITs in the TSX as of March 31, 2020.  
Source: https://www.blackrock.com/ca/individual/en/products/239843/ishares-sptsx-capped-reit-index-
etf?switchLocale=y&siteEntryPassthrough=true 
In addition to these financialized landlords, developers also act as key actors of the housing market. 
In this case, we need to clarify the differences and similarities between REITs and developers. The 
key difference is that not all REITs act as developers; instead, they often show interest in investing 
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in the projects built by developers. Certain REITs (such as Cadillac Fairview in Toronto) may also 
act as developers for large housing projects, or they may create partnerships with developers to act 
as speculators of place-making. As Harvey (1989) indicates, these developers act as speculator-
developers to extract the highest possible land-rent from urban development and generate a volume 
of economic growth. Economic growth based on urban land speculation has become a priority of 
public administrations in neoliberal times, and thanks to the roles they play in building cities and 
reproducing urban space, developers along with REITs have become driving forces of this growth 
model.  
The production of space by developers is not solely a construction matter; it is also a social matter 
that is tied to political choices, strategies, and struggles, as well as financial flows. As such, we 
need to consider developers as key components of the growth coalitions in the REFCOM model. 
In Toronto, the largest developers are Smart Centres, Oxford Properties Group, Cadillac Fairview, 
Tridel Corporation, Menkes, H&R Development, and Daniels Corporation (Moore, 2013: 105–6). 
In these suburbs, Mattamy Home and Metrus are also well-known large players. In addition to 
these corporations, giant subcontractors also work on construction sites; EllisDon, for instance, is 
the largest subcontractor that provides developers with the construction materials and workforces 
needed for large-scale projects.  
Developers and REITs have used condofication and massive suburbanization as a primary strategy 
to bolster economic growth out of land commodification and land-rent speculation. The latter is 
one of the most important developments pertaining to REFCOM in the GTA. Condofication, or 
condo-ism, originated as a massive speculation tool in the 1990s in response to the economic 
recession. Immigration has also helped to drive condofication, as developers and financial 
institutions perceive immigrants as potential homebuyers:  
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For a very long time, the access to housing credits was facilitated for immigrants. The idea 
behind this policy was not only about integrating these immigrants into the Canadian 
system but also maintaining a financial chain through which banks and developers can 
benefit. (Interviewee 1)  
New immigrants coming with dreams of homeownership to Toronto could easily obtain mortgage 
credits, particularly before the introduction of the stress test in 201721. The Bank of Canada 
reduced the interest rate, and many banks have embraced the strategy of articulating new 
immigrants into the financial system.  
The OMB (currently LPAT) was also another actor that has enabled growth coalitions in the 
REFCOM model to dominate urban land commodification. The OMB is a supervisory body that 
acts as a kind of court for disputed urban development projects. The Ontario Government 
technically invests planning authority in local politicians (i.e., municipal councils). However, it 
allows actors that are upset with municipal council decisions to appeal those decisions to the OMB. 
The OMB is the most powerful board of its kind in North America. Its role is to act as an appeal 
body in planning disputes, and its ability to overturn or alter the decisions of democratically elected 
councils is a cause for consternation in many Ontario communities, including the provincial capital 
of Toronto. Aaron A. Moore writes: 
 
21 Stress Test was a precaution taken by the Canada’s Federal Government in 2017 as the Canadian real estate 
bubble expanded tremendously in the early months of 2017. As Tencer (2018) higlighted, Toronto and Vancouver 
became leading cities in Global Real Estate Bubble Index, the government introduced the stress test to slow down 
the market. The rationale behind this move was to slow down the money lending of the banks by introducing 
financial criteria to qualify for a mortgage credit. The potential homeowners must pass the stress test in order to 
receive a mortgage credit for their dreamed house.  
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the OMB can overturn Toronto City Council’s decisions regarding development just as it 
can the decisions of the province’s smallest municipalities. Both the OMB’s position as the 
final decision-maker on development and planning issues and the procedural requirements 
of appealing to the board may substantially shape and direct the politics of urban 
development in the City of Toronto. (Moore, 2013: 5) 
As such, the OMB is an important actor in urban development in Ontario. As Moore highlights, 
developers and REITs can influence members of the OMB through their lobbying power, and 
many development projects are accepted by the OMB after being turned down by local councils. 
As one of my interviewees, a former planner in Ontario, told me: “the development industry knows 
that they have the OMB wrapped up for them” (Interviewee 3)22.  
Thus, the formation of REFCOM, in a nutshell, can be seen as a coalition of the development 
industry, REITs, banks, other financial institutions, along with the OMB, local politicians, and 
other actors such as media and universities. This coalition can be depicted within the growth 
coalition framework drawn by Logan and Molotch (2007). In fact, as I explained in Chapter 4, 
under neoliberal hegemony, the growth machine has a broader meaning and it operates as an 
overwhelming engine of debt creation as Peck and Whiteside (2016) would claim. This debt 
machine in the GTA leads to the rise of indebtedness, inequalities, and poverty. On the one hand, 
we witness the increasing indebtedness of households, particularly in the suburbs. On the other 
hand, we also see increasing homelessness, particularly in inner-city areas. In fact, Toronto now 
 
22 OMB had been the appeal court for many years but in 2019 it was replaced by LPAT (Local Planning Apepal 
Tribunal). LPAT is basically a new version of OMB and it was introduced by Progressive Conservative Government 
led by Doug Ford. Through this transformation, the conservative government of Ontario aimed at expanding the 
responsibilities and legislation of OMB with a new structure. LPAT has the power to override the municipal 
decision (Willing, 2019).  
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has one of the most serious homelessness problems in North America. According to Toronto’s 
Street Assessment results, there were 4,969 homeless people in the city as of 2006. By 2016, this 
number had increased to 8,715. Now, there are more than an estimated 9,200 homeless people in 
Toronto (Toronto Housing Market Report, 2018; Fredvictor, 2020). This number is subject to 
ongoing increase, as there are no new social housing projects or new investments are being made 
to improve the accessibility of proper and affordable shelter. 
5.4. Boosting the housing market by spreading fear of housing scarcity 
As indicated above, banks, REITs, developers, the OMB, political decision-makers, and other 
actors, such as media, private lenders, and real estate agencies, create the housing-finance nexus 
in the GTA. In order to understand how they maintain this economic growth model, it is important 
to grasp how they represent the housing market and promote their actions. Rising unaffordability 
in the GTA is exacerbated by a fear of housing scarcity. This fear boosts the demand for a limited 
housing supply, which in turn boosts prices. As one of my interviewees explained: 
Disposable income to obtain a proper housing is not sufficient for many people. It is 
preventing certain income groups to get into ownership market. Even if they want to spend 
20, 30, 40 percent of their income. In fact, the lender will lend you the money if you qualify. 
Certain income groups cannot qualify to get a mortgage for ownership. (Interviewee 3)  
In the GTA, housing prices are skyrocketing due to the high volume of speculation and financial 
engagement. The rising unaffordability has a big impact on the rental market, as well as the 
ownership market: “I think what we are seeing is a much lower vacancy rate, and prices go up on 
the rental side as well, and there is much less choice on the market” (Interviewee 3). Thus, while 
prices go up, housing choices are decreasing in the market. The growth coalition aims to shrink 
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housing choices, so that people feel obliged to go for the limited options on the market—which 
are generally condominium units or suburban detached houses.  
The GTA saw a tremendous increase in prices between 2013–2017. There are two key reasons for 
that: first, the demand has increased at a rate that the market has been unable meet; and second, 
there is plenty of choices available for financing property. Thus, “in a sense, the proliferation of 
financial tools led to the rise of demand” (Interviewee 20). These financial tools include not only 
mortgage credits, but also other financial options that I will touch upon later. Such tools contribute 
to the demand for housing, by enabling more people to access the credit needed to buy homes. 
However, there remains a question of whether or not the increase in demand has been unexpected. 
Many actors of the housing-finance nexus claim that there is very high demand for housing and 
the supply is inadequate to meet it because there is insufficient space to grow. However, one of 
my interviewees disagreed with this argument, telling me that:  
The demand side has not really changed. We have been growing by 100–120,000 people 
per year in the last 20–25 years. There is nothing new, in terms of giant explosion of the 
demand. The prices go up, and people who have waited for the market say, ’I gotta go 
now… If I don’t get in there now, I will never get in there.’ (Interviewee 3)  
Here, we see how one of the most important strategies for attracting people into the market is the 
spread of market fear. Many people would argue that the demand is very high and that is why 
prices are going up; however, in principle, the demand has remained similar across a couple of 
decades, and the population growth has not been unprecedented. There are three key factors that 
would boost the demand for housing in Toronto Region: a) the decline of the interest rate, b) 
population growth and c) the rise of household income. If we evaluate these factors;  
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a) The Decline of Interest Rate  
The decline of the interest rate inevitably leads to an increment in the demand for more credits as 
people would like to invest in asset ownership. Decreasing the rate of interest is part of a long-run 
strategy that Canada embraced since the 1990s. The early 1990s saw a real estate crisis essentially 
in Toronto, and due to the crisis, the house prices fell apart and many people lost their investments. 
In order to revitalize the housing market two strategies were embraced; 1) CMHC began to issue 
mortgage securities under National Housing Act, 2) The Bank of Canada began to decrease the 
interest rates. There are two fundamental reasons for these two steps; 1) As a response to the real 
estate crisis, the credits were deregulated, so that more people could easily go into the mortgage 
market, 2) CMHC guaranteed the credits of the banks through the securitization mechanism, 
therefore the banks could easily lend their money without having the risk of losing a big share of 
their reserves.   
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As the Figure 13 also illustrates we are witnessing the decline of interest rates for mortgage credit 
since the 1980s and this decline began to accelerate in the mid-1990s.  The banks have been the 
mortgage credit lender for decades in Canada, and CMHC is the leading agency that guarantees 
the securities. Therefore, the decline of interest rate came with easy lending of banks (which lasted 
until 2018 when the stress test was introduced).  
b) Population Growth  
The 2016 population of Toronto is 2,731,571, or 7.8% of Canada's absolute populace of 
35,151,728. In fact, As Stats Canada indicates 46% of the populace in Toronto is made out of 
workers. Toronto’s population grows with a rapid haste as its population developed by 116,511 
inhabitants somewhere in the range of 2011 and 2016, an increment of 4.5%. This increase refers 
to more than the quantity of individuals added somewhere in the range of 2006 and 2011 of 
111,779 or 4.5%. Additionally, the 2016 populace of the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area 
(GTHA) is 6,954,433, or 19.8% of Canada's entire population (Toronto, 2017). 
Also, as of 2019, Ontario’s population is 14.57 Million people and this population is subject to 
increase according to the projection for 2040. There are a few suburban towns where the population 
increases by the rate of 15%. For instance, A 2018 report published by Peel Region, indicates that 
Brampton’s population was 635,400 that year (Peel’s Economic Pulse, 2018), up 15 percent from 
the 2016 census numbers just two years before. 73 percent of the immigrants are “visible 
minorities” (The term used for non-white non-Indigenous people in Canada).  
c) The Rise of Household Income 
The disposable income rises in GTA every year, but this does not mean that the increase in the 
income of households will lead to the easy down payment for homeownership as in the meantime 
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home prices are also increasing. The key problem with the rise of disposable income in GTA, this 
rise is considered as a new force that increases the prices.  
As the Table 11. illustrates, the median household income in the suburbs of GTA is higher than 
the city of Toronto. There are a few reasons to explain it, and the first one is that as David Gordon 
(2018) underlines the majority of population reside in the suburbs in Canada. Suburban 
development is the key urbanization form that determines the urban expansion in GTA essentially 
in the last two decades. Also, more and more immigrants tend to live in the suburbs to be close to 
their own ethnic community (Üçoğlu, 2020). Another reason is that the suburban housing is much 
larger than the average size in Toronto; for that reason, families with a high household income 
tend to go to the suburbs to dwell in a large freehold house. The suburban development provides 
necessary land to construct large estates. Therefore, much of the urban development in GTA takes 
place in the suburbs and the household with higher income dwell in the suburbs. In Toronto, there 
is a lot of students, international expats and newcomers that begin a new life. That is why the 
household income is lower than the suburbs. Also, in Toronto as the condominiums have become 
the dominant housing style, many families with high income do not want to reside in Toronto.  
Therefore, the rise of household median income has a great impact on further suburbanization as 
many families aim to live in the suburbs rather than in downtown Toronto. Another important 
point here is that many jobs in the sectors of logistics, warehousing, service businesses, 
technological services are located in the suburban area. The flexible land use in the suburban 
regions provides the developers and policymakers to expand the suburban land in a way to allocate 
large lands for business and infrastructure (Lehrer, 2013). However, there is a crucial point in 
understanding the median household income in GTA. This problem is the widening inequality of 
household income. Even though the average income signals a reasonable amount that is acceptable 
189 
 
for everyone, this income is not distributed fairly and the share of top 1% is much higher than the 
bottom 50%.  







East Gwillimbury 104,716 
Georgina 81,695 














Table 11. The median household income in the cities of GTA, Source: Canada Census 2016, received from https://torontofoundation.ca/wp-




Therefore, the increase in the demand is predictable but the house prices are increasing far more 
than the affordability level in Toronto. One of the key indicators of housing unaffordability is 
identified as the core housing need by Statistics Canada. Stats Canada defines the concept as: “A 
household is said to be in 'core housing need' if its housing falls below at least one of the adequacy, 
affordability or suitability standards and it would have to spend 30% or more of its total before-
tax income to pay the median rent of alternative local housing that is acceptable” (Stats Canada, 
2017). According to their explanation, the three housing standards are: “Adequate housing is 
reported by their residents as not requiring any major repairs. Affordable housing has shelter costs 
equal to less than 30% of total before-tax household income. Suitable housing has enough 
bedrooms for the size and composition of resident households according to National Occupancy 
Standard (NOS) requirements” (Ibid.). In Canada the core housing need rate is 12.7% as of 2016. 
It was 12.5% in 2011, this means that the trend has a tendency of increase. In the meantime, in 
Ontario the rate of households in need of core housing is 15.3% as of 2016, much higher than the 
Canada’s average. Indeed, in Ontario this rate was 13.4% in 2011; this means that the housing 
conditions provided and the stock supplied to the market between 2011 and 2016 in Ontario had a 
lot of problems with meeting the demand for proper and affordable housing. Particularly, if we 
check the data for Toronto, the picture gets worse. In Toronto, the rate of households in need of 
core housing is 19.7%, this is the highest percentage in entire Canada. Therefore, in Toronto 1/5 
of all households are not able to dwell in housings that can really satisfy their proper and affordable 
living standards.23 
 




As I indicated, the key reason for the rise of unaffordability and also for the rise of housing scarcity 
is that developers and other real estate corporations are creating the rhetoric of fear and 
disseminating the message to “get in right now” through the media:  
We see this engagement essentially for the detached house market. The media talks about 
that there is no more land for single detached houses. The supply is getting smaller. The 
total stock of singles in Toronto is declining. The prices are going up because it is now a 
limited commodity. The press then starts to talk about how the prices are going up because 
there is no single homes. People did not realize that they are talking about 416. This 
snowballing effect reaches the entire region and becomes the mindset of everybody. ‘There 
is not more detached houses, we gotta get in now.’24 (Interviewee 3) 
Hence, we can see that REFCOM employs a strategy of spreading fear in order to boost housing 
demand and prices. This fear works to two effects: on the one hand, it increases prices for detached 
houses, hence engendering a new speculative market for singles (and even for semi-detached 
houses); on the other hand, it also inflates the demand for condominiums, since many young adults 
are now unable to afford the singles market. The demand for suburban housing increases, as 
developers invest in the fear-driven propaganda of “you have to buy it right now.” In fact, 
suburbanization in this case is often offered as a remedy to slow the skyrocketing of house prices. 
According to the rhetoric of many media outlets (e.g., The Globe and Mail and Toronto Star), new 
immigrants go to the suburbs because suburban houses are more affordable (Pelley, 2017). A 
widely asserted solution to fix the problem of unaffordability generally begins with: “we need 
 
24 416 is the area code of the City of Toronto, formally known as the historical city of Toronto.  
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more housing.” From this perspective, the only thing that politicians have to do is “to allow more 
housing supply,” so that we can fix the crisis of housing affordability (Florida, 2018). However, 
one of the interviewees explained that the housing industry does not operate with this simple 
strategy—and that “the developers are not that stupid” (Interviewee 3). 
The development industry has short-term and long-term plans, both of which I will 
mention. The short-term plan comprises what I described above: to foster the idea that 
“there is not enough housing stock” in the minds of the population. The development 
industry cultivates this idea because it knows that if it controls the supply of housing, or if 
there is limited supply, it can more sell new houses at a very high price. Therefore, instead 
of expanding the housing supply to benefit everyone, developers circulate anecdotal stories 
of line ups. My team worked with all the municipalities in the Golden Horseshoe area, and 
we found that there is plenty of land that is ready for development, and there is no necessity 
to expand the boundaries or destroy the farmlands and greenbelt. On these lands, according 
to our estimations, around 800,000 ground-related units can be planned. This means that 
these plans can provide housing to between 1.6 million to 2.4 million people in the coming 
years. This would be 85 percent of all the population growth up to 2031. However, the 
industry always claims the opposite. They always argue that they are running out of land. 
This is complete bullshit. (Interviewee 3)  
This acerbic account of developers’ scarcity-focused rhetoric illustrates how the politics around 
space-making are shaped. As noted above, many actors are involved in shaping those politics, 
including not only developers but also the OMB, local politicians, media, and more. One 
interviewee told me that: “In the GTA, there are many associations of builders. These are home 
builders associations. These associations act like the umbrella of developers, and they have close 
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relations with both the local politicians and Ontario Municipal Board (OMB)” (Interviewee 20). 
Another said similar things: “they have the city wrapped up, they got OMB wrapped up, and most 
importantly, they have media wrapped up” (Interviewee 3).  
In fact, it is not only the media, corporate finance, and actors of the real estate sectors (mainly 
REITs), but also certain academic institutions that work with developers to form REFCOM:  
Bay Street and real estate sectors and essentially the banks are listening to these guys, 
instead of officials who claim that there is necessary land, there is space for an affordable 
housing supply, and we can provide more options to our citizens. In fact, these developers 
work with professionals and universities’ research centres in order to get a very broad range 
of data. You can check Toronto Sun (sometimes Star) as the advocates of these developers. 
Also, some research faculty at Ryerson are always working with these developers. If you 
check the sponsors of Ryerson University Centre for Urban Research, you will see these 
corporate developers. Also, they use those magazines that are free in the subways (such as 
Condos), and they run full page ads that look like news—at the bottom it is indicated that 
this is advertorial. (Interviewee 3)  
In fact, if we check the sponsors of the Centre for Urban Research and Land Development at 
Ryerson University, we find numerous corporations that are the key actors of the housing-finance 
nexus in the GTA: Brookfield Residentials, Empire, Geranium, Pace Credit Union, Holborn 
Group, Mattamy Homes, Solmar Development, etc. The REFCOM coalition thus works with 
information, reporting, and survey support from academia, together with experts of urban 
planning, geographic information systems, and surveys:  
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The industry claims that they have reliable data, so that they can easily convince other 
actors of the fact that they are running out of land. In the meantime, these experts and 
faculty members are working with them for their future plans. They have a huge data 
network, so that they can create 20–30-year plans. Their long-run plan is to appropriate the 
potential vacant houses that are accommodated by baby boomers. You should again keep 
in mind that these guys do not go for the vacant land provided by municipalities; they go 
after the already-existing subdivisions and land, since there will not be additional 
infrastructural costs for these lands. Some of them, of course, they create new subdivisions, 
but they do it with the help of local governments and with a limited supply. In the case of 
baby boomers, the industry knew it by 2006 that there are 330,000 units owned by people 
between 55 and 65. Many of these people are now retired and some of them died. By 2031, 
the oldest ones of these people will be 91, and by 2041 the youngest ones will be 91. Hence, 
they also calculate that by 2045, we are not going to expand any more. They are waiting to 
appropriate the houses of those baby boomers mainly residing in the inner suburbs. They 
are now calculating how to appropriate and convert the subdivisions in the suburbs, 
essentially in the inner suburbs, into a capital accumulation stream. (Interviewee 3)  
Thus, the development industry and their coalitions operate with the incentive of keeping prices 
as high as possible, and politicians as well as the OMB pave the path for this coalition to act as 
brutally as possible. The increase in prices has affected not only singles but also condominiums, 
which means one thing in an economy with limited choices: more indebtedness.  
The shrinkage of market options has also been pursued as a deliberate policy to allow REFCOM 
actors to serve as the key economic boosters in the region, where the coalition now plays a leading 
role in determining the production of space. The GTA now hosts one of the largest housing markets 
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and development industries in North America. The shrinkage of market options began with the 
decline of social housing, when the Federal Government declared that it would no longer support 
affordable housing systems for poor families. It relegated this duty to the provinces; however, in 
Ontario, the provincial government has always acted in such a way as to support market actors 
rather than social housing systems (Abbruzzese, 2017). The gradual elimination of the social 
housing system has been followed by two developments: the shrinkage of the rental market and 
the financialization of rental buildings. The latter matter is also related to REITs. August and 
Walks (2019) indicate that REITs act as financialized landlords, and they invest in rental market 
with the motivation of increasing the average rental price. As part of this process, some REITs 
open the door for further investment and attract big funds to invest in the rental apartment buildings 
in the GTA.  
If we analyze the market through the lens of the development industry, this industry wants 
indebtedness to continue:  
The market actors can always rationalize the ongoing financial system because according 
to them, the financial system provides necessary options for people to own a house. The 
variety of financial options gives the sector an opportunity to legitimize market tools that 
come with being a homeowner. That is why many people take the risk of becoming a 
homeowner. (Interviewee 20)  
The variety of financial options (not housing options) are presented to homebuyers as a blessing 
of the market, since the market provides everything to buyers to enable them to become 




There are several financial tools that people can benefit from owning a house. That is why 
many people go for a mortgage credit. What I mean is that affordability is decreasing, but 
the options for financial tools are increasing. If you have a house that you bought through 
mortgage credit, in Toronto and in the GTA, the value of a house rises every year. Every 
year, the properties become more valuable. Suppose that you bought a house valued at 
$500,000: Usually 5 percent goes to the down payment. You have to pay $450,000 for your 
mortgage credit, which is for between 22–30 years in average. In fact, after a year, your 
house’s value hits $600,000, and the value difference of $100,000 becomes your home 
equity line of credit. It means that there is a concept called appraisal. They assess the value 
of your house. If the value increases, that increment becomes your line of credit. It means 
that if you want, they reform your mortgage with the new value of the house. Then the 
difference of $100,000 becomes your credit. Many people get this credit for further 
investment; they either buy a car or go for another house (Interviewee 20). 
Therefore, one of the reasons that increases the demand is the creative financial technique called 
home equity line of credit. Home equity line of credit is a tool that mortgage credit holders can use 
to go for further investments. Therefore, the most important thing for many people is to enter the 
housing market as a homeowner. 
For many people the most important thing is to enter the housing market as a homeowner 
in one way or another. I know many people who used to live in Brampton and Mississauga 
as tenants because their workplaces were there. However, I found houses for them in 
Barrie, as the prices are lower in Barrie than GTA. The reason for this strategy is that they 
want to enter the market as a homeowner with a mortgage credit that they can afford. Once 
they begin to live in their houses, their home equity line of credit begins to accumulate. 
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This financial tool will make them a potential investor for further housing projects 
(Interviewee 20). 
As the idea relies on that fact that various financial tools must be used in the market in order to 
increase property ownership, another strategy is to go for private lenders. I asked to my interviewee 
about how and why people go for private lenders, and he responded as; 
Private lenders charge more interest rate and they have more fees. But the issue is that the 
formal banking system can be very conservative while lending money, as they ask your 
credit score and financial history. Many newcomers do not have credit score in Canada; 
however, private lenders do not mind your financial history. They lend the money and they 
want you to pay it in 1 or 2 years. This is impossible, but guess what happens, if you buy 
your house with a mortgage credit from a private lender, and in the market your house 
value will increase the year after the appraisal, so that you can go to the bank, and say that, 
“I want an appraisal for my house,” and the banks will issue you a mortgage with the new 
value of the house, so that with this mortgage you can pay your debt to the private lender 
and become a formal client of the bank. The system provides a lot of opportunities to make 
people enter the market as a homeowner. Also, in Canada, if you sell your primary 
residence, you do not have to pay any income tax. This also provides a lot of opportunities. 
That is why many people go for mortgage even though they know that they will have to 
pay debt for a very long time. (Interviewee 20-1) 
In fact, while this variety of financial tools, mortgage credits, and private lenders provides 
financing options for homeownership, it also increases the burden of indebtedness. People use 
secondary mortgage lenders as a temporary solution. Private lenders enable access to housing at a 
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very high rate of interest, and they want the homebuyers to pay their debts in 1 year. After the 
homebuyer gets a house using credit from a private lender, they can now begin to bargain with the 
bank for a long-term mortgage deal. If they can convince the bank to extend them credit, they can 
pay back their debt to the private lender, using the money lent by the bank, and they continue as 
the new customer of the bank. Hence, private lenders offer a tool for gaining bargaining power 
against banks, since banks do not accept everyone’s mortgage application.  
5.5. Massive suburbanization and suburban condofication: The rise of the suburban-
financial Nexus in the GTA 
Hitherto, I have illustrated how the housing and real estate sectors, together with the rise of 
financialization, constitute the dominant way of doing business in Ontario, as a replacement for 
the declining manufacturing sectors. The financialization of the housing market is now the central 
dynamic that dominates the socio-spatial reality in the GTA. This socio-spatial reality refers to the 
hegemony of finance capitalism aligned with sectors involved in the production of space. Within 
this new hegemonic growth model, it is possible to say that, on the one hand, business elites and 
growth coalitions are able to accumulate an enormous amount of wealth, while on the other hand, 
subordinated populations are subjected to debt mechanisms for the continuation of assetization. 
On the one hand, the top centiles of society increase the assets that they own, while on the other 
hand, subordinated communities are caught in the loop of debt-payment just to own a house as a 
family asset.  
The literature on the financialization of the housing market in Toronto and the wider GTA touches 
upon the increasing income disparities, household indebtedness, and dominance of REITs as 
important aspects of the changing housing policy. While carefully examining the role of 
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government in supporting mortgage credit distribution and the construction of more buildings for 
more financial investments, researchers often emphasize the role of condofication in this new 
construction-led economy. In fact, while condofication is an important symbol and reality of the 
new economic growth model, the financialization of the housing market mainly takes place in the 
suburbs. That is because the majority of the Canadian population resides in the suburbs (Addie et 
al., 2015); hence, the demand for suburban housing is higher than the demand for housing in 
downtown areas. North American societies also embrace the suburban way of life more than 
Western and Eastern European countries do. The suburban way of life is ingrained in the social 
life of Ontarians, and it is also a point of attraction for new immigrants, many of whom come to 
Ontario to live in suburban single-family houses with backyards. At least, this has been the ongoing 
perception of the housing market in Canada. Hence, the actors of the REFCOM growth model 
have rediscovered the importance of suburbanization in land-rent speculation and 
commodification.  
As I explained in the previous chapter, suburbanization provides a higher volume of speculation, 
and it is easier to convert suburban land into an investment platform, compared with already-
inhabited urban areas. As Jean-Paul Addie and colleagues argue, suburbanization has been 
associated in Canada with this notion of “rediscovering the suburbs” since the 1960s. As Harris 
(1999) indicates, suburban development began with an auto-constructed and unplanned housing 
model in the early urban areas of Toronto. Since then, many different forms of suburbanization 
have emerged Canada. While the stereotyped image of suburbanization in North America consists 
of middle-class single-family homes (Moos and Mendez, 2015), suburban development has always 
entailed diverse dynamics. For example, it has encompassed both the working-class suburbs of the 
early 20th century (Harris, 1999) and the middle-class suburbs of creeping conformity (Harris, 
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2004). Over time, suburbs have also become more ethnically diverse: “the white middle-class 
suburbs of the postwar years are largely gone, with the ‘old’ or ‘inner’ suburbs now having very 
diverse non-white and immigrant populations” (Keil et al. 2015: 82). In the meantime, suburbs in 
many parts of the world, and specifically in the GTA, have also become the terrain of growing 
poverty, poor infrastructure, and the racialization of space (Keil, Güney and Üçoğlu, 2019). 
Therefore, Keil (2011) argues that suburbs should be understood as the emergence of new types 
of urbanization, including global-city regions.  
Another important point to consider for the suburbanization process in the GTA is that land use 
and suburban planning have become muddled, and many suburban spaces now exist as spaces in-
between cities. In other words, the neoliberal land regime (which is dependent on flexible land use 
for potential commodification and speculation) has changed the ways that suburbs are organized:  
Many Canadians now live, work and play in quite undefined and nondescript middle 
landscapes where everything seems to happen at once: large-scale infrastructure such as 
highways and airports are next to residential quarters; all manner of service providers, 
including universities and high-tech industries, are adjacent to low-rent apartments; parks 




Figure 14. The classic image of suburbanization in North America. This photo was taken in 2018 in Markham, Ontario. Photo 
credit: Murat Üçoğlu  
However, we need to keep in mind that suburbanization is still viewed by many people in Canada 
as a process distinct from the urban form (Ibid.). In fact, in the case of the GTA, the dominance of 
Toronto creates the perception of Toronto as the urban core and the rest as the suburbs. 
Nevertheless, a new type of suburbanization has been emerging in the GTA, in the form of massive 
peripheral construction with the adjacent combination of diverse land use. Studies on 
suburbanization in the GTA often emphasize the role of regionalization, economic restructuring, 
and new blurry forms of governance in this process. While these approaches are very significant 
for grasping the process, we also need a perspective that addresses the role of the financialization 
of housing.  
There is a tendency to perceive recent suburban development in the GTA as part of a spatio-
temporal fix strategy to boost the economy for a while. However, the crucial point to recognize is 
that the financialization of housing refers to a new growth model, and this growth model instigates 
socio-economic reorganization based on assetization and indebtedness. The suburbanization that 
we have seen in the last two decades in the GTA is an outcome of this new growth model, which 
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is dependent on the construction of more housing units and the connection of more households 
into financial mechanisms. That is why massive suburbanization is the driving force of the 
financialization of housing, as this is the dominant growth model. That is why I identify this 
distinctive form of suburbanization as the suburban-financial nexus. 
That is to say, massive suburbanization has become the initial driving force of the financialization 
of the housing market in the GTA. This suburban-financial nexus occurs within a regional context 
that is supported by provincial mobility plans and the rising service sectors of logistics, cargo, and 
warehousing. More and more households are located in the suburbs, thanks to their abilities to 
obtain mortgage credits: 
Suburbs in the GTA have much higher level of indebtedness. With building new 
communities in the suburbs, you basically open a new opportunity for the first-time 
homebuyers. In this limited market structure, financial institutions are more tolerant to first 
time homebuyers, as CMHC guarantees the potential losses of banks. Then, first time 
homebuyers are more likely to get access to the credits. (Interviewee 1)  
This massive suburbanization process does not only proceed in the classic suburban image of 
single-family homes. Rather, one of the distinctive points of the suburban-financial nexus is that 
suburbanization has become increasingly connected to projects of condofication. Hence, 
condofication is no longer a spatial indicator of urban gentrification. Instead, more and more 
suburban towns aim to attract developers and investors to build high-rise condominium projects in 
order to create a downtownesque density and attract young professionals.  
The tendency to build more condo buildings in the suburbs of the GTA has two driving forces: 
First, condominiums are gated communities with their own gated governance; hence, this allows 
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developers and REITs to charge extra fees or arrange the buildings in more profitable ways. 
Second, the suburban way of life has been moving towards a more securitized model, and 
condominium buildings provide the opportunity to own a home in a gated community. The demand 
for suburban housing has been fostered around the idea of security, gated governance, and a 
privileged or exclusive lifestyle. Hence, suburbs have become full of gated community projects, 
in the form of both detached houses and communities. In the GTA, developers have promoted this 
new gated lifestyle by highlighting the privileges of modern life in exclusive detached suburban 
communities, which are generally built for ethnic communities (this is also an exclusion policy), 
or by advertising the special amenities and privileges of concierged life in middle-class condos. 
The latter lifestyle is generally targeted towards young adults, and more development projects and 
planning initiative are being implemented on suburban land to attract these groups as potential 
homeowners.  
 





Figure 16. An example of how the press promotes massive construction projects in the suburbs. This image comes 
from the business section of the Toronto Star, on January 31, 2020. 
Income disparity among young professionals is another defining dimension of the suburbanization 
and condofication of the GTA:  
There is a huge income disparity between young professionals. Some of them have 
managerial positions, so that they can easily afford a mortgage credit and they can pass the 
stress test. However, many young couples and professionals are not in the same position. 
They should either rent in order to live in central areas and suburban areas or they should 
work in more than two jobs in order to pay their mortgage loans. (Interviewee 10) 
Thus, the REFCOM growth model heralds not only the spread of condominiums, gated 
communities, and flexible land use, but also the rise of the debt machine. The GTA is now one of 
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the global city-regions where household debt has most dramatically increased in the last two 
decades. As one of my interviewees told me:  
The housing system inevitably leads to more indebtedness, since there is no accurate 
housing policy in Canada. In Toronto and the GTA, we are now seeing that household 
indebtedness has become more and more suburban. If we check the disposable income ratio 
to household debt, we see that suburban households are drawn into mortgage indebtedness. 
Not to mention that in the GTA, the major share of household debt is the mortgage loan. 
There are a few key reasons for that: One of them is the immigration stream. The banks 
and many different financial institutions provided an easy access to mortgage credits before 
2017. With a very low interest-rate, people coming from all around the world to the GTA 
easily entered the mortgage pool with relatively easy conditions and rates. Many of these 
new immigrants ended up in the suburbs, since the detached housing market and even 
condominium markets are very expensive in Toronto for newcomers. One of the things that 
we need to consider in order to understand the increasing household debt is that in Canada, 
there is no coherent housing policy that can support affordable housing in both federal and 
provincial levels. (Interviewee 1)  
The lack of affordable housing supply is often obscured by the pro-growth discourse of supplying 
more suburban housing. Business elites perceive the ongoing immigration stream and real estate 
growth as an opportunity for exploitation; for this very reason, suburbs have become spaces of 
household debt, not only for young adults but also for immigrants of diverse ages. This increasing 
indebtedness goes hand in hand with the wealth accumulation of the growth coalition. This 
coalition of developers, REITs, financiers, media, experts, politicians, and international 
corporations is not only an economic form that strives to do business in the globalized world; 
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rather, it also forms a hegemonic strategy through which members of the coalition dominate the 
production of space. 
 
Figure 17. The percentage of households paying mortgage debt in the GTA. Source: Census Canada 2016 
As Figure 17 shows, the percentage of households paying mortgage debt is much higher in the 
suburbs than in the inner city of Toronto. We should also keep in mind that in the city of Toronto, 
a considerable proportion of condominium units and townhouse projects are owned by the 
investors (currently 30 percent), and these investors rent out their units at a very high price. This 
also makes suburban development more attractive for young couples and professionals, including 
potential investors in Airbnb:  
Another actor in Toronto is the investors for Airbnb. These are generally speculative 
purchases. They either buy or rent the unit and convert them into Airbnb market 
commodity. This inevitable increases the cost of housing in Toronto and limits the access 
to the market. (Interviewee 1)  
Suburbs are mainly becoming sites of investment for first-time buyers, immigrants, and young 
adults. That is why the percentage of households paying debt is higher in the suburbs than in the 



















5.6. Brampton: A case between debt and growth—the suburbs of changing political economy 
The financialization of the housing market in the GTA is a process that is driven by market actors, 
particularly business elites, financial circles, REITs, developers, and other sectors that benefit from 
the housing market. As indicated above, one of the key spatial reflections of this process is the 
dominance of the condofication that goes hand in hand with gentrification in the city of Toronto. 
However, another driving force of this process is suburbanization. Suburbanization in the GTA 
also illustrates how the economic growth model has evolved into a regime of land commodification 
and household indebtedness. I call the rediscovery of suburbanization with the creation of massive 
subdivisions for the financialized housing market the suburban-financial nexus. In the suburban-
financial nexus, suburban expansion and all of the necessary investments in suburban land use are 
conspired in such a way as to financialize the suburban housing market and suburban households.  
Local politics and economic dynamics in the GTA help to promote the suburban way of life to 
further the financialization of housing. For this reason, the case of Brampton stands as a crucial 
example for illustrating the suburban-financial nexus. The significance of Brampton as a case 
study of novel growth model is illustrated in Figure 16, which shows that 79.1 percent of 
households in Brampton are paying mortgage debt, representing the highest rate in the GTA.25  
There is another reason to analyze Brampton as a key site of the changing growth model, as well: 
Brampton stands as a unique example of the changing political economy. Compared with the 
 
25 Here, we need to note that the definition of “household” is generally given as the accommodation occupied by a 
resident or many residents that have the legal right to stay in that unit. According to Census Canada, a household can 
be a single person, or a single parent, or couples and families with children. The most ambiguous is shared 
occupancy by roommates or flatmates. In this category, only the primary tenant or the owner is considered to be a 
household in statistical analyses.  
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Kitchener-Waterloo and Hamilton areas, for example, Peel Region’s political economy is 
articulated into the global economy in different ways. The Hamilton and Kitchener-Waterloo areas 
have universities and long traditions of engineering education and well-trained human capital. That 
is how they are articulated into the current global economy. In comparison, Brampton is now full 
of suburban economic transformation, characterized by flexible land use, supply chains and airport 
traffic, and new labour relations. The airport and warehousing economies are mainly located in 
this area, and many new immigrants, particularly from South Asia, choose Brampton as their first 
destination in Ontario. Its role as a landing site for new immigrants is supported by the supply 
chain networks and new economy of labour relations in Peel Region. Brampton thus reflects the 
changing patterns of political economy in the GTA (Interviewee 8).  
The changing political economy of Brampton can be analyzed through its geography of flexible 
suburban land, which is full of supply chain networks and new housing projects, as well as the 
growth of its immigrant populations. According to Keil (2018: 7), Brampton is the beacon of a 
new Canada. More than half of the population comprises immigrants, and 73 percent of the 
immigrants are visible minorities—the Canadian term for non-white populations. This suburban 
city is located at the heart of Peel Region, which is governed by an administrative body that is 
called the Region of Peel or The Regional Municipality of Peel. This region consists of three 
suburban municipalities west of the city of Toronto: Mississauga, Brampton, and Caledon. Most 
of the local services and planning issues within the region are managed by the local municipalities; 
however, the Region of Peel also plays a role in shaping local policies, including housing policy.  
In fact, there is administrative uncertainty around the planning of housing and other things related 
to the construction economy in Brampton. On the one hand, officials in Brampton say that it is the 
Peel Region that is responsible for housing; however, building and construction permits go through 
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the municipal administration. At the same time, the Peel Region in theory bears responsibility for 
social housing; however, social housing projects are not the key agenda of this regional body. One 
of my interviewees, who was one of the key planners for Brampton’s 2040 Vision Plan told me 
that:  
The two-tier system in Peel creates a lot of problems, and one of them is housing. Peel 
Region is responsible for affordable housing, but they do not really plan any new projects 
for it. The City of Brampton also has no coordination with the Peel Region to provide an 
affordable housing system (Interviewee 5)  
 
Figure 18. Map-view of Brampton. Retrieved from Google Maps on April 29, 2020. 
The lack of communication is one of the key problems in the regional governance of Peel, 
essentially in the matters of housing. In the case of suburban governance this lack of 
communication might have severe consequences as the population growth mainly takes place in 
the suburbs. In Canada, population growth is currently centred in the suburbs. That is why the 
housing market and construction are mainly concentrated in suburban regions that are located close 
to central metropolitan areas. Daniyal Zuberi and colleagues write that: 
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Canada’s suburbs are growing much faster than its cities, largely as a result of immigration. 
Between 2006 and 2011, the population growth of Toronto (4.5 percent), Vancouver (4.4 
percent), and Montreal (1.8 percent) lagged far behind suburbs like Brampton (20.8 
percent), Surrey (18.6 percent), or Laval (8.9 percent). (Zuberi, Ivemark and Ptashnick, 
2018: 444) 
As the statistics indicate, there is rapid population growth underway in Brampton. One of the 
features that needs to be emphasized here is that suburban regionalism and economics have become 
global matters. Brampton, as a suburban city and as part of Peel Region, aims to bring foreign 
direct investments together with new immigrants. The plans and economic forecasting of the 
suburban cities of Peel Region are constructed on two key pillars: (1) on the one hand, these 
suburban cities aim to design new downtown centres, where huge amount of funds are invested in 
condominium projects and downtown revitalization, so that young adults may choose to live there 
without having to go to Toronto; and (2) on the other hand, the region represents itself as a transit 
and “cargo” hub, which illustrates the changing economy and role of the suburban cities in the 
new regionalization.  
Population growth is an important factor that planners account for, while creating ambitious 
growth plans for the GTA. According to a report from the Urban Land Institute: 
 Over the next two decades, the province of Ontario, home to the GTA, will grow by over 
4 million people. The Greater Toronto Area is expected to grow from 6.35 million today 
to more than 10 million residents by mid-century, making it one of the fastest growing 
regions in the developed world. (Greenberg, 2020: 1)  
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Growth plans for the GTA are mainly associated with the creation of new “downtown centres” 
through the building of high-density neighbourhoods (Ibid.). Hence, suburban governance is 
shaped by investment in new downtowns in suburban cities.  
Another common feature of GTA growth plans is transit-oriented development. The reorganization 
of the GTA is shaped by new competitive economy dynamics—and the circulation of goods, 
services, and financial flows are crucial in this new competitive economy. The province of Ontario 
has reserved a fund of 28 billion CAD for the Regional Transit Plan, announced in April 2019 
(Ibid.). For this reason, transit-oriented growth is very important for the reorganization of the 
political economy in the GTA. 
Peel Region plays a crucial role in this reorganization, since the Pearson Airport is located there, 
along with a growing cargo sector and construction industry. Reports from the Region of Peel 
often emphasize the role of the region in creating a transit and cargo hub (Region of Peel Report, 
2015). In fact, Peel Region is also one of the key contributors to the “Goods Movement” growth 
plan, which showcases the region’s ambition to create a transit-oriented regional governance. The 
Goods Movement strategic plan was crafted in 2012, for the period of 2012–2016; it was later 
updated in 2017, for the period of 2017–2021. According to a report from the planners: “an 
estimated $1.8 billion worth of commodities travel to, from and through Peel every day making 
goods movement a pillar of the regional economy” (Ibid., 2). Goods movement is thus one of the 
primary employment sources in Peel Region. It includes the movement of manufacturing, 
wholesale trade, transportation, warehousing, agricultural, mining, and construction goods (Ibid.). 
Most of the transportation activities are carried out by trucks, and Peel Region has grown into a 
transitional suburban region full of truck traffic circulating between warehouses, airport, and 
highways. The goods coming to Pearson Airport are distributed from warehouses around the 
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airport by these trucks. The Goods Movement planning report even includes a plethora of truck 
photos, reflecting the fact that trucks represent a colossal portion of road traffic in the region. The 
annual truck freight volume in Peel is 154,862,000 tonnes; the trucks in the region carry goods 
valued at $502,218,000 and conduct 24,238,000 trips (Ibid., 15). It is possible to see the footprint 
of the goods movement sector in the movements of these trucks; moreover, goods movement 
industries contribute 49 billion CAD to the GDP of Peel Region and provide 43 percent of the jobs 
(Ibid., 10).  
Brampton stands in the middle of this new regional economy, and as a suburban town, it represents 
one of the largest portions of the transportation and construction economy in the GTA. Hence, the 
labour and employment composition of the city is very reliant on transit-related industries and 
construction. According to census data published by Statistics Canada, the population of Brampton 
was 593,638 in 2016. Peel Region reports indicate that as of 2018, the population of Brampton had 
reached 635,400 (2018 Peel’s Economic Pulse Report, 2019: 7). The population thus increased by 
15 percent from 2016 to 2018—and there is a pressing need to accommodate this growing 
population. Brampton attracts a crucial amount of immigration, which needs to be governed vis-
à-vis the investments of the growth coalitions within REFCOM. Thus, construction and real estate 
industries are very active in Brampton, which these sectors see as a key investment city, along 
with the City of Toronto. The local politics and suburban governance of the city also facilitate this 
industry, enabling it to dominate the suburban landscape by creating dense communities through 
a new mobilization of mortgage debt. The construction economy has been one of the key industries 
for Peel Region, and particularly for Brampton, since 2011. In 2015, the construction sector 
reached a peak point in Brampton, as the value of residential building permits hit 3.63 billion CAD 
in Peel Region and 2.38 billion CAD in Brampton specifically (Peel Region Building Permits, 
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2019). Approximately 70 percent of the construction projects in Peel started in Brampton. Since 
2015, Brampton has had the 7th largest construction market in all of Canada. On this metric, it 
numbers among the main metropolitan centres of the country: 1) Toronto, 2) Calgary, 3) Montreal, 
4) Edmonton, 5) Vancouver, 6) Ottawa, and 7) Brampton (Brampton City Hall Economic 
Snapshot, 2015).  
 
Figure 19. The total value of residential building permits in Peel Region (bn. CAD), 2015–2019. Source: Peel Region, Financial 
Indicators, Building Permits, chart drawn by data provided by Statistics Canada: https://www.peelregion.ca/finance/economic-
indicators/building-permits.asp 
Figure 19 highlights the central role of the construction industry in Brampton’s economy. Within 
the larger regional body, we can see that there is competition between Brampton and Mississauga 
to attract investment in urban development. While Brampton is the leading housing market in Peel 
Region, Mississauga is as eager as Brampton to attract foreign direct investment and real estate 
capital in order to build new “downtown centres.” These ambitious plans depend upon the 
transportation and construction sectors.  
On that front, Brampton aims to bring investments together with new immigrants. Large 
corporations and brands have their operation centres and/or logistical warehouses and cargo 
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positioning Brampton as a transportation hub is dependent on the growing economy of logistics 
and construction. According to Brampton’s 2040 Vision Plan, the population of the city is expected 
to reach 1 million by 2040. This growth will be supported by corporations that are themselves 
subject to growth. The commercial real estate market is also growing every year, and as of 2017, 
Brampton ranked as the 4th largest city in the GTA in commercial development investment and the 
12th largest in all of Canada (Brampton Economic Development, 2017: 4).  
Company name Number of employees Company name Number of 
employees 
Rogers Communications 5,200 Amazon (distribution centre) 970 
FCA Canada Inc. 3,521 Technicolor Canada 915 
Loblaw Companies 
(distribution centre) 
3,200 TJX Canada  720 
Canadian Tire (distribution 
centre) 
2,140 Polar Pak 700 
Maple Lodge Farms 1,700 Adesa Toronto (car auction) 615 
Coca-Cola Canada 1,300 Kaneff Group 500 
Dynacare  1,200 DHL Canada 400 
Table 12. Top employers in Brampton. Source: Brampton City Hall:  
https://www.brampton.ca/EN/Business/economic-development/Research-and-Data/Pages/Top-Employers.aspx 
These are generally large communication, transportation, retail, and warehousing corporations. 
Other corporations from a wide variety of sectors, such as groceries and textiles, also maintain 
warehouses or depots in Brampton. Apart from these employers, there are also construction 
companies that are constantly building new facilities and residential units. In this suburban city, 
commercial facilities, industrial facilities, residential areas, and roads connected to regional 
highways are juxtaposed side-by-side. While Brampton has a historical downtown where the City 
Hall and main GO Transit station are located, the majority of the population resides in the 
peripheral subdivisions, close to the roads and business areas. Strip malls, auto-repair shops, huge 
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warehouses, million-dollar castles, gas stations, community centres, bank headquarters—all are 
side by side in Brampton, and you can come across all while walking around the city. These 
developments emerge in the form of suburban super-blocks, sometimes in a matrix of flexible land 
use: they may be located close to a housing block, commercial area, and public area (school or 
municipal building).  
5.7. The rise of the suburban-financial nexus in Brampton 
The literature on the recent suburbanization process in Brampton often focuses on ethnic diversity, 
social segregation based on ethnic identities, and the problems faced by immigrant families 
(Ahmed-Ullah, 2016, 2017; Keil, 2018; Patel et al., 2018). While this literature encompasses 
important dynamics of the suburban towns in the GTA, it does not fully address the new economy 
of suburbanization in Brampton. Only Dylan Simone and Walks (2018) have conducted a detailed 
analysis of immigrant indebtedness and the role of asset-ownership in this growing indebtedness. 
However, they mainly focus on metropolitan areas rather than the suburban parts of these areas. 
Research on Brampton’s growing suburban housing market and the dominance of financialization 
in this market can provide essential clues on how the suburban-financial nexus functions in the 
GTA. 
The rise of the suburban-financial nexus in Brampton relies on four key factors: 1) the 
construction-based agenda of City Hall and its planning department; 2) the disconnect between 
City Hall and the residents of Brampton; 3) the increasing use of private mortgage lenders in the 
area; and 4) the creation of new suburban subdivisions for further land commodification. 
Regarding the first two factors, it is possible to say that Brampton’s City Hall has its own agenda 
of urbanization; on the one hand, the municipal government wants to create new downtownesque 
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urbanization by investing in massive condofication; on the other hand, it wants to expand this 
condofication into the subdivisions of this suburban town. 
To dive into the details of these factors, I will first examine the Brampton 2040 Vision Plan that 
was announced in 2018 by Brampton City Hall’s Vision Team. This plan imagines the Brampton 
living experience as “Living the Mosaic,” while promising to provide sustainable housing for 
everyone in Brampton. It is built on a strategy of revitalizing downtown Brampton through the 
development of a new downtownesque subdivision, called Uptown Brampton. It forecasts: “in 
2040, Brampton will be a mosaic of sustainable urban places… will be a mosaic of healthy 
citizens… artistic expression and production” (Brampton 2040 Vision, 2018: 5). The plan is 
centred around the establishment of a university campus in the downtown area, as well as massive 
condofication and gated community construction.  
If one looks at the plan, the first thing that she will see is the rise of condos and the construction 
economy. This image demonstrates the disconnect between City Hall and the realities of 
Brampton, illustrating how the municipal government prioritizes boosting construction over fixing 
the problems faced by its residents. One of my interviewees, who is a doctor in Brampton and a 
leading figure in the local Sikh community, knows well the problems faced by immigrant 
communities. I asked him: “What are the key problems about the accommodation of new 
immigrants?” He told me:  
The key problem with Brampton is that the City Hall is totally disconnected from the 
realities of Brampton. The City Hall mainly deals with new construction projects, new 
industrial projects, and new money-making things. However, we have severe problems. 
Crime rate is increasing because Brampton is mainly a bedroom community, immigrants 
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coming here usually work in two jobs, sometimes three, and in a family, mother and father 
work in several jobs but the children are not well taken care of. Our school system is not 
working properly. However, the City Hall is not really interested in these problems. 
Households are in debt, but nobody minds. (Interviewee 14)  
The 2040 Vision Plan is one of the key indicators of how and why Brampton’s City Hall disregards 
the already-existing problems of residents and new immigrants. Among these problems, Brampton 
has a healthcare problem: the city has only one full-capacity hospital, and the emergency service 
is not well funded or adequate for 590,000 people. The city had no plans to fix this problem until 
2019; now, due to internal conflicts among conservative politicians—including disputes between 
the new mayor of Brampton, Patrick Brown, and the premiere of Ontario, Doug Ford—the 
healthcare investment plans in Brampton have been stopped. Brampton is also experiencing rising 
crime. According to data provided by Peel Police, the crime rate in Brampton has now topped the 
crimes rate in other cities in Peel Region. The increase in crime in Brampton is often associated 
with homelessness, drug use, and increasing poverty. Indeed, visible poverty is also growing in 
Brampton. These problems are not really addressed by the 2040 Vision Plan. Instead of proposing 
substantive policies to address these issues, Brampton’s plan focuses instead on creating a thriving 
downtown economy by enabling further land commodification and land-rent speculation for the 
actors of the suburban-financial nexus. 
The strategy is therefore to revitalize the historical downtown, which is currently quite empty 
during workdays, and to invest in infrastructural facilities in the subdivisions to boost the market 
prices of a limited supply of single detached or semi-detached houses. These strategies aim to 
promote projects that will be built by the development industry. The plan is based on three key 
factors: 1) It relies on an ongoing increase in population. The authors of Brampton’s 2040 Vision 
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Plan believe that population growth provides an opportunity for further investment (Brampton 
Vision Plan, 2018). 2) The authors think that attracting young adults and new professionals is 
crucial for downtown revitalization. That is why they want Ryerson University to establish a 
satellite campus in downtown Brampton. This would also bring more international students to the 
area. 3) The plan depends on the flexibility of land use, which enables the opening of new lands 
for residential and commercial investments through the conversion of agricultural areas and 
greenfield. 
Downtown Brampton grew out of a historical town that was founded in the 19th century. 
Downtown Brampton does not have many restaurants, cafés, or stores, but it has several micro-
finance institutions that operate as private (and secondary) mortgage lenders. Everywhere, you can 
see these institutions offering a good deal of mortgage credit. I talked to one of the city councillors 
of Brampton, who is a socially democratic-oriented member of city’s Sikh community and he told 
me that:  
These are predatory lenders. The city does not have any policy to ease housing financing 
for newcomers; therefore, these predatory lenders have proliferated over the years. We try 
to take action against them, but still we will have to wait until we get a solution. 
(Interviewee 15) 
This interviewee told me that they were trying to find new ways to eliminate the predatory 
financing model; however, their attempts have not worked so far. Brampton is now home to one 
of the most indebted populations in North America, and Brampton’s City Hall believes that the 
best way to eliminate this problem is to invest more in the housing market in order to create a new 
downtown life and provide more jobs through the construction economy.  
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In fact, when we look at Brampton’s 2040 Vision Plan, we see that it works for the well-being of 
the construction economy. This plan is a result of a growth coalition that aims to dominate through 
the suburban lifestyle by connecting potential homeowners to financial mechanisms. It is also a 
plan to bind new immigrants into financial mechanisms by selling them a future city. In this plan, 
there is no strategy or policy to build affordable housing systems. The planners simply use the 
concept of “sustainability” as a metanarrative tool to justify massive suburbanization and 
condofication. This new sustainability-fix does not aim to reduce the indebtedness of Brampton’s 
population or accommodate new immigrants with proper and affordable housing. During my 
meetings with the Brampton’s Vision Team, I asked them: “Why are there so many private lenders 
in this city? And why do we see that there is a massive increase in the rate of indebtedness in this 
city? Does your plan include anything to address this problem?” The answers were really 
surprising: “I even did not notice that there are so many private lenders in this city,” responded 





Figure 20. Brampton 2040 Vision Plan. This is a plan based on condofication. 
While Brampton’s 2040 Vision Plan aims to use condofication as a new strategy of subdivision 
creation, the ongoing massive suburbanization process is currently continuing through the 
construction of low-rise buildings. Thus, the new plan will change the entire socio-spatial 
dynamics of the city. In order to grasp the ongoing massive suburbanization process in Brampton, 
I conducted several interviews in the city and its subdivisions. I sought to understand why there 
are so many micro-finance institutions, credit unions, and debt management corporations, not only 
in downtown Brampton but also in many subdivisions. As I indicated previously, 79.1 percent of 
households in Brampton are paying mortgage debt. To learn more about this situation, I spoke with 




Figure 21. Photos of downtown Brampton, where many micro-finance institutions and their fliers can be found. Photo credit: Murat 
Üçoğlu  
The percentage of 79,10 percent covers all types of mortgage credits. The census gets the 
information about whether or not this household pays mortgage debt, but it does not ask 
who the lenders are. This percentage covers all the mortgages that are taken from numerous 
lenders. The reason why we have such a high percentage of indebtedness and also various 
private mortgage lenders in Brampton is that people like the suburban way of life in 
Ontario, and Brampton is one of the suburban places that provides the opportunity of living 
in a suburban house where you can raise your children. I am from the Indian community, 
and in our culture, if you go to Canada from India, you have to own a house in order to be 
successful in this new country. It is actually a prestige among our community. It is a success 
here in Brampton, but it is seen as a bigger success back home. Personally, I also pay 
mortgage debt. I would never think in this way while living with my family. We came to 
Brampton from India with my family when I was a teenager. Now I have my own family 
and I am paying mortgage debt. The reason why I chose to live in Brampton, like my 
family—why I found it reasonable to pay mortgage debt—is that this is a great place to 
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raise your children. I really recommend you live here, as it is relatively affordable in the 
GTA. Many new immigrants are coming here, and it is not easy for them to get credit from 
the formally known financially institutions. These lenders saw this as an opportunity; 
hence, they started to issue private mortgages for those who are ready to take risks for the 
sake of communal prestige. (Interviewee 6)26 
As illustrated in this example, Brampton is consistently promoted in two ways: it is the best place 
to live with your family and it is the city of hyper-diversity. The dream of homeownership among 
immigrants brings a lot of people to this city. The City of Brampton also uses the discourse of 
diversity as a rhetorical strategy to attract more immigrants.  
When I started to talk with residents about their lives in Brampton, they usually began by saying 
that: “it is a great place for a family.”27 This statement was typically followed by: “Toronto is too 
chaotic, the streets are too narrow, here we have large streets.” Once I interviewed a resident of 
the Castlemore subdivision of Brampton—an activist working on the campaign to increase the 
minimum wage to $15—and she told me similar things: “My parents came to Brampton a few 
decades ago. In the beginning, it was difficult for them to settle in this area. They worked very 
hard in their early years. Now we are residing in Castlemore” (Interviewee 14). Castlemore is 
actually one of the most luxurious subdivisions of Brampton, where immigrants mostly from India 
and Sikh communities reside. 
 
26As noted at the beginning of this excerpt, the interviewee told me that he wanted one of the things that he said to 
say off the record. As promised, I cannot reveal that part here.  




Figure 22. The subdivisions of Brampton. Source: GeoHub Database of Brampton’s City Hall 
The interviewee from Castlemore continued:  
I work in downtown Toronto, so every day, I have to commute, and I drive my own car. In 
fact, being in Toronto is very difficult. There are not enough parking lots, the streets are 
too narrow, and the city is very crowded. I do not like it. In Castlemore, we have huge 
spaces for parking, our streets are large enough so that children can play there. Also, we 
have a lot of green space, so that our elderly can go for a walk, and they can socialize. I 
love living in Brampton. It is a peaceful place. (Interviewee 11) 
This narrative was always on the agenda when I talked to people in Brampton. One of my 
interviewees, an architect leading a rental apartment building project in Brampton, told me that: 
“even though the profiles or the forms of immigration have changed over the time, people still see 
224 
 
suburbs as a refuge” (Interviewee 9). In fact, this image of the suburbs as a refuge has been the 
subject of historical metaphors, stories, and events over the last two centuries.28  
These stories are part of the urbanization of nature; the refuge sentiment, which goes hand in hand 
with idea of finding shelter in nature, was actually part of the colonial settler mentality in the 18th 
and 19th centuries. As Williams (1973) points out, the countryside has historically been perceived 
as the site of refuge, an opportunity to escape from the complexity of the industrial city form. 
Nature or countryside as the space external to the city and to the relations of production has long 
been a matter of nostalgia in Western societies. One of my interviewees even cited the example of 
Thoreau’s Walden: 
 Suburbs have been in the mind of people with its image of living in the woods. When I 
was a university student, I read Thoreau’s Walden, and that story taught me a lot about 
North American keenness of living in the suburbs. Suburbs are still seen as refuge. 
Brampton is not exempt from this image—essentially, new immigrants come here for this 
image of refuge. (Interviewee 9)  
 
28I do not want to dive into the details of the literature that bloomed after the industrial revolution. However, 
Raymond Williams provides a concise but crucial historical account of the urbanization of nature. In The Country 
and the City (1973), Williams attempts to highlight this aspect of capitalism by stressing that the relationship 
between the city and country is deeply connected to capitalist global imperialism. Williams’ argument centres on the 
heydays of English imperialism, and he emphasizes: “Much of the real history of city and country, within England 
itself, is from an early date a history of the extension of a dominant model of capitalist development to include other 
regions of the world” (1973: 279). He notes that this capitalist development has a reciprocal global dimension that 
influences the regions of colonization: “What was happening in the ‘city,’ the ‘metropolitan’ economy, determined 
and was determined by what was made to happen in the ‘country’; first the local hinterland and then the vast regions 
beyond it, in other people’s lands” (Ibid., 279). Williams argues that colonization determines the relationships 
between country and city, based on the metropolitan economic regime of the colonizer. Tropical plantations and 
country houses in the colonies were all part of this colonial economy, and they were all based on capital 
accumulation through slavery and exploitation (Ibid., 280). Hence, free market utopianism utilizes nature as a site of 
conquest to advance the “greater liberty” of towns, and from this perspective, nature is waiting to be colonized for 
the well-being of the free market. 
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I then asked this interviewee to tell me more about people’s decision to live in suburbs such as 
Brampton:  
When Brampton made its first explosion in the 1980s and 90s, suburbs seemed to be a 
refuge for people because the downtown areas were not good. You do not want to live 
there. When I was young and met my wife, for instance, she was living in Cabbagetown, 
Toronto. The entire neighbourhood was very nasty. You would never want to live there. It 
was cheap housing, but downtowns were not the places to live in the 1990s. It was all 
around the suburban dream. The 1950s suburban dream lasted in Canada for a very long 
time. This has always reminded me of a Waldenesque theory, the culture of living in the 
country. All the infrastructure, highways, and roads were planned to rescue you from 
downtown…. In Brampton, for instance, you can still see this suburban mentality over 
there. (Interviewee 9) 
Thus, the historical appeal of a refuge on the periphery persists in contemporary conceptions of 
suburban life.  
However, people coming to Brampton and new young generations that grew up in Brampton are 
now struggling with two things: 1) the difficulty of finding proper affordable housing, and 2) the 
restrictive strategies of financial institutions towards certain communities. The former is also 
related to the supply of housing; hence, it is related to strategies of the development. The latter is 
linked to bias, redlining, and the stress test. These two challenges help to form the suburban-
financial nexus. Two of the key factors that increase indebtedness in Brampton are the restrictive 
treatment of the banks towards communities, as well as the introduction of the stress test. Many of 
my interviewees told me that the stress test is the key reason that people go for private lenders:  
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Part of the problem is that stress test has really changed the way that the market has 
behaved. We had a very hot condo market in Toronto, a lot of them were in the form of 
speculation, and Brampton has been subject to that speculation. Still, condominiums are 
still seen as one of the most affordable choices. But for instance, we sold many units in our 
projects in Brampton, but they are all small and cheap units. There is still a lot of demand 
for housing in the GTA. Interest rate, coupled with the stress test, makes everything very 
difficult because the stress test limits the choices. In order to qualify the stress test, you 
really need to make a lot of money, or somehow you have a good down payment. The 
banks under the new guidelines have absolutely been restricted. The panic of “in the future 
it may get worse” makes people take risk. In North America, homeownership is seen as a 
social status, as a prestige—people do not want to miss this chance. (Interviewee 9)  
The suburban mentality thus converges with financial debt mechanisms. People want to live in 
Brampton, particularly immigrants from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. That is why sometimes 
people call the city “Browntown” or “Sikhdale.” These identifications create a kind of bias towards 
the new immigrant communities. That contributes to the reluctance of banks to lend mortgage 
credits to community members, particularly after 2017.  
A resident of Brampton, who is from the Indian immigrant community, told me that: “even though 
I and my partner were born in here, in Ontario, we still had many difficulties of getting mortgage 
credit since we are part of South Asian communities” (Interviewee 13). We then had the following 
exchange:  
My partner is a teacher, and I am doing PhD at York with a special scholarship; however, 
they [the banks] still could not believe that we can really pay our mortgages. In fact, this 
227 
 
would not be the case for many couples from the communities of other backgrounds. We 
even thought about going for private lenders, but we decided not to do that. We said to the 
bank that we could give a high down payment. The problem is that the banks wanted a 
person to be the guarantor of our credit. Our parents signed a special guarantee contract. 
This is how we received the credit with high down payment, and we bought our house. 
(Interviewee 13) 
Another interviewee, a local resident and journalist, also emphasized the existence of this social 
segregation:  
There is indeed an ongoing social segregation towards the immigrant communities in 
Brampton. It is not new, and if you go to downtown Brampton and other subdivisions, you 
will see that the poverty exists there. White people always claim that their town has turned 
into “Browntown,” and people nastily create the discourse of “white flight,” which means 
that white people “escape” from Brampton due to the mass immigration of people of 
colour. In fact, many of them went to Caledon, not to downtown Toronto. You cannot 
disregard these ongoing problems while talking about Brampton. (Interviewee 12) 
While some people say that “it is a perfect place to have a family life,” the reality is that Brampton 
is deeply a segregated community. On the one hand, white communities reside around downtown 
areas; on the other hand, new immigrants and working-class people live in the subdivisions that 
are located very far from each other. We should remember what Harris (2004) says about 
suburbanization: according to him, suburbanization is a means of social segregation, and it occurs 
through the construction of new subdivisions. The creation of new subdivisions is one of the key 
strategies to create the suburban-financial nexus in Brampton. I asked one of the urban planners at 
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Brampton’s City Hall about how the new housing projects come into being and how new 
subdivisions are being created in Brampton:  
I have been here as a planner for 15–16 years now. If we look at the development 
applications, much of Brampton’s explosions in the 80, 90s, and 2000s, of course, were in 
the form of subdivision expansion. The expansion of subdivisions has always been 
promoted with the principle of, you would buy a house in Brampton which is 20–50 
thousand dollars cheaper than Mississauga. The cost of land is also an important factor. 
Since land is relatively cheaper in this area. An example that I can give for the creation of 
a subdivision is the Mount Pleasant Village of Brampton We developed sustainability 
guidelines and worked with Mattamy Homes, as you know, one of the largest developers 
in Ontario, and we talked to Go Transit, since Mount Pleasant stands in the middle of a 
road where people can either go to Toronto or Kitchener-Waterloo area. Then, Metrolinx 
established a stop at Mount Pleasant Village. These are mix-used buildings in the form of 
3–4-storey townhouses. There are some singles and semis, but in general, families are 
residing there. In the near future, we will have more high-rises with more stores in the 
second stage of the project. This was a profitable project for Mattamy too, as the land was 
very cheap, as we started the project more than a decade ago. These are not, of course, 
social housing, but still they are quite affordable, at least more than Mississauga. In 2011, 
the prices were affordable, and some people bought for investment. The good thing is that 
this subdivision has been planned for a transit-oriented approach. This means that you do 
not have to spend money for a second car since you also have the option of public transit 






Figure 23. Mount Pleasant Village Community Centre, which is located across from the Go Station and the beginning of Mount 
Pleasant Subdivision, Photo Credit: Murat Üçoğlu 
These explanations demonstrate that the creation of subdivisions goes hand in hand with the 
interests of large developers, who seek to acquire a large amount of land-rent from the 
financialization of immigrant households. Households are getting highly indebted, and some of 
them have to go to private lenders and micro-finance institutions. That is why many people live as 
joint families, in order to save money before going to these financial institutions. While the 
municipal planners and local politicians often claim that “they live together because this is a 
cultural fact,” this statement is in fact a stigmatizing generalization about immigrant communities. 
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Another interviewee of mine explained the situation differently (I began to ask her how she started 
to live in Brampton): 
I grew up in Toronto, and we moved to Scarborough, but after getting married, we went to 
Chicago for my partner’s work, but later on we came to Canada, and we started to live in 
Brampton. We have family and relatives in Brampton—my mother and two of my sisters 
and their families live in Brampton—that is why we chose to live there. We were renting a 
semi-detached house there, so it was affordable comparing to Toronto. It was a large three-
bedroom apartment, and we were paying $1,750 per month. In Toronto, you can’t imagine 
the price of a similar unit. Certain neighbourhoods of Toronto are not really accessible for 
a new immigrant. Landlords do not accept you, or it is not easy to get a good credit scoring. 
That is why many people come to Brampton. There are so many South Asians, that is why 
I feel like home in Brampton. People are good to each other. But in Toronto, I do not get 
the same respect. I live in Etobicoke now. We moved recently, and here I do not feel the 
same. I feel very much alone. Our neighbors are mostly white, and they are not like me. 
People like me, wearing hijab with a South Asian background, are not welcome in my new 
neighbourhood. South Asians in Brampton, they are dispersed in the subdivisions. We used 
to live nearby Highway 15, in one of the subdivisions. Another well-known subdivision is 
the Springdale subdivision. These are the main subdivisions where South Asian 
communities reside, but of course, in other subdivisions, too, many new immigrants are 
living. There is also Castlemore, which is the rich part of Brampton. You will see million-
dollar castles over there. 
Downtown Brampton is mainly white, and you do not see any South Asians over there. It 
is on purpose. For the question of multiple families living together, I can say that yes there 
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is a cultural dimension, but not all of those big mansions have joint families. It is not 
entirely cultural; it is part of an affordability problem. Of course, people want to have a 
nice family home. They do not want to have an apartment building, because going to an 
apartment is a downgrade for them. But still, not every family is like that. This is not a 
general cultural issue. One of the reasons about this perception is that there is no diversity 
in the City Hall, and the City Hall is totally disconnected from the reality of Brampton. 
Prices are high. As long as the families are coming together, they afford it, but people work 
in many different works. There are many poor subdivisions in Brampton. These are 
working-class neighbourhoods, and the city hall does not really work to improve the 
conditions in these subdivisions. (Interviewee 12) 
In comparison, another interviewee shared a very different account of her immigration experience 
in Brampton, as I asked her experience of housing and her witnesses on the problems of her 
community. She began by saying that she has problems with living in Brampton; 
I do not like living in Brampton. I came here in 2008 from Abu Dhabi. I have always been 
in Brampton since I came to Canada. Most of Bramptonians are Indian and Pakistani 
immigrants, so that I do not feel excluded, but whenever I go to Toronto, for business or 
voluntary things that I worked, people over there try to over-dictate you. Even my son felt 
it. He went to a kindergarten where most of the class was white. We had a complaint about 
it, but the teachers were not listening to us like they were listening to white families. There 
is an ongoing discrimination that I faced several times as a Pakistani woman wearing hijab. 
I felt discrimination in every stage of my life here in the GTA. Even for my graduate studies 
at the university, I had the same problem. I felt like I am there, hence, the university could 
say that they have diversity. We came to Brampton because my husband’s entire family is 
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in Brampton. We lived on rent for 3 years. I started to work as a teacher. I got a job in a 
private school, even though I was not paid well. During that time, we saved a good down 
payment. We applied for mortgage—we did it through a bank. This is a flat in a building. 
I used to live on rent, and I saw that many houses do not have necessary facilities like air-
conditioning and so on because houseowners are not investing, as many of them also pay 
mortgage credits for these houses. These are their second or third houses that they bought 
for investment. They want the tenants to live a very simple life. They buy houses with legal 
basements, they rent these basements, but they do not help tenants to improve the 
conditions. (Interviewee 17) 
This statement also shows how people use their mortgages as an investor. In fact, this way of 
investment leads to further problems pertaining living conditions of houses. As indicated above, 
once people enter the housing market, they use their property and mortgage credit as a source of 
home equity line of credit, so that they can go for second and third mortgages. However, once they 
rent out their new units, problems begin as they are not able to invest in improving the conditions 
of those house. I asked my interviewee about the multiple families living in Brampton and she told 
me that: 
I have a couple of Punjabi Indian friends—they live as multiple families in big homes in 
the area nearby Caledon, where there are many castles. Families are saving a lot. If there 
is enough money, the families buy another one. Many people work in two or three jobs 
here in order to have a good down payment. Without a very big down payment, it is too 
difficult to access the mortgages for these communities. We should also keep in mind that 
these people were middle-class or high middle-classes in Bangladesh, Pakistan, or in India. 
Some of them, they go for the private lenders for their mortgages. These people that are 
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paying mortgages, I know many of them, they live a very simple life. Some of them, they 
go for a second mortgage, and then they dedicate their lives to pay their debts. It is a tough 
life. Whenever they rent out their second units or basements, it is not like downtown 
Toronto. They do not want the tenant to spend a lot of time in the unit. They want the 
tenants to use the units as bedroom, since when they are home, they spend a lot of electricity 
and gas, so the bills are increasing. These people in their second mortgages do not want 
high bills. People are working in two or three jobs, they are working as truck drivers and 
taxi drivers, some of them were doctors and engineers in their countries. They are here for 
more than 15 years. They work in these jobs because the job market was not accessible to 
them, even though they had a good career. I know a family, the husband used to be an 
engineer in Pakistan, but he never got the job for being engineer here. He is a truck driver 
now. They sold their everything in Pakistan since they do not want to live in Pakistan.  
The rental market is very limited in Brampton, with a vacancy rate of 1.1 percent, and the allegory 
of “bedroom town” is often used to describe the city. As one city planner told me:  
This is bedroom town. The construction companies build these subdivisions to create more 
bedroom houses. The streets that you will see here are mainly empty— people go to their 
work, they have more than one work. These subdivisions often have a small mall and a 
community centre where elderly and some women hang out with their children. These 
community centres had big costs. You cannot see similar things in Toronto. (Interviewee 
7-2) 
Later on, this same planner took me to Springdale Subdivision, where castle-like manors are being 
built in large numbers. He said: 
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This area [Springdale Subdivision] was a green field. Many converted subdivisions used 
to be a green field here, and some of them were agricultural fields. We started to build these 
communities here, and the nature was covering so fast. That is why we had to send some 
of the geese to New Brunswick, but you can still see a lot here. Here you will see many 
South Asian communities. These are bedroom communities. Many people do not even 
come and see the community centre here. We made this community centre, it was a big 
project, and the architecture of this project won a special award for this. We spend a lot of 










Figure 24. The community centre in Springdale Subdivision. Photo credit: Murat Üçoğlu  
What we are seeing here is the prioritization of tax money at work. The money collected by local 
authorities is heavily spent on infrastructure and community centres in the subdivisions. I do not 
mean to assert that this should not happen, but it shows how the prioritization of funding benefits 
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the development industry that constructs these subdivisions. Many of these community centres are 
designed as part of the housing market promotion of these subdivisions. Developers use these 
infrastructures as a marketing strategy to promote a lifestyle that is akin to that of American gated 
communities (even though these particular subdivisions are not actually gated in Brampton).  
The planner then took me to another subdivision that is located close to Castlemore. Castlemore 
is a community where you can find million-dollar castles, huge manors with huge backyards. The 
housing sites also look like gated communities (but it is not a gated community, rather it looks like 
an exclusive community), seems excluded from the outside world. Once again, there are huge 
community centres nearby. You can see some community members, particularly elderly people, 
hanging out and playing cards at the Gore Meadows Community Centre. When I first saw these 
exclusive communities, it was surprising for me. It is very difficult to find houses this large in 
Toronto; they would be priced at $10 million at least, if they were located near downtown Toronto.  
Likewise, I have never seen such large and well-designed community centres in Toronto or 
anywhere else in the GTA. The Gore Meadows Community Centre looks like a middle-sized 




Figure 25. Gore Meadows Community Centre. Photo credit: Murat Üçoğlu  
These are exclusive communities. They are not literally gated, but as Harris (2004) indicates, the 
creation of such subdivisions in the suburbs does contribute to segregation. One of the city planners 
that I interviewed told me: “People living here, they are like isolated from the world. Usually, these 
communities were built on greenfield as well, and in the future, we expect more construction 
projects that look like gated communities around this area” (Interviewee 7-2). The huge 
community centres in these isolated communities also show how the creation of subdivisions 
drives further construction projects. These community centres are huge in size, they have a lot of 






Figure 26. A castle-like house in Castlemore near Gore Meadows Community Centre. Photo credit: Murat Üçoğlu  
This suburban expansion comes with the price of indebtedness. The debt volume increases year 
by year, as private lending also increases in Ontario. According to a report published in 2018 in 
the Toronto Star:  
For nearly a year, Canadian banks have been required to “stress test” borrowers to make 
sure they can withstand a mortgage-rate increase…. In the Greater Toronto Area, private 
lending provided funds for 20 per cent of second mortgages in the second quarter of 2018, 
a 67 per cent increase in two years. (St. Denis, 2018: 12) 
Realosophy also reports that: “total private mortgage volumes have increased from $920 Million 
in the first quarter of 2016 to $1.5 during the second quarter of 2018” (Market Insights, 2018). The 
same report indicates that in Peel Region, the percentage of private lending increased by 20 percent 
in 2018, and forecasting suggests that this growing trend will continue. In the meantime, people in 
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Brampton are trapped by the financialized housing market. Property ownership has made the 
economy in the GTA totally dependent on real estate money, financialization, and immigration. 
The average detached house price has tripled over the past decade in Brampton, from 312,918 
CAD to 908,354 CAD (Younglai and Wang, 2019).  
A journalist who was also investigating increasing indebtedness in Brampton told me: “We did a 
census track and realized that people are paying a considerable amount of their monthly income 
just for the interest rate of their mortgages. In Brampton, this is 22 percent of their income after 
tax” (Interviewee 21). Another interviewee, who is an immigrant working in the construction 
sector, said that: 
You have to make at least $5,000 per month to pay your modest mortgage. There are also 
other costs. If your house is larger, the costs are higher, of course the mortgage will be 
higher. I am now working in various construction sites in order to be able to pay my 
mortgage. (Interview 19) 
These stories and the ongoing financialization of the suburban housing market in Brampton 
demonstrate how this suburban expansion has turned into a debt accumulation machine and a 
suburban-financial nexus that works with social segregation. The suburban-financial nexus in 
Brampton refers to a new socio-economic reorganization; on the one hand, the development 
industry is able to accumulate an enormous amount of wealth, while on the other hand, residents 
(mostly immigrants) are pulled into the turmoil of indebtedness. They have organized their lives 





To conclude this chapter, I will start by sharing the perspective of one of my interviewees who is 
a realtor in Toronto—and who has also worked as a representative of construction workers unions 
in contract bargaining. This interviewee told me that:  
In Toronto, it was easy to understand the boundaries of economic classes in the past. We 
had the workers and capitalists, and the key clash was between them. However, we now 
have a clash over the property: we now have landlords and tenants; we see the clash 
between these two groups, but these groups are very amorphous. The number of 
homeowners is increasing but more people seek to rent as they are not able to enter the 
ownership market. People use their home equity line of credit to have a dominant position 
in the market, in reality this increases the rental prices and many people spend a large share 
of their income for expensive rent payment (Interviewee 20). 
The research and the fieldwork in this chapter illustrate how suburban reality in the GTA has 
become a debt machine, which instigates a new social order based on financialization and 
indebtedness. The debt that households in the suburbs of GTA pay has become a financial tool in 
the hands of REITs that issue equities in the TSX, together with mining corporations. In addition, 
these debts are the key sources of capital accumulation for the development industry. The results 
of this study shows that there are two simultaneous processes at work here: On the one hand, the 
hegemony of REFCOM dominates space and strategizes capital accumulation through place-
making. On the other hand, the subordinated populations also become part of this hegemony, 
through financial coercion. The subordinated populations, particularly immigrant populations, also 
develop certain strategies to articulate themselves into the new financialization process in such a 
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way as to benefit from it. In reality, however, not everyone is lucky enough to benefit from 
financialization.  
The agro-industrial complex that defined the growth model of Ontario for more than a century has 
come to an end. This does not mean that agricultural production and industrial labour relations no 
longer exist or no longer matter in province. However, as time passes, the real estate economy and 
immigration stream that is linked to the production of space have become hegemonic socio-
economic realities, particularly in the GTA. These economic realities are reflected in a competitive 
regionalization that aims to capture flows of immigration and capital in order to boost the economy 
of place-making. In this schema, in Peel Region and more particularly Brampton, REFCOM is 
constituted by large developers (mainly Mattamy and Metrus), local politicians, municipal 
planners and bureaucrats, financiers, private lenders, and other industries that boost the new spatial 
economy. Essentially, with the transformation of the economy into a supply chain and 
transportation network full of warehouses and logistical sectors, Brampton has become a city of 
trucks, where truck drivers constitute a considerable share of the population.  
REFCOM in Brampton instigates the suburban-financial nexus by limiting housing supply, while 
implementing certain subdivision projects along with novel tools of financing. The suburban-
financial nexus operates by creating a region of debt accumulation. This ongoing process 
constitutes a new social order: On the one hand, households are thrown into a debt accumulation 
model, which is the only option for owning property. On the other hand, local politicians prioritize 
the tax money collected from the public to boost further projects, which will primarily benefit 
development industry and real estate actors. In this new hegemony, people have to work a lot in 
order to pay their debt, and they are indoctrinated into this process through the rhetoric of the 
“Canadian Dream,” “you have to buy right now,” and “if you own a house, you will have many 
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financial tools to make money out of your property.” In reality, the creation of subdivisions to 
attract investment and immigrant money leads to more social segregation. Communities are 
socially segregated in Brampton, and people who are unable to own a property are excluded and 
mainly live in terrible conditions in the basements of large manors.  
We need to understand this transition to a new hegemony based on the financialization of housing 
within a new regional economy that encapsulates numerous suburban regimes. These suburban 
regimes mainly prioritize direct investments made in the real estate market, land-rent speculation, 
and sectors of logistics and cargo. Brampton stands as the key example of this new life. People in 
Brampton are in debt, and many of them realize that they are trapped by the debt machine, but they 
are not able to get out of it. As I explained in the previous chapters, REFCOM operates as a debt 
machine, and in Canada, this debt machine is mainly suburban in character. There is a clash 
between the appropriators of land and those who try to survive in the financialized system. Local 
politics favour the development industry, as one interviewee told me:  
There is nothing more profitable than becoming a local politician and councillor in Ontario. 
Even Federal MPs do not have the opportunities that those councillors have. Many of them 
are good friends with the development industry. I worked as the representative of the 
construction workers’ union here in the GTA. I did several bargaining with developers and 
I know very well how they own the politicians. (Interviewee 20-2) 
Hence, the hegemony of REFCOM defines ongoing land politics in Brampton, as well as the wider 
GTA. We can see these politics at work in Brampton’s 2040 Vision Plan, which represents nothing 




In the next chapter, I will examine the case of Istanbul, and more particularly the case of Göktürk, 
a former-forest-village-turned-garden-city in Istanbul. Like Brampton in the GTA, this suburban 
area also stands in the middle of a logistical and highway network, which has been augmented by 
the construction of mega-projects, including a new airport that is supposed to be the largest in the 
world. We may say that the Göktürk case represents a completely different spatial context than 
Brampton; however, in terms of economic transition and socio-spatial reality, there are many 
similarities between them. The REFCOM growth model also dominates in Istanbul, as part of a 
competitive regional plan similar to the one discussed here for the GTA.  
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Chapter 6: Massive Suburbanization and the Financialization of Housing as a Growth 
Model in Istanbul: The Case of Göktürk 
The financialization of housing in Turkey began as a governmental strategy to yield a 
developmentalist economic growth model. This chapter focuses on this strategy and what kind of 
hegemony the new growth model instigates. Since late 2002, Turkey has been ruled by the Justice 
and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP – Justice and Development Party), 
which came to power with an agenda of neoliberal developmentalism and radical urbanization. In 
fact, the party was founded by politicians with an Islamic—even Ihvan, i.e., Muslim Brothe-
rhood—background. The key supporters of the party were the gecekondu neighbourhood dwellers 
in Istanbul and the conservative people of Anatolia (Tuğal, 2009, Üçoğlu, 2012).  
There are a few reasons why the AKP came to power with its new agenda of urbanization. The 
most well-known among them is the earthquake of Marmara in 1999, which revealed the failures 
of the housing model that had been implemented from the early 1980s–1999. On August 17, 1999, 
the Marmara Region, where Istanbul is located, was hit by an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.4. 
This earthquake killed more than 17,000 people and led to the destruction of more than 285,000 
buildings (TrtWorld, 2020). It destroyed many houses that had not been built properly and that had 
not been properly inspected during construction due to corruption in the construction sector. 
Marmara Region is the industrial heartland of Turkey, and following the earthquake, the economy 
shrank by 3.4 percent. The country was unable able to fix the economic problems, and as a result, 
a financial crisis broke out in February 2001. During this economic crisis, the economy shrank by 
5.7 percent. The estimation is that the earthquake caused $36 billion USD economic loss and 
around 600,00 people became homeless (Ibid.). As a result, people lost their faith in the existing 
economic system and housing policy.  
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The AKP came to power after this crisis, with the promise to implement radical changes in the 
housing sector in order to prevent future corruption and economic crises. In reality, the AKP 
embraced the financialization of housing as a new growth model, and on this basis, it has 
established a crony capitalist system, rather than fixing the political problems of yore. This chapter 
focuses on how the AKP hegemony has positioned Istanbul at the centre of its new growth model, 
as well as how this new growth model has created popular consent for the authoritarian hegemony 
of the AKP, which is now functioning as a crony capitalist organization without really providing 
economic progress for the country. 
6.1. Growth models in Turkey and the rise of the AKP 
Before the AKP regime, Turkey had implemented two notable growth models: import substitution 
industrialization (ISI) between 1960–1980 and market-oriented neoliberalization between 1980–
2002. I describe the historical emergence and key traits of these models below. I then turn my 
attention to the rise of power of the AKP and the implementation of its crony capitalist growth 
model. 
6.1.1. Import substitution industrialization model: 1980–2002  
The ISI growth model of 1960–1980 is widely seen as the golden age or belle époque of capitalism 
in Turkey (Boratav, 2014; Pamuk, 2014). As in many parts of the world, thanks to the Keynesian 
welfare model, salaries during this period were high in Turkey and domestic production was 
protected by high tariffs on imported goods (Pamuk, 2014). The living standards of Turkey’s 
society increased, and the newly rising industrial bourgeoisie gained skills in industrial production 
and technology development. The newly rising working class and urbanized middle classes were 
able to obtain home appliances produced by local industries (e.g., radios, fridges, ovens, laundry 
246 
 
machines; Ibid.). Such industries were particularly important since Turkey does not have any 
remarkable sources of oil and natural gas. From 1960–1977, Turkey’s economy experienced no 
economic crises, and the GDP per capita in the country increased above the world average. In 
1950, the average GDP per capita in the world was 2,100 USD, and the GDP per capita in Turkey 
was 1,600 USD. By 1980, the average GDP per capita in the world had reached 4,500 USD, but 
in Turkey it had hit 4,750 USD (Ibid., 248; these numbers are calculated by measuring the 
purchasing power index). In 1950, only 5 percent of Turkey’s population was able to have a fridge 
in their homes; by 1980, this proportion hit 85 percent (Ibid., 241). The increasing use of home 
appliances and rising living standards resulted from the growth model of ISI led by Istanbul’s 
bourgeoisie, as well as rapid urbanization.  
Although Turkey began to implement the policies of ISI before the 1960s, that decade constituted 
an important transition period in the ISI growth model. Before the 1960s, ISI policies positioned 
the state as the key investor in industrial, mining, and construction sectors. Since the Great 
Depression of 1929, the state had begun to implement étatiste (or statist/state-led/dirigiste) 
policies, through which the state became the central actor of the economy. During the period 
between 1930–1950, the state invested in building large-scale industrial complexes for textile 
production, sugar production, steel industries, glass industries, breweries, and aircraft production. 
One of the important points of this policy is that most of the investments were made in Anatolian 
cities, rather than concentrated in Istanbul (Türkün et al., 2014). The idea was to remedy and 
prevent uneven geographical development, as private business could already find a thriving 
atmosphere in Istanbul, whereas Anatolian cities had been depressed by a lack of investment made 
by the Ottomans, who had been reluctant to create an economic growth model since the 19th 
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century (Karaman and Pamuk, 2010). Therefore, between 1930–1950, the ISI model functioned 
under the leadership of the state, mainly in industrial production and infrastructural investments.  
From 1950–1960, this model became less salient in industrial production, and many private 
businesses began to appear, even as the state became a key actor of agricultural production 
(Boratav, 2014; Pamuk, 2014). During this time period, Istanbul began to gain crucial importance 
as the central city attracting investments in Turkey. This shift constitutes the key difference that 
emerged in the ISI growth model during the 1960s: from the 1960s onwards, the state initiated a 
planning economy in which the fundamental goal was to create a large class of industrial 
bourgeoisie located in Istanbul. Therefore, instead of initiating direct investments in production, 
the state provided the necessary infrastructure for the rise of a national bourgeoisie, mainly based 
in Istanbul, as well as in Ankara and İzmir. This industrial bourgeoisie was protected by high tariffs 
on imported goods. The result is that Istanbul has become the ultimate business centre of Turkey. 
The rise of the Istanbul-based bourgeoisie also improved the economic conditions of the working 
class in Istanbul. In the 1960s–1970s, Istanbul became a working-class city, where many strikes 
and working-class movements took place. That is to say, the working class appeared as a 
significant political force during this time period. 
This belle époque lasted until 1977. As the global crisis deepened in the world, many political 
problems began to appear in Turkey, and street conflicts between right-wing and left-wing factions 
increased tensions in the country (Zürcher, 2004). Working-class strikes also proliferated, as the 
country’s capitalists tried to cut jobs, salaries, and pension guarantees in response to the global 
crisis and emerging domestic political crisis. Tensions between the capitalists and working class 
increased, and Turkey entered a period of turmoil that erased the most of benefits garnered from 
1960–1977. Due to Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus in 1974, the United States (US) government 
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also imposed a military embargo and economic sanctions on Turkey (Ahmad, 2002). These 
ongoing problems culminated in a military coup in September 1980 and a harsh neoliberal program 
imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). 
According to economic historian Şevket Pamuk (2014), the ISI growth model of the 1960s and 
1970s did not fail because it followed the wrong economic path. He argues that it was an apt 
development model that would prepare Turkey to articulate into global competitive markets—
however, it failed due to political instability in the country. This political instability began in the 
late 1970s became a paramount problem in the country between 1977–1980. It stemmed mainly 
from street conflicts between left-wing and right-wing groups, particularly young militias. An 
ultra-nationalist right-wing group, The Grey Wolves, was supported by the Justice Party led by 
Süleyman Demirel and by Nationalist Movement Party led by Alparslan Türkeş. The left-wing 
militias were supported by the Republican People’s Party led by Bülent Ecevit, communist 
factions, and worker unions. The conflict between these groups emerged in the form of a micro 
civil war, which led to political instability, for which politicians at the time could not find a 
solution; in fact, they even exacerbated the conflict. The US-imposed economic sanctions also 
contributed to economic instability. According to Pamuk, the ISI growth model had been a 
successful development strategy for two decades; however, it had evolved into a new model that 
was more open to global competitive markets and technological advancements. The political and 
economic instability that arose from internal conflicts in the country and external sanctions led to 
the failure of this model. Following the military coup in 1980, the IMF and WB adjustment 




6.1.2. Neoliberal growth model: 1980–2002  
The ISI growth model came to an end after the military coup of 1980. On September 12, 1980, the 
army seized power in Turkey, claiming that it was a necessary intervention because the country’s 
politicians had failed to prevent the street conflicts. The coup constituted a form of a shock therapy, 
as described by Klein in The Shock Doctrine (2007). The military government began to rule the 
country with an iron fist and started to implement regulations that aimed to quell social 
opposition—mainly the opposition of the working class. After the coup, the military government 
announced its commitment to the neoliberal program that had been declared by the overthrown 
civil government. Before the coup, right-wing Süleyman Demirel had been the prime minister, and 
he had assigned his undersecretary, Turgut Özal, to conduct negotiations with the WB and IMF in 
order to develop a new growth model that was coherent with the free market capitalism of the 
Western Bloc. The world was in the midst of a neoliberal turn, and the government wanted to 
articulate Turkey into this global current (Yalman, 2009). On January 24, 1980, the civil 
government unveiled their plan, after the WB and IMB negotiations had come to an end, in an 
economic strategy document. The plan, popularly known as the January 24 Decisions, constituted 
a neoliberal austerity programme, envisioning the cut of workers’ salaries and benefits, the closure 
of certain state-owned enterprises, the privatization of certain social provisions, the deregulation 
of financial markets, and the facilitating of foreign currency flow (Üçoğlu, 2012). Ultimately, the 
civil government was unable to implement this austerity plan, due to strong opposition from the 
working class, the union power of which had reached paramount strength between 1960–1980.  
After the coup, the military government declared that it would implement the January 24 
Decisions, appointing Özal as the minister of economic affairs in the military cabinet. The military 
government began to eliminate its social opposition. A prominent labour union, the Confederation 
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of Revolutionary Workers (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonui, DİSK), was shut down 
right after the coup, and its leaders were imprisoned (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014: 86). The right of 
civil servants to act as members of political associations was revoked. Many opponents and critics 
of the government were arrested. As Erik Zürcher reports, by 1982, approximately 80,000 people 
had been arrested, and 30,000 of them were still awaiting trial (2004: 279). Many of the arrested 
people were tortured, and some were killed during detainment. Kurds in Diyarbakır were 
systematically tortured in prisons, and many leftist publications were banned. In the meantime, 
thousands of people were also banned from entering the country, and some were sent into exile 
(Ahmad, 2002). Hence, the brutality of the neoliberal transformation cannot be disregarded; this 
brutality was targeted most particularly at leftist opponents.  
One might question whether or not we can consider the neoliberal shift in Turkey to be similar to 
what has happened in many Western countries. Harvey (2005) and other scholars (Brenner and 
Tickell, 2003) suggest that neoliberalization refers to the restoration of class power, particularly in 
mature capitalist economies. The problem in the Turkish case, as Pamuk (2014) highlights, is that 
capitalists (mainly large-scale industrial bourgeoisie located in Istanbul) did not lose their power 
in the 1960s; instead, they became more powerful and emerged as a strong class alliance under the 
umbrella of the Turkish Industry and Businessmen Association (Türkiye Sanayici ve İş Adamları 
Derneği, TÜSIAD; also known as Turkey’s “boss club”), which was founded in 1971. TÜSIAD 
has achieved a powerful class alliance position in Turkish politics and economics since its 
foundation, enabling the industrial bourgeoisie for the first time to become very strong political 
actors in Turkey, in parallel with the rise of the working class.  
Therefore, it might not be possible or appropriate to characterize the neoliberal turn in Turkey as 
a restoration of class power, but we can see this neoliberal turn as the ultimate domination of 
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capitalist classes by eliminating the rights of the working-class. There are two main approaches 
taken to conceptualizing the neoliberal turn in Turkey. The first contends that after the Iranian 
revolution, the US worried that it would lose control in the Middle East, and due to the Cyprus 
problem, Turkey had weak relations with the US. Şahan Savaş Karatasli (2015) argues that the 
military coup and subsequent neoliberal turn constituted an effort by Turkish power-holders to 
position the country as an ally of the US once again, in order to convince US authorities to lift the 
economic sanctions that it had imposed on Turkey since 1974. Karatasli claims that Özal was 
chosen to lead the neoliberal transition for this very reason. He was an admirer of the American 
economic system, technological advancements, and neoliberal policies, and he had worked for the 
WB for a while. He also demonstrated profound hostility towards communism and social 
democracy (Çölaşan, 1985). The Turkish army agreed to work together with the US after the 
military coup. In what may also be seen as a conciliatory move, the military regime also agreed to 
the readmission of Greece to NATO. The January 24 Decisions served as a sort of promise to the 
US, demonstrating the military government’s readiness to articulate into the newly rising 
neoliberal doctrine. 
The other approach to conceptualizing neoliberalization in Turkey contends that neoliberalism 
emerged in the country as a new regime for asserting free market fundamentalism by eliminating 
the social opposition. The argument here is that business elites wanted to destroy the strong union 
power of the working class (Yalman, 2009). As a result, the capitalist classes began to dominate 
the economy in the 1970s. They simply wanted to eliminate certain rights of the working class and 
also silence the social opposition. The military coup provided an opportunity for business elites to 
achieve these goals. Vehbi Koç, the head of TÜSIAD at that time, declared his happiness and 
satisfaction after the military coup (Üçoğlu, 2012). From this perspective, neoliberalization 
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constituted a brutal strategy to transform the socio-economic conditions in Turkey in order to assert 
neoliberal market fundamentalism, followed by privatization and the exportation of foreign luxury 
goods.  
The neoliberal growth model that aimed to articulate Turkey into the global neoliberal system 
continued even after the military government was abolished, following limited democratic 
elections in 1983. Özal became the prime minister, as the head of the pro-market conservative 
Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi). His main policy was to enable Turkey’s transition to an 
export-based economy open to global markets and to implement an austerity policy in order to cut 
the benefits of workers and close down state-owned enterprises (Boratav, 2014). This policy 
continued throughout the 1980s, during which time Özal had close relations with TÜSIAD. 
Working with TÜSIAD business leaders, who had become large-scale capitalists in the 1960s, he 
launched a program of privatization. For this very reason, the Özal era is also known as the first 
attempt to institutionalize the corruption-based economy in Turkey (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014: 
89). Özal also tried to institutionalize an authoritarian governance model, by bypassing 
parliamentary and bureaucratic processes and declaring his own governmental decrees. Thus, this 
period between 1983–1991 may be seen as a time in which corruption and nepotism were 
institutionalized in Turkey. Even though crony capitalism had not yet become very powerful, 
Özal’s family became one of the richest in the country.  
During these years of neoliberalization, Turkey’s economic performance was not as successful as 
it had been during the period from 1960–1977, despite the fact that labour costs decreased by 30 
percent in the country (Türkün et al. 2014). The GDP growth was 5.3 percent between 1985–1990, 
and the unemployment rate increased to 6.94 percent (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014: 111–2). 
Privatization continued for a while, but it was not successful in creating considerable revenue. 
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During this period, the export-based economy and small and medium-size businesses gained 
importance in the neoliberal competitive strategy. Export revenues increased as a share of total 
GDP to 8.6 percent. However, importing also increased tremendously. Moreover, agricultural 
investments ceased, and agricultural production was largely abandoned in many parts of the 
country. An income distribution problem emerged, as the gap between the rich and poor began to 
widen rapidly. 
The second period of neoliberalization from 1991–2002 can be conceptualized as a time of roll-
out neoliberalization. As many scholars indicate, the 1990s are also the years of democratic 
opening in Turkey (Boratav, 2014; Şenses, 2016). During this period, many political bans were 
lifted, and Turkey also attempted to become a member of the European Union by declaring that it 
would work towards fulfilling the criteria for full membership. While this long decade saw the 
continuation of neoliberal market-oriented policies (Öncü and Balkan, 2016: 30), two key 
developments transformed the ongoing neoliberalization process in Turkey and led to the rise of a 
new hegemony within the neoliberal framework of market fundamentalism: 1) the 1999 
earthquake in the Marmara Region, and 2) the economic crisis in 2001.   
On August 17, 1999, an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.4 hit the Marmara Region, which notably 
includes Istanbul and the neighboring cities of Kocaeli, Adapazarı, and Yalova. This earthquake 
caused the deaths of more than 17,000 people and the destruction of more than 285,000 buildings 
(TrtWorld, 2020). Businesses in Istanbul were severely affected. Hence in 1999, Turkey’s 
economy shrank by 3.4 percent. This economic decline was followed by a liquidity and banking 
crisis in 2001, which is considered to be the greatest economic crisis in Turkey’s history. In 2001, 
the economy shrank by 5.7 percent, and the interest rate rose to 34 percent (World Bank, Annual 
Growth Data, 2020).  
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This crisis had two key consequences. First, the then-coalition government, led by Bülent Ecevit 
(a social democrat), Devlet Bahçeli (a far-right nationalist), and Mesut Yılmaz (a right-wing 
liberal), had to establish a new standby agreement with the IMF. This agreement was mainly 
prepared in such a way as to pave the path to increased financialization in Turkey. Before this IMF 
program was implemented, the financialization of markets was very limited in Turkey. The 
standby agreement outlines a substantial agenda of reform: 
The Fund commends the depth and breadth of the new economic program. The emphasis 
on banking reform is appropriate, especially given the structural weaknesses in this area 
that were seen during the recent crises. The elimination of public sector banks' large 
overnight exposure, their full recapitalization, and the overhaul of their governance 
structure will go a long way to strengthen the financial sector. In addition, measures to 
privatize key companies and reform major domestic markets, including the 
telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, tobacco, and sugar markets, and to enhance 
governance and improve transparency, are essential elements of the program. (IMF, 2001) 
This standby program instituted a new wave of roll-back neoliberalization in Turkey, in response 
to the crises that the country had experienced between 1999–2001. This new austerity program, 
and its large-scale privatization aims, led to a governmental change in November 2002, when the 
neoconservative AKP government came to power with a special agenda of Islamic hegemony 





6.1.3. The AKP’s growth model: Crony capitalism, the housing industry, and massive 
suburbanization 
The AKP came to power in November 2002, with a new radical agenda of transforming the politics 
in Turkey, as well as transforming the cities. The AKP claimed that the political domain in Turkey 
had become intensely corrupted; in turn, the party promised that once it came to power, it would 
wipe this corrupted system out (The AKP’s Party Programme, 2002). According to the AKP, one 
of the systems that needed to be changed was the housing model. Following the earthquake in 
1999, citizens had lost their faith in the existing housing model, which had proven to be unsafe 
and unsustainable; the structural damage wrought by the earthquake had revealed deep corruption 
in the industry. The AKP thus began its rule by following three key policies: a new housing system, 
a new social aid system, and a new wealth distribution system. To serve all of these policy goals, 
the AKP began by transforming Istanbul and the housing system across the entire country.  
Critical scholarship on the transformation of Istanbul under the AKP hegemony focuses on a few 
dimensions of how this hegemony perceives and utilizes urban space. A set of studies from the 
perspective of political sociology perceives the massive housing mobilization between 2002– 2019 
as a strategy of consent manufacturing, as housing would yield large political support (Buğra and 
Savaşkan, 2014; Marschall et al. 2016, 2016; Üçoğlu, 2019). In the meantime, another set of 
similar studies argues that the AKP established an authoritarian regime for which it has received 
support from loyal business elites and potential homeowners. Although it is an authoritarian 
regime, it is able to obtain popular support by utilizing the housing market; as such, this hegemony 
has managed to form a social coalition, together with loyal business elites and grassroots 
community members (Arslanalp, 2019; Çavuşoğlu and Strutz, 2019; Esen and Gümüşçü, 2018). 
There is also a growing critical scholarship that focuses on the institutionalization of a housing 
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market tied to global financial markets. Melih Yeşilbağ (2019) argues that the state currently 
orchestrates the financialization of housing in Turkey. Similarly, Havva Ezgi Doğru (2016) 
examines the transformation of housing from the perspective of social welfare and argues that a 
new institutionalization of the housing market is now occurring under the umbrella of the Housing 
Development Administration of Turkey (Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı, TOKI). Housing is thus 
presented as a benevolent act of the state, in order to manufacture consent for the authoritarian 
regime of the AKP. Finally, critical scholarship from the perspective of urban sociology also 
argues that the AKP has established its authoritarian regime by displacing gecekondu dwellers and 
forcefully binding them into a new debtfare regime. The AKP’s aim is to get rid of gecekondus 
and send gecekondu dwellers to new large-scale housing projects built by TOKI on the periphery 
of Istanbul. This strategy is then followed by gentrification projects, such as those in Galata, 
Karaköy, Sulukule, and Tarlabasi (Aksoy, 2014; Kuyucu and Ünsal, 2010, Uzun, 2018; Ünsal, 
2013).  
All of these studies in one way or another examine the different dynamics of how the AKP 
hegemony perceives urban space and why Istanbul is very important for manufacturing the consent 
of the masses. However, most of these studies do not touch upon a critical point that the AKP has 
prioritized from the very beginning of its rule: the institutionalization of a new growth model based 
on crony capitalism and massive suburbanization. Although the AKP came to power by promising 
to eliminate corruption from the political system, it has in fact constructed its own corrupted 
system. As Ayse Buğra and Osman Savaşkan (2014) argue, the AKP hegemony has become the 
zenith point of business-politics relations in Turkey, as the AKP has sought to create its own 
business elites as a new wealth distribution mechanism.  
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When the AKP came into power, the business elites of Turkey were unionized under TÜSIAD. 
Although the AKP has many close allies from TÜSIAD, it has also established its own business 
circles, such as the Association for Detached Business Men (Müstakil İş Adamları Derneği, 
MÜSIAD; also known as Müslüman İş Adamları, the Association for Muslim Business Men) and 
a few other associations that have become close allies of the AKP regime. The only obstacle that 
the AKP regime faced to directing its own wealth distribution was that many business fields were 
already filled by members of TÜSIAD. That is why the hegemony had to find a profitable business 
domain to enable rapid rent-maximization and create its own business elites. It chose the corrupted 
housing system as the key business terrain to distribute urban fortunes to the newly rising Islamic 
bourgeoisie. 
The rise of the housing market as the key driving force of the economy has been achieved mainly 
through a strategy of transforming suburban land in Istanbul. In other words, the formation of a 
suburban-financial nexus is the central strategy of the AKP for perpetuating its hegemony. 
Evidence of this strategy can be seen in the party program of the AKP. In its 2002 program, which 
was updated in 2007 and remains since then, the party claims that the best way to get rid of 
gecekondus is to build garden-cities (AKP Party Program, 2002, 2007). The party perceives the 
suburban mass-housing and garden-city model as the key panacea for fixing the problems of 
urbanization. Therefore, the AKP has established its hegemony on the transformation of suburban 
land by building large-scale suburban towns (or as they say, garden-cities) and by supporting these 
projects with large-scale mega infrastructure and shopping mall projects. The massive 
suburbanization process and its link to finance capital in Istanbul constitute key aspects of the 
urban transformation and economic growth model of this hegemony.  
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One of the scholarly discussion points on the establishment of this hegemony focuses on how to 
define the authoritarian regime. The AKP’s housing model, based on large-scale mass housing 
projects built by TOKI and large gated communities built by private developers and REITS, 
constitutes a new economic growth model that is paired with crony capitalism and financialization. 
The AKP has established its hegemony by deepening crony capitalism in Turkey, while choosing 
the real estate/construction sectors as the main business coalitions for distributing wealth 
accumulation among cronies. Here, the key questions are: Who are those cronies? How they have 
become cronies under this hegemony? Or even, is it appropriate to identify the AKP hegemony as 
crony capitalism? 
I use the definition of “crony capitalist” given by The Economist, which began to publish a crony 
capitalism index in 2014. For this index, the editors of The Economist state that in crony capitalism, 
business elites enhance their wealth accumulation by forging very strong connections to political 
authorities. In countries such as Russia, Singapore, and Turkey, the political authorities may even 
choose the businesspeople to which the wealth of the nation is channeled (The Economist, 2014, 
2016). In other words, the only way of doing business and accumulating wealth in a crony capitalist 
system is to have close and strong relations with the political authorities. From this perspective, it 
is possible to argue that the AKP hegemony has established a lopsided crony capitalism in Turkey. 
This hegemony has fostered cronies from among Islamic business circles, as well as close friends 
and hometown associates of Tayyip Erdoğan, the head of the AKP and the current president of 
Turkey. The crony capitalists that have emerged during the AKP hegemony work mainly in the 
sectors of health (private hospitals), construction (including the real estate sector), mining, and 
tourism. Buğra and Savaşkan (2004) also note that these cronies have bought most of corporate 
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media since 2005. Table 12 illustrates the names of individuals and corporations that that have 
become crony capitalists (hence tremendously rich) in the AKP hegemony.  
As Fuat Ercan and Sebnem Oğuz underline, the AKP hegemony maintains itself “through the 
deployment of economic, ideological, and repressive apparatuses of the state” (2015: 118). This 
means that the AKP hegemony uses the repressive state apparatus to distribute urban fortunes and 
mining resources to its cronies; in the meantime, it uses a system of “charity distribution” in order 
to provide a new social aid system for the exploited working class. According to Ercan and Oğuz: 
“Charity distribution is the Turkish version of poverty reduction strategies suggested by the World 
Bank since the early 2000s, and one of the most important political tools of the AKP in recruiting 
support from the working class” (Ibid.). Therefore, the AKP hegemony produces consent for its 
new crony and corrupted regime by distributing charities to the working class, the conditions of 
which have gotten worse since the AKP came to power. As Savaşkan (2019) points out, the AKP 

















One of the closest friends of 
Erdoğan 
Owner of various companies in 
construction, mining, media, and 
military production sectors 
Sancak develops partnerships 
with the Qatari allies of Erdoğan 
Çalık 
Holding 
Company head, Ahmet Çalık, is 
a very close friend of Erdoğan; 
Berat Albayrak, Erdoğan’s son-
in-law, also worked as the CEO 
for a long time 
Owner of media, textile, 
construction, and mining 
corporations 
Çalık is now one of the richest 
people in Turkey, with a net 
worth of 1.9 billion USD; he was 
a modest businessman before the 
AKP came to power 
Rönesans 
Holding 
Owner, Erman Ilıcak, is a close 
friend of Erdoğan 
Contractor for large-scale 
infrastructural mega-projects and 
large city hospitals projects 
Ilıcak is the richest person in 
Turkey, with a net worth of 3.8 
billion USD; he was just a modest 
businessman before the AKP 
came to power 
Fettah 
Tamince 
Close friend of Erdoğan Owner of a luxurious hotel chain 





Company head, Mehmet Cengiz, 
is a very close friend of Erdoğan 
One of the largest contractors of 
the mega-projects run by the AKP 
hegemony 
Cengiz Holding was a small 
business two decades ago, but 
currently it has 4 billion TL in 
capital open to the public 
Ali Ağaoğlu Close friend of many AKP 
members 
Owner of Ağaoğlu Construction 
Company, one of the largest 
contractors of TOKI 
Ağaoğlu is currently one of the 
largest developers in the suburbs 




Became part of the AKP’s crony 
circle after 2007 
One of the largest energy 
providers in Turkey; an investor 
in real estate and the housing 
market; owner of largest gated 
community, Kemer Country, in 
Göktürk; owner of the country’s 
largest media corporations, 
Hürriyet Newspaper and Kanal D 
The chairman of the group 
worked as the chairman of 
Beşiktaş Football Club for a very 
long time; when the group bought 
Hürriyet Newspaper and Kanal D, 
it paved the path for the AKP 




Chairman is a close friend of 
Erdoğan 
One of the largest contractors that 
builds large-scale housing 
projects 
The chairman of the corporation 
is now the head of Turkey’s 
Football Association and the 




Chairman is a close friend of 
Erdoğan 
One of the contractors of the new 
airport of Istanbul and one of the 





Owner is a close friend of 
Erdoğan, going back to high 
school 
Currently the largest private REIT 
that constructs gated communities 
in Istanbul 
 
Table 13. The AKP’s Crony Capitalists that dominate the wealth accumulation channels and urban growth machine in Turkey.  
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Apart from the list of cronies presented in Table 12, other large corporations have also developed 
good relations with the AKP. However, this list comprises the prominent loyal business members 
that have dominated economic life in Turkey through their political ties with the head of the AKP. 
Some of these businesspeople were seen as members of the so-called “Anatolian Tigers” in the 
1980s, a new breed of entrepreneurs that sought to rival the already established industrial 
bourgeoisie in Istanbul29. Under the AKP hegemony, many of these businessmen and corporations 
have now become the new bourgeoisie of Istanbul, thanks to their ties with political authorities. 
Other small corporations and businessmen also have personal ties to the AKP regime, and many 
of them have become affluent through construction, real estate, and mining. Many of these 
corporations have increased their capitalization by receiving public bids and auctions from the 
government. They receive these contracts for mega-projects, or they work closely with TOKI and 
Emlak Konut REIT30 in housing projects and other developments.  
Since 2003, the AKP hegemony has begun to work with its close friends and cronies as part of a 
new wealth distribution strategy. This strategy is based on the displacement of the old housing 
 
29 Anatolian Tigers is a symbolic nickname used by the rising Islamic bourgeoisie in Anatolia after the 1980s. The 
reference here is given to the rising economies of Asia as the economic development of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Singapore was once pronounced as Asian Tigers. Here, the Islamic bourgeoisie which began to gain 
importance since the 1980s, started to identify themselves as Anatolian Tigers to convince people that they would be 
the locomotive of economic progress in Turkey. Even some members of the Anatolian Tigers (essentially in 
MÜSIAD) identify themselves as Islamic Calvinists and/or Protestant of Islamic economy to refer to the rise of 
capitalism as the extension of Protestantism into the economic life as Weber suggested (Ayhan ad Sağıroğlu, 2012). 
Essentially, the reports published by MÜSIAD give a great emphasis on the matter of creating a new Islamic homo 
economicus that is in pursuit of wealth accumulation. In the report called Homo Islamicus, the Anatolian Tigers 
mentality reveals itself as an ambitious Islamic capitalist that is inclined to a morality similar to Protestant ethics 
(Üçoğlu, 2012). 
30 Emlak Konut used to be the special bank (with the name of Emlak Bank) founded in the 1930s to distribute credits 
for housing projects. Emlak means real estate in Turkish, and this real estate bank gained a new status under the 
AKP regime. The bank had several problems of corruption and financial deficit in the late 1990s, the AKP 




model dominated by build-and-sell developers and gecekondus; in its place, the AKP hegemony 
seeks to create a new housing model and urbanization strategy dominated by its cronies, 
particularly in Istanbul. This has resulted in a construction boom led by a hybrid state capitalism, 
in which state agencies (TOKI, Emlak Konut REIT), ministries (the Ministry of Urban Affairs, the 
Ministry of Transportation, and the Ministry of Treasury and Finance), and crony capitalists form 
a hegemonic class alliance. 
There have been two periods in this construction boom: the period between 2003–2009 and the 
period between 2009-2019. Between 2003–2009, Turkey’s economy saw the entry of large flows 
of global financial money, as Figure 27 illustrates. Between 2003– 2009, the selected strategy 
focused on fixing the problem of gecekondus. A few gentrification projects, urban renewal 
projects, and TOKI mass housing projects were completed during this period.31 However, 
following the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, during which the economy shrank by 4.8 
percent, a new strategy of construction began. In this new strategy, the idea was to enable the 
emergence of large REITs and developers close to the AKP government, in order to distribute 
urban fortunes (e.g., projects, land, and mega infrastructure projects) to these cronies and to build 
mega-projects in order to boost the land-rent value and volume of speculation.  
 
31 For the urban transformation projects, there is wide literature on the cases of Galata, Tarlabasi, Sulukule and 
Başıbüyük. This literature is fair enough to cover the urban transformation projects that were conducted and still 




Figure 27. Global money flow to Turkey in the form of financial or direct investment (bn. USD). Source: The Central Bank of 
Turkey, quoted from Sönmez, 2010: 267 
In this case, urban expropriation plays the key role in creating temporal economic volume through 
mega-projects. Mega infrastructure projects on the periphery of Istanbul have served as a key state-
led developmentalist strategy (Güney, 2019). The production of peripheral space as a tool of real 
estate capitalism to prevent potential economic inertia has been undertaken as the main urban 
policy. For the purpose of boosting financialization through real estate, Istanbul has been chosen 
as the nodal point of investment, and a massive suburbanization process has been strategized. This 
massive suburbanization has been sold via a discourse of attracting global financial flows and a 
nationalist rhetoric of demonstrating the impetus of development and immediate control over 
nature. This state-led developmentalism has had severe consequences, from depleting the crucial 
forestry areas of Istanbul’s northern greenbelt to contributing to work accidents that have led to 
the death of several workers (Üçoğlu, 2019). 
AKP’s regime of real estate financialization operates within an administrative framework that is 
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(formerly the office of the prime ministry, until Erdoğan appropriated this authority under the aegis 
of his presidency), the Ministry of Urban Affairs, the state agency TOKI, Emlak REIT, and local 
municipalities are the main actors of this process. Apart from these governmental bodies, there are 
also market actors involved—mainly private REITs, mining sectors, and home appliance sectors. 
These business elites are the rent-seekers that have close relations with the central government. 
Together with these rent-seekers, the AKP prioritizes the real estate market as the main driving 
force of wealth accumulation for its inner crony circle.  
There are two overlapping strategies for centralizing the REFCOM model to extract land-rent 
value from Istanbul’s peripheral expansion: (1) “Crazy” mega-projects are arbitrarily developed 
and promoted by the central government in Ankara. These projects are managed by the Ministry 
of Urban Affairs, while the Ministry of Treasury and Finance provides financial back-up. In certain 
cases, the projects may require approval from the metropolitan municipality of Istanbul; however, 
this approval may be easily bypassed, thanks to the ambiguity of legislation in Turkey (Kuyucu, 
2014). In most cases, urgent expropriation is undertaken to hasten construction. (2) TOKI, together 
with Emlak REIT, functions to produce large-scale housing projects near those mega-projects. The 
central government thus plays a key role in implementing both of these overlapping strategies, 
including the mega-projects run by ministries and the large-scale housing projects run by TOKI 
and its subsidiaries. 
Most of the mega-projects are huge in size and difficult to build without destroying environmental 
balances and creating a proper infrastructural foundation. These operations come at a great cost. 
That is why REITs and construction companies do not want to participate in this process, without 
a guarantee of long-term profit. Necessary credit is provided by three giant public banks; at the 
same time, the Ministry of Treasury and Finance provides a guarantee of long-term profit to those 
265 
 
corporations. Tax money collected from Turkish citizens is thus allocated as a guarantee of profit 
for mega-projects. This guarantee provides an opportunity for public banks and project holders to 
obtain the enormous amounts of financial credit needed from global markets to launch the projects. 
The strategy here is to begin the projects as soon as possible at any cost, not only to provide 
temporary speculation but also to mute any opposition.  
These mega-projects are identified as “crazy” projects by the central government itself. They serve 
to support a new hegemony, which has deep ties to the conservative authoritarianism that the AKP 
seeks to consolidate with its class alliances and nationalist rhetoric. Thus, “crazy” mega-projects 
serve as a Machiavellian political maneuver (see Flyvbjern, 2006). In his critical analysis, Mustafa 
Dikeç writes: 
Since the 2005 release of a best-selling semi-documentary novel on the Turkish War of 
Independence entitled Şu Çılgın Türkler (Those Crazy Turks), the term ‘crazy’ (çılgın) has 
become part of nationalist rhetoric and been appropriated by the government to legitimize 
projects facing public opposition. The 2012 publication of the book Osmanlı’nın Çılgın 
Projeleri (Crazy Projects of the Ottomans) by a conservative publisher reinforced this 
trend, and resonated equally well with the government’s nationalist rhetoric with an 
Ottoman and Islamic twist. The environmentally disastrous canal project (Kanal Istanbul) 
to join the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara, constructing artificial islands in the latter 
are just some of this government’s ‘crazy projects,’ as Erdoğan himself refers to them. 
Turkey now is a country where government officials justify projects by their craziness 
rather than, say, their value for the public good, well-being of citizens or the environment. 
(Dikeç, 2017: 178) 
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The allocation of tax money in this REFCOM model is legitimized by the promotion of mega-
projects in Istanbul and the presentation of those projects as “crazy,” which invokes a nationalist 
right-wing populism that aims to silence all oppositional movements against these projects. These 
projects are entangled in a legitimizing discourse that asserts that “growth is good for everyone.” 
Meanwhile, the “crazy” projects are promoted along a “time-speed” axis. In other words, they are 
often portrayed as a triumph over nature and time, with the AKP regime praising the relatively 
short amount of time akin to construct them.32 
Examples of proposed and undertaken “crazy” projects include the canal project, the third bridge 
on the Bosporus strait, Istanbul’s new airport, and new cities by the Black Sea shores on both sides 
of Istanbul. Among these projects, the proposed canal project seems to be totally unrealistic. That 
is why it has never actually been launched, since it was first proposed in 2011; however, it is still 
used as a tool for political maneuvering. Other projects are already complete or under construction. 
These projects aim to produce massive suburban development in the northern part of Istanbul, 
which used to be the greenbelt of the city; there, they create new opportunities to construct large-
scale housing projects near mega-projects.  
Such projects aim to valorize land-rent in Northern Istanbul by attracting global financial flows 
through the guarantee of the state. Murat Güney indicates that the explicit purpose of these projects 
is to boost the housing market in Istanbul:  
 
32 Essentially, this rhetoric serves as a form of comparative demagogy, in which the Turkish government presents 
the new airport of Istanbul, for example, as a triumph over Berlin’s never-finished international airport. Here, the 
emphasis is placed on the time taken to build such mega-projects. 
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[T]he highest increase in housing prices was observed in suburban neighborhoods near 
Istanbul’s ongoing mega-project areas. While in several neighborhoods of Catalca 
province house and land prices increased about 76 percent in only one year following the 
construction of the third bridge over the Bosporus, suburban neighbourhoods of Eyüp 
district that are close to the new airport construction site have seen property increase in 
value by about 30 percent… (Güney, 2019: 195) 
These projects are used as a tool of hegemony consolidation. According to the WB, five Turkish 
firms that are very close to the AKP government are among the top ten corporations in the world, 
when it comes to obtaining public bid funds through public-private partnerships. Figure 27 
illustrates the enormous amount of wealth accumulated by these corporations, which act as the 
ruling classes of Turkey. “Crazy” mega-projects are assembled as a regime of wealth accumulation 
for these elites; in the meantime, these projects open ground for further land-rent speculation in 
the form of large-scale housing projects. The suburban landscape of Istanbul is now full of large-
scale mass housing projects built by TOKI, Emlak REIT, and other REITs and developers. 
 
Figure 28. Top five corporations in Turkey that received public bids for mega-projects, 1990–2018. While this figure shows the 
















If we examine the example of Istanbul’s new airport, a prime case in point, we see that construction 
was allocated to a consortium of REITs and developers that are cronies of the AKP government. 
Limak-Cengiz-Kolin-Kalyon-Mapa Consortium won the bid, with support provided by three 
private banks (Finansbank, Garanti Bank, and Deniz Bank) and three public banks (Ziraat Bank, 
Halk Bank, and Vakıf Bank). According to Evinc Doğan and Aleksandra Stupar: “The state-owned 
banks committed a 70 percent share of the loan package, which means putting the majority of the 
burden on Turkish taxpayers” (2017: 284). According to a report from the WB, the cost of the 
project is 35,587 million USD, with a yearly profit guaranteed by the Ministry of Treasury and 
Finance for the consortium of five REITs. Such mega-projects open ground for further housing 
market speculation. However, they are constructed at great cost. In the case of Istanbul’s airport, 
there is still ambiguity around the number of workers who died due to accidents during 
construction. Estimates range from 400–1000 (T24 News, 2018), although officials deny these 
claims. 
The new growth model in Turkey thus comprises the institutionalization of crony capitalism, 
which works through the financialization of housing. Financialization in this case does not 
necessarily occur directly by making households indebted; rather, it increases the total public debt, 
through the provision and finding of global credits for large projects and government guarantees 
of long-term profiting for REITs and developers that build mega-projects33. This 
institutionalization takes place by changing the form of public procurement. As Ayhan and Yılmaz 
 
33 Government guarantee for long-term profitting is a sophisticated model of public procurement in Turkey. The 
strategy here is that the government guarantees the crony corporations that they will never lose money when they 
participate in large-scale mega projects. Even if they fail to profit, the government will pay the funds necessary to 
offset their losses.  
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Üstüner (2015) point out the AKP regime transformed the public procurement system in Turkey 
in a way to institutionalize crony capitalism. 
6.2. Istanbul’s geographic and economic position in Turkey  
To understand why the AKP hegemony uses Istanbul as its key site for manufacturing consent, it 
is important to consider the economic position of the city. As we can see in Table 13, Istanbul’s 
share of Turkey’s total population was 5.9 percent in 1927; however, by 2019 this share had grown 
to 18.6 percent. This huge rise in population runs hand in hand with the city’s growing share of 
the national GDP. In 1927, Istanbul’s population actually declined, due to the fact that the 
republican regime that was founded that year favoured Ankara as the new capital city because it 
had served as the command centre of the national independence movement from 1919–1922. 
However, the modernist project that was introduced by the Kemalist34 regime initiated a new set 
of projects to transform Istanbul, in order to create a Western-type modern city. The rationale was 
that if the urban space was modernized, then the population would adapt to that modernization 




34 Kemalist regime is a term commonly used to describe the period between 1923 and 1950 when Kemal Atatürk, 
the founder of modern Turkey, was the President of Republic, and he created the new republican regime in Turkey 
by overthrowing the Sultanhood after the War of Independence between 1919 and 1922. During this time Ataturk’s 
party (The Republican People’s Party – Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - CHP) was the single party (even though there was 
a period when opposition parties existed for a while) and transformed Turkey with a series of reforms in socio-
economic life. After Ataturk passed away in November 1938, Ismet İnönü became the President of Republic as the 
leader of CHP and ruled until 1950 when he left his post after the triumph of Democratic Party in the democratic 
elections (see. Ahmad, 2002, Zürcher, 2004).  
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Year Population of Turkey Population of Istanbul 
1927 13,648,270 806,863 
1935 16,158,018 883,599 
1940 17,820,950 991,237 
1950 20,947,188 1,166,477 
1960 27,754,820 1,882,092 
1970 35,605,176 3,019,032 
1980 44,736,957 4,741,890 
1990 56,473,035 7,309,190 
2000 67,803,927 10,018,735 
2009 72,561,312 12,915,158 
2019 83,154,997 15,519,267 
Table 14. The populations of Turkey and Istanbul, 1927–2019. Source: TurkStat (TUIK, Adrese dayalı nüfus kayıt 
sistemi): http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=33705 
The years following 1927 witnessed a rise of population in Istanbul, which increased rapidly from 
the 1960s onwards. These are the years in which the ISI growth model was implemented, with the 
effect of creating a national bourgeoisie based in Istanbul (as described above). In the 1960s, 
Istanbul was chosen as the key industrial hub of the country. It is located in the Marmara Region, 
one of seven geographical regions in Turkey. These regional divisions do not rely on any 
administrative status or borders; rather, they are based on physical geography and climatic 
conditions. The Marmara Region is located in the northwestern part of Turkey, where one finds 
the largest industrial cities of the country, including not only Istanbul but also Bursa, Kocaeli, 
Sakarya, and Balıkesir. The Marmara Region cities of Tekirdağ, Kırklareli, Edirne, and Çanakkale 
















Marmara Region total 25,379,427 
     Table 15. The population of cities in the Marmara Region, December 2019. Source: TurkStat 
 
 
Figure 29. Cities in the Marmara Region. Source: The Marmara Municipalities Association 
The Marmara Region now contains around 30 percent of Turkey’s population, and Istanbul is 
home to about 65 percent of the Marmara Region population. This demographic distribution is 
quite important to consider, as Istanbul’s economy also shapes and controls other cities in this 
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region. Bursa, Sakarya, and Kocaeli are industrial cities that serve as prominent manufacturing 
sites for the automobile and home hardware industries. Huge employers such as Tofaş (Turkish 
partner of Italian FIAT) and Ford Otosan (Turkish partner of Ford Motor Company), as well as 
large textile producers (e.g., Özdilek in the towel industry in Bursa), are among the well-known 
industrial sites located here. Bursa is one of the centres of textile business in Turkey, and the textile 
enterprises in Bursa primarily produce for customers and exporters in Istanbul. Tekirdağ, Edirne, 
and Çanakkale are commonly known as the agricultural parts of Marmara Region, and they provide 
a necessary food supply for Istanbul. Istanbul has by far the largest business volume in the region: 
in the entire Marmara Region, there are 1,411,306 enterprises, of which 881,489 are located in 
Istanbul (TurkStat, 2018).  
In addition to considering the position of Istanbul in the Marmara Region, it is also important to 
evaluate its position within the wider country. Istanbul produces 50 percent of Turkey’s entire 
export (88.2 billion USD) and accounts for 54 percent of its entire import (125.17 billion USD). 
Turkey’s national GDP was 718.12 billion USD in 2018, and Istanbul generated 210.8 billion 
USD—or 29.25 percent of Turkey’s total GDP. (TurkStat, 2019). In Istanbul, the GDP per capita 
was 16,264 USD in 2018, whereas the national GDP per capita was 9,370 USD.35 Istanbul then 
stands as the key economic centre within a terrain of colossal uneven geographical development.  
Istanbul is also currently a tourism hub of the hinterlands, and converting Istanbul into a touristic 
attraction point was one of the key strategies of neoliberalization that began in the late 1980s. 
Converting Istanbul into a touristic hub started through a gentrification process, followed by the 
 




enlargement of Ataturk Airport and construction of the second airport (Sabiha Gökçen Airport) in 
the Asian part of the city. The AKP regime continued this strategy through opening the large mega-
project Istanbul Airport (supposedly the largest airport in the world) in late 2018.  
Year Number of foreign tourists that stay 
overnight in Istanbul 
Number of tourists that come to 
Istanbul as a transit point 
2016 14,409,188 9,217,644 
2017 16,001,916 10,730,510 
2018 20,132,109 13,432,990 
2019 23,570,640 14,906,663 
Table 16. Number of tourists that come to Istanbul as a transit point or to stay overnight. Source: TurkStat 
These numbers also reflect the change in Istanbul’s economy. As indicated before, Istanbul used 
to be an industrial production and working-class city in the 1960s and 1970s. However, by the 
1980s, we witness the beginning of the decline of industrial production and the rise of service, 
financial, and construction/real estate sectors. During this time, the housing problem emerged as 
one of the key problems of the city as between 1960–1990, as the number of gecekondus 
skyrocketed not only on the periphery of the city but also around the industrial zones. I will focus 
on this issue in the coming sections.  
The decentralization of industrial production that had begun by the 1980s was offset by the rise of 
the construction economy. I will return to that point later on, but if we check Turkey’s GDP as of 
2018, we see that Istanbul accounts for 210.8 billion USD, and 137.4 billion USD of that came 




Years Total GDP of 
Istanbul  
(bn. USD) 








2004 130.08  77.8 35.3 398.8 16.5 
2010 229.00 145.3 55.8 381.3 27.6 
2018 210.8  137.4 57.9 225.5 22.8 
Table 17. Sectoral break-down of Istanbul’s GDP, 2004–2018. Source: TurkStat 
Table 16 illustrates that service sectors now account for the dominant share of Istanbul’s GDP. 
Service sectors accounted for 64.52 percent of Istanbul’s GDP in 2004, 63.29 percent in 2010, and 
65.36 percent in 2018. In the meantime, we witness a major decline in agricultural production in 
the city, even though the city needs more agricultural products to supply its growing population. 
One of the reasons for this decline is the conversion of agricultural land into construction sites, 
due to massive suburbanization. The fluctuation in GDP from 2010–2018 reflects the devaluation 
of Turkish Lira (TL) against USD. The stagnation of agricultural production and decline in foreign 
financial flows contributed to this devaluation..  
There is one more datum point that I will highlight to emphasize the significance of real estate in 
Turkey’s economy. In 2018, the share of construction in Turkey’s GDP was 7.2 percent, and the 
share of real estate activities was 6.8 percent—representing a combined share of 15 percent in 
total. This constitutes a significant share, particularly since other manufacturing and service sectors 
are dependent on its growth. In 2002, the combined share of these sectors was 12.5 percent. At 
that point in time, construction was not positioned as the locomotive of the economy; instead, 
manufacturing and agriculture still played leading roles. Since then, the construction and real estate 
sectors have taken crucial roles in driving economic growth. Istanbul in particular accounts for the 
largest share of the real estate and construction economy in Turkey. On average 17.6 percent of 
new houses that are built each year in Turkey are built in Istanbul.  
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Year Annual GDP growth rate 
(percent) 
Share of construction in total 
GDP  
Share of real estate in total 
GDP  
1999 -3.4 5.6 6.9 
2001 -6.0 4.6 8.5 
2002 6.4 4.5 8.0 
2003 5.6 4.6 7.9 
2004 9.6 5.3 8.1 
2005 9.0 5.6 8.5 
2006 7.1 6.3 8.9 
2007 5.0 6.8 9.6 
2008 0.8 6.8 9.7 
2009 -4.8 5.6 10.5 
2010 8.5 6.1 9.9 
2011 11.1 7.2 9.0 
2012 4.8 7.5 8.6 
2013 8.5 8.1 8.2 
2014 5.2 8.1 8.0 
2015 6.1 8.2 7.7 
2016 3.2 8.6 7.7 
2017 7.5 8.6 7.1 
2018 2.8 7.2 6.8 
Table 18.  Share of construction and real estate in the GDP of Turkey, I have deliberately omitted data from the year 2000, in order 
to show two recession years back to back. Source: TUIK (TurkStat, Economic Outlook, Sectoral Percentages and Annual GDP). 
As the numbers in Table 17 illustrate, when the annual growth rate has increased during the past 
two decades, so has the share of construction and real estate in the total GDP. The difference 
between construction and real estate as a sector is that the real estate sector includes second-hand 
housing sales, office resales, and land acquisitions and resales. Since 2003, the share of these two 
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sectors in Turkey’s GDP has vacillated between 13.5 percent and 17 percent. Again, the majority 
of construction and real estate transactions take place in Istanbul. 
There is also one more point that I need to highlight in order to illustrate the rise of the housing 
industry and its role in reshaping public administration. In Turkey, if a city has a population of 
more than 750,000 people, that city gains the status of a metropolitan municipality. For instance, 
Istanbul is part of a metropolitan municipality that is called Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality 
(IBB), which oversees 39 district-level municipalities. 
 
Figure 30. A map of Istanbul’s district-level municipalities. Source: Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality 
This was a strategy that came into being in the 1980s, in order to create a regional governance 
structure.36 Within the context of neoliberalization, this strategy was implemented to serve a 
twofold plan: First, it aimed to create competitive urban governance. All of the district-level 
municipalities within the IBB have their own mayors, all of whom are democratically elected. 
Hence, in theory, each candidate must work hard to win their elections; therefore, at a local level, 
citizens will receive competitive service with quality. However, in reality, this strategy has also 
 




increased nepotism and corruption at the district level (Savaşkan, 2019). Second, this structuring 
of local government served to facilitate land commodification. These district-level municipalities 
were given the authority to distribute land tenure, provide neighbourhood-level planning, and 
make decisions on certain housing projects. Hence, short-cut governance might be used to 
commodify land, unless that land has a complicated status (i.e., if land is owned by the Ministry 
of Treasury and Finance or another ministry, then other bureaucratic processes are necessary).  
In fact, Istanbul previously had fewer district-level municipalities; however, during the AKP 
regime, the number increased to 39 after the enactment of a new metropolitan law in 2012. The 
IBB is responsible for major planning and major infrastructural services, such as the transit systems 
(e.g., subway, bus lines, maritime transportation), as well as for creating master plans for the 
boundaries of urban areas and for infrastructural investments (e.g., water systems, pipelines, 
sewage systems), whereas district-level municipalities are responsible for administering permits 
for business openings and neighbourhood-level services (e.g., pavement and sidewalk repair, 
beautification of local parks, housing tenure). District-level municipalities also play a key role in 
gentrification projects and in developing plans for further suburban projects. As some of them are 
suburban localities, they play a key role in grabbing land for further development. As such, they 
can develop close relations with TOKI, REITs, and developers (Tekeli, 2013). In Istanbul, district-
level governments are among the key actors of urban development; sometimes they play a more 
crucial role than TOKI and ministries. 
6.3. Branded housing, gated communities, and a new socio-spatial reality 
Within the context of massive suburbanization in Turkey, it is important to identify the role of 
financialization. As one of my interviewees told me:  
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For a very long time in Turkey, financialization did not work in the form of household debt, 
as we see in mature economies. One of the reasons for that, the banks were very hesitant 
to lend money after the crisis of 2001. Additionally, the legislation for REITs, TOKI, and 
other housing developers created an alternative model of financing. Instead of going to the 
banks for mortgage credits, the dwellers could pay to REITs and TOKI their monthly rent. 
After 20 or 25 years, they can get their tenures from these corporations. This is why 
household indebtedness to the banks can be seen lower in Turkey, but this does not mean 
that they are not paying a kind of mortgage debt. (Interviewee 22)  
She then continued: 
Much of the financialization in Istanbul goes through REITs and developers; in many 
mature capitalist economies, the banks usually play the key role in distributing credits and 
boosting the housing market. In fact, in Turkey, REITs play the key role by their financing 
models, and also sometimes public banks distribute cheap credits as they act for spatio-
temporal fix. REITs and developers find the credits, and they undergo a financial debt 
process. They then reflect this debt to the prices. (Interviewee 22)  
Thus, REITs are acting as the key “financializers” of the system in Turkey. Many banks, 
developers, and former industrial corporations in the country have founded REITs. Currently there 
are 34 REITs operating in large-scale housing projects, branded-gated community projects, and 
shopping mall projects across the country. In Turkey, REITs generally exist in the form of 
developer REITs; however, some of them may also operate together with other developers to 
subcontract their construction operations. These 34 REITs have their shares issued in the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange, and they have wide portfolios of construction, mining, shopping mall projects, 
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housing financing, and more. REITs in Turkey hold a total value of assets and shares of 86.227 
billion TL. The largest, Emlak REIT, holds 23.411 billion TL. The second largest is Torunlar 
REIT, a builder of branded gated communities that has close ties to the AKP government. Figure 
26 below illustrates the shares of different REITs in the total market value of REIT capitalization—
and shows how crony capitalism dominates the real estate and construction industries in Turkey. 
 
Figure 31. The share of REITs in the total market value of REIT capitalization. Source: Turkish Capital Board Annual Report, 
2019 
The rise of REITs as the one of the key actors of the REFCOM model has had severe impacts on 
the socio-economic reorganization of Turkish society. Wealth accumulation for certain members 
of society has grown. REITs in Turkey, and particularly Emlak REIT, work with an accumulation 
model based on revenue-sharing: 
The model is based on sharing profits generated by the projects among the public and 
private partners. While the public partner provides land for the project, the private 





The share of REITs in the total market value of REIT 
capitalization
Emlak REIT Torunlar REIT AKİŞ REIT İŞ REIT The Rest
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revenue. Emlak Konut REIT defines this model as a way to ensure high profitability and 
fund flows. (Serin et al. 2020: 9).  
Hence, these REITs work mainly as a growth coalition according to the guidelines of the state, and 
the accumulated wealth is distributed among the partnering developers and contractors. The state 
provides the land for large-scale suburban housing projects, and this land is usually transferred to 
REITs by TOKI, the state treasury, and sometimes directly by the office of the president. 
Development projects that have been built since 2003 in Turkey usually take the form of a gated 
community, exclusive community, or branded housing project. They are promoted as the latest 
form of modern life, often with an enclosed green space, a playground for children, parking lots, 
and security patrols. Often, these developments are promoted through a narrative of “time,” as we 
saw in the case of mega-projects. These large-scale housing projects are typically constructed in 
2–4 years and are often presented as models of the latest construction technology and the 
worldwide success of Turkish construction firms and REITs.  
Gated communities began to spread in Istanbul after people saw the example of branded 
projects in the Kemerburgaz-Göktürk area. Also, the earthquake in 1999 spread a fear of 
dwelling in the central parts of the city. That is why Istanbulites, particularly middle 
classes, made the choice of living in gated mass housing projects. As time has passed, 
branded projects have become the new normal; even in inner-city areas, people are looking 
for residence projects with security units, concierges, and special amenities. This is based 
on an American model, and in Istanbul, security units have become a must in many 
projects. In suburban expansion, this is now the norm; even projects made for low-income 
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families have security units now. Emlak REIT and other developers are presenting this 
model as the new normal and the latest form of modern urban life (Interviewee 22).  
 
Figure 32. Kent Plus Project in Ataşehir. This suburban town has been growing since the 1990s. The project was completed 
according to the revenue-sharing model of Emlak Bank. It is now a gated community with a special security unit at the entrance. 
Photo credit: Murat Üçoğlu, 2018 
 
Figure 33. Bahçekent Project in the suburban town of Bahçeşehir. This was another project completed by Emlak REIT, through a 
revenue-sharing model. Source: Google Maps 
These REITs and the revenue-sharing model in which they work with large developers and 
constructors have created a new housing model in Turkey, particularly in the suburbs. These REITs 
are the key players that commodify land and housing in the financial markets (Candan and 
Kolluoğlu, 2008). In Turkey’s case, these REITs are financializing space through the spread of 
gated communities; almost all the housing projects in the new suburbs of Istanbul are either 
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branded large projects or have strict security units and patrols. They also act with their special 
financing models to boost the sales of housing. That is why housing sale numbers have increased 
tremendously in Istanbul in the last decade. Hence, suburbanization works through a logic of 
spatial segregation, which is often determined by the socio-economic conditions of the dwellers. 
Financing models also differ from one project to another, depending on the project’s socio-
economic scale. For projects built for low-income families, the down payments and conditions of 
homeownership are higher than expected; for certain projects targeting middle-class buyers, down 
payments and flexible monthly options make it easier for middle-class citizens to exercise their 
right to own a home.  
This new suburban reality works as a large crony capitalist and financialized system, in which the 
rent-seeking drive of state-led land developers, REITs, and construction firms converges with the 
middle-class competition to own a home in a prestigious project in order to be close to elites and 
live an American Dream of a suburban lifestyle on the periphery of Istanbul. This competition, 
and the wider class war, can be seen clearly in the suburban town example of Göktürk. In the next 
section, I focus on this case.  
6.4. The Göktürk-Kemerburgaz split: The rise of suburban gated communities as the 
ultimate development model 
Gated communities, as mentioned in Chapter 3, are seemingly universal housing models that began 
to shape suburban reality in many developing countries in the 1990s. As gated communities began 
to spread in other parts of the world, there were a few small attempts made to build gated 
communities with fences and walls in Istanbul (Esen and Rieniets, 2007). However, it was not 
until the late 1990s that the example of Göktürk started to garner attention as a prominent model 
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of gated communities in Istanbul. The gated community housing model in this suburban town has 
become a dominant reference point for the new housing strategy of the AKP hegemony. As 
indicated above, the AKP hegemony proceeds on the basis of three dynamics to create its housing 
model: 
1) The housing projects must be in the form of a large-scale garden-city. New towns or 
suburban centralities must be constructed, and people must be sent to these projects through 
an abiding financial mechanism. As such, this model entails a strategy of financial 
inclusion.  
2) The housing projects in the suburbs must be supported by a large-scale mega-project 
nearby, so that the housing prices become attractive and open to speculation. Thus, large 
highways, hospitals, shopping malls, financial centres, and airport projects are being 
constructed around new towns. 
3) The projects must be open to global financial flows. In particular, wealth from Gulf 
countries plays a crucial role in this housing model. 
Within this context, Göktürk has emerged as a model for other garden-city towns developed by 
the AKP hegemony.  
The AKP has planned and constructed multiple large-scale garden-city towns in Istanbul, with 
special security units or surrounding walls. Examples include Kayaşehir, Altınşehir, Kasaba, 
Ispartakule, and Bahçekent. Some of these projects were built by TOKI and Emlak REIT with the 
help of crony contractors, while others were built by crony developers. Göktürk is where the model 
of gated communities in a suburban town emerged for the first time in Istanbul. This helps to 
account for its significance in studies on sub/urbanization in Turkey. There is a set of critical 
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studies on the emergence and proliferation of gated communities in Göktürk (Geniş, 2007), which 
largely focuses on how these gated communities have created a segregated elite and high-middle 
class lifestyle emulating the North American suburban dream. There is also some discussion in the 
literature of the role that informal development has played in the creation of Göktürk—as gated 
communities in Göktürk began to be built illegally on erstwhile forest and greenbelt land. The 
informal dimension of Göktürk’s gated community developments is an important point for 
consideration. 
In Turkey, informality has been ascribed to the phenomenon of gecekondu, and suburbanization 
has often been associated with gecekondufication. However, a suburban expansion process has 
also taken place without gecekondufication. The French concept of banlieue, transcribed in 
Turkish as banliyö, has also entered the Turkish lexicon of urbanization, particularly in reference 
to districts outside of the city centre. It has been associated with commuter trains (banliyö trains) 
that run to the suburban neighbourhoods of Istanbul. That is why banliyö has acquired a relatively 
neutral connotation: it may refer to poor suburban neighbourhoods, but it may also be used to 
describe middle-class and high middle-class districts, such as Yeşilköy and Florya around the 
Atatürk Airport area.  
However, gecekondu neighbourhoods have historically existed as the main descriptive form of 
suburbanization in Istanbul. The word varoş has also been used to describe gecekondu 
neighbourhoods and their dwellers. It is a pejorative word, used to describe the underdeveloped, 
illiterate, and poor lifestyle associated with the gecekondu areas (Demirtaş and Şen, 2007). This 
pejorative conceptualization has contributed to the segregation between working-class and middle-
class suburbs. Gecekondu dwellers, particularly women, have historically worked for middle-class 
suburban households as housekeepers and cleaning ladies. In fact, many historical middle-class 
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suburbs have existed in Turkey for a long time. They have mainly been considered as small centres 
in a poly-centric urban matrix, rather than American-style suburban towns (Üçoğlu and Güney, 
2021). That is why suburbanization (or the phenomenon of sprawl) has been conventionally 
associated with the spread of gecekondus or varoş neighbourhoods in Turkey. 
In the 1980s, mobilization against gecekondufication began, as part of an effort to transform 
Istanbul into a tourism and mobility hub. In 2000, 52 percent of the housing stock in Istanbul still 
took the form of gecekondu (Gyoder, 2015). Here, the key point of differentiation is between being 
illegal and informal. That is not to say that all illegal or informal houses built in Istanbul after the 
1980s are gecekondus. In fact, in many elite and high middle-class neighbourhoods, it is possible 
to find illegal housing. Therefore, the equation of illegal housing with gecekondu no longer applies 
in Istanbul, particularly since the 1980s. Many gecekondu neighbourhoods have received land 
amnesty, and some of them have received their tenures.  
The rise of the construction and real estate industry in Istanbul since the early 2000s has brought 
up the problem of land again. Istanbul has a limited ratio of land to population, due to its increasing 
population. As note before, there has been a tremendous population boom from 19802019. There 
have been two other crucial developments since the late 1990s, as well: new suburbanization has 
begun to encompass the periphery of the city, while at the same time, greed for wealth 
accumulation has led to the rise of large project construction on erstwhile agricultural and forest 
lands. For this reason, the illegal destruction of forest areas for the sake of construction projects 
has become widespread, and some projects have been completed despite the issuing of court 
decisions to stop the development. This shows the changing patterns of acceptance for informality. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, gecekondus were tolerated due to their ability to provide accommodation 
for the industrial reserve army. However, since the late 1990s and early 2000s, informality in the 
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housing market has shifted orbits. Many large gated community projects and elite housing sites 
have now been built illegally in forests areas or on public land. This represents a new suburban 
governance strategy to bypass legal processes for rapid land commodification. Usually in this 
strategy, district-level municipal governments play a more important role than TOKI or the 
Ministry of Urban Affairs.  
Manufacturing the consent of the urban poor has been an important aspect of the strategy employed 
by the AKP from the very outset of its regime. Along with TOKI and REIT, the district-level 
municipalities serve as key actors in the manufacturing of this consent:  
Local district municipalities are still a key player in manufacturing the consent for AKP’s 
authoritarian regime. These municipalities have a lot of authority in the case of housing, 
perhaps more than people think. Many people believe that in the case of housing, TOKI is 
the key player, but they often disregard the role of district municipalities, as these 
municipalities have direct contact with dwellers. They actually play an intermediary role 
between the large developers and the urban poor. Large developers donate a considerable 
amount of money [we can say bribery] to these municipalities; later on, these municipalities 
distribute some portion of this money to those in need. It is usually in the form of food 
bank. They do not want to change people’s economic condition, they just want to donate 
them to keep this chain going on. (Interviewee 28) 
Similar to what this interviewee told me, Savaşkan (2019) also argues that the most important 
strategy for the AKP has been to keep local district municipalities operating in the form of social 
aid institutions. This social aid policy manufactures consent for large projects and urban 
transformation projects in local districts, while developers provide a cash flow for maintaining the 
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urban poor in conditions of poverty. That is why land grabbing has paramount importance for 
district-level municipalities. However, it is important to recognize that manufacturing the consent 
of the middle classes and elites is much more important for this regime. Many of the projects 
carried out by REITs and developers are for the middle classes, rather than low-income households 
(Perouse, 2014). This reorganization also includes the real estate market, through which new 
branded housing projects are promoted for foreign investors. Anyone who is able to bring 250,00 
USD to Turkey for investment in real estate may obtain citizenship.  
 
Figure 34. The promotion of Turkish citizenship through real estate investment. 
The prioritization of real estate investment over all other sectors has been supported by the regional 
transportation plan (i.e., the Marmara Regional Transportation Plan), as well as a state plan to 
create a financial hub in Istanbul. While the AKP regime is now building a large complex called 
the “financial centre” in Ataşehir in the Asian part of the city, the Levent-Maslak Split in the 
European part of the city is currently known as the financial centre of Istanbul. The Middle Eastern 
or Eastern European headquarters of multiple global corporations are located in this area because 
they want to use Istanbul as their regional command centre. Many other large corporations have 
offices there, the largest banks of Turkey have their headquarters there, and the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange is also located there. Branded shopping malls, luxury hotels, and housing projects are 
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also found in this part of the city. The area is linked to Ataturk Airport via a special highway called 
the Trans-European Motorway (TEM), which enables accelerated mobility between the airport and 
this financial centre.  
In fact, efforts to position Istanbul as a financial centre at the scale of global cities have not worked 
well, as the city is not considered to be an important financial hub. However, investment in 
mobility has been a key strategy for expanding the construction economy. Özbay (2014) argues 
that as the construction economy has expanded in the city, investment in mobility has also 
expanded. However, a key point to note here is that this investment in mobility has primarily served 
the purposes of land-rent speculation, rather than bringing services to resident populations. In fact, 
it is normal for infrastructure to expand as a city expands; however, when infrastructural 
investments are made within the confines of a growth machine, then such projects are carried out 
to transfer wealth from the tax money collected from the public to developers and construction 
companies.  
Massive suburbanization has been accelerated by mega-projects and large-scale mobility projects 
in Istanbul. Several suburban towns, usually taking the form of gated communities, high-rise mass 
housing projects (still with security units), and branded projects, have proliferated near large-scale 
mobility projects through the occupation of vacant forest or public land. Among these suburban 
towns, Göktürk holds a special place. It began to develop in the late 1990s, when the middle classes 
began to move to this area because of its proximity to mobility networks that connect people to 
financial centres. This was the first time that suburban housing projects began to be sold through 
a marketing strategy that accentuated the American suburban dream. Now, newly constructed 
gated communities often emphasize such points in their advertisements: “a safe life with your 
family,” “a modern life nearby to nature,” “a privileged community that awaits you.” They often 
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have Americanized names, such Kemer Country, Koru Life, and Country Life. In the meantime, 
these projects are also promoted for their vicinity to key highways and connection roads that lead 
to business areas. Göktürk was the first of these suburban towns to shift the mentality of 
suburbanization in Istanbul through the promotion of gated community projects, advertisement of 
an Americanized suburban lifestyle, and informal land grabbing for speculative land 
commodification.  
 
Figure 35. Map of Eyüp Disrict, along with neighbouring Arnavutköy, where the new airport is located, and Beşiktaş and Sarıyer, 
where the Levent-Maslak Split is located. 
Göktürk is located on the boundaries of Eyüp District. While Eyüp’s central region is a 
conservative area on the north shores of the Golden Horn River, the northern part of Eyüp includes 
the greenbelt and popular Belgrade Forest of Istanbul. As of 2019, the population of Eyüp was 
400,513 (TurkStat, 2019), while the population of Göktürk was 37,853. There are three dynamics 
that make Göktürk a significant location for understanding the ongoing construction boom, 
mobility-based mega-projects, informality, and changing form of urban life based on gated 
communites: 1) The greed to create an elite club in the Belgrade Forest, the largest and most 
popular greenbelt forest of Istanbul, was followed by competition among REITs and developers 
in Göktürk, as the land-rent in the area is very valuable. The result was a total attack on the old 
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historical town through the informal and illegal expansion of its boundaries into the surrounding 
forests. 2) Göktürk stands in the middle of a transit network between the Levent-Maslak Split and 
western parts of Instanbul. This positioning of the town, amid a network of highway, gained even 
greater importance after the new airport project was launched in 2013. The completion of the new 
Istanbul Airport, which is supposedly the largest airport in the world, has made Göktürk even more 
important. It is now located in the midst of a large transit project, which consists of a new highway 
network that conects the third bridge on Bosporus to the new airport area, connects the new airport 
with the Levent-Maslak financial district, and also holds the potential to link the new city to be 
built around the airport with the rest of Istanbul’s European site. The location of Göktürk now 
makes it a crucial point of mobility; in the meantime, it is also a special spot for further land 
commodification. 
 
Figure 36. The aerial view of Göktürk. This suburban town was built informally in the middle of the greenbelt Belgrade Forest. It 
is connected to the nearby financial centre by highways and connection roads, and it is now located between the financial core of 
the city and the new airport. Source: Google Earth 
The problem with this new Americanized suburban dream town is that Göktürk used to be a small 
forest village, located between the town of Kemerburgaz and the Belgrade Forest. The village was 
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at that time a small settlement, surrounded by a city dump, mining areas (mostly marble), and 
forests. However, in the 1990s, a group of elite people decided to build high-scale gated 
communities in the village of Göktürk. In 1991, the Kemer Golf Resort was founded as an elite 
business club by an entrepreneurial family that was able to rent a parcel of land in the Belgrade 
Forest. Later on, in the late 1990s, this family decided to expand the facility into an elite gated 
community, with the name of Kemer Country. This decision was illegal, as it violated the land 
tenure given to the development (Sözcü, 2013). Due to the development’s informal status, the AKP 
hegemony appropriated Kemer Country in 2013; later on, it transferred property management to 
Demirören Group, one of the key cronies of the AKP regime.  
When construction on Kemer Country started, the development looked to be in the middle of 
nowhere, surrounded by greenfield without adequate infrastructure (Geniş, 2007). However, the 
area is now full of gated communities, luxurious shops, bars, and branches of luxury food chains. 
There are even two new privately funded universities nearby. Kemer Country was initially 
designed as an elite club, with the idea of offering a lifestyle in nature close to a small village and 
the Belgrade Forest. The project now comprises a golf resort, a small downtown village in the 
middle of the gated community, and several stages of housing, from large wood manors to 3–4 
storey luxurious condominiums. In Kemer Country’s promotional materials, the developers 
represent the project as “the gate to the global world,” implying that those who live behind its gates 
will become part of a global network of elites. They reinforce this image by referring to the elite 
distinction acquired with membership to the golf club. The project developers had spent 
considerable time in the US and were influenced by Orange County in Los Angeles. The gated 
community that they developed in Göktürk became a point of attraction for the rich in the 1990s, 
not only because of its global network promise, but also because it seemed to offer a safe refuge 
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following the 1999 earthquake in the Marmara Region. The houses in the project are believed to 
be safe and durable against an earthquake with a magnitude of more than 7.5.  
Figure 37. The first flyer published by the developers of Kemer Country in 1999. The flyer outlines the stages of the gated 
community, which comprises a huge area with a pond, forested tracts, golf pitches, and more. 
The gated community of Kemer Country is highly protected by special security units. I was granted 
permission to enter with the help of a former resident, with whom I had conducted an interview, 
who still works as a real estate agent in the area. However, even as her guest, I was unable to access 
certain parts of the community. 
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Figure 38. The golf pitch and pond in Kemer Country. Photo credit: Murat Üçoğlu  
When Kemer Country began to be built, there was nothing around the village of Göktürk. It had 
been established as a small Greek village in the late 1870s. The Greek population later decreased, 
but it continued as a small forest village until the 1990s. Nowadays, the small village still exists in 
the middle of the town, but it is now surrounded by large gated community projects:  
Once we came here, there was nothing. There was a city dump nearby: many district 
municipalities in the vicinity, essentially Eyüp, Şişli, and Fatih municipalities, they were 
putting their dump nearby this area. Kemer Country [the housing component] began to be 
constructed in 1997, and we began to reside here in 1999 in the year of the earthquake. The 
roads were full of dump trucks, and the area was smelling terribly. Then later on, they 
moved the dump area into another part of Eyüp municipality. They somehow worked with 
Eyüp municipality to eliminate the dump. The Edin family—Mekpare Edin and Esat 
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Edin—created this project. They lived in the United States for a while, and probably they 
were affected by the large housing systems, particularly in California. Esat Edin graduated 
from Yale University many decades ago; hence, he knew very well the suburban housing 
system in the US. They were influenced by large cottage-style houses and golf resorts of 
the elites. The area is around 2,000 acres, and they built the gated community step by step. 
Year by year, the area of construction expanded; however, this expansion came with a lot 
of problem (Interviewee 25). 
I heard similar stories from the first inhabitants of the first gated communities in the area. At the 
beginning, it was a small town standing in the middle of nowhere. The people who lived in the 
small historic village worked primarily in forestry and agriculture. However, with the rise of the 
real estate economy, the labour relations and socio-economic conditions of the area have changed. 
The town has lost its quality as a forest village, and the forested areas have been illegally violated 
by the construction boom.  As the construction boom continues, the town has become an elite- and 
high middle-class-dominated district that attracts luxury-brand food and restaurant chains: 
There were some problems pertaining to legally residing and land registration, but step by 
step they have been resolved. When we moved to this area in 2004, there were only three 
major gated communities plus ours. Year by year, the number has proliferated, and the land 
use changed. At that time, there was no grocery store, no branch of a bank, and no 
restaurants. There was only a small market in a gas station. But nowadays, it is full of new 
gated communities. We have Starbucks, nice restaurants, Le Pain Quotidien, branches of 
all banks, and everyday life is circulating around the main street [Istanbul Avnue] that is 
full of cafés, shops, and luxurious restaurants (Interviewee 24). 
295 
 
This description illustrates the inclination of the town towards an American lifestyle. Generally, 
young professionals in Istanbul have undergraduate or master’s degrees from universities in New 
York, or they are trying to do business in companies that have connections to New York-based 
companies. They often believe that their tastes are akin to those of New Yorkers. Thus, the 
consumption habits of people in Göktürk reflect a global style, led by an Americanized approach 
to everyday life.  
As indicated above, the area has had land tenure problems, and it has not been easy for people to 
receive land tenure, even after buying their homes. Instead of land tenure, they have been given 
long-term rental permission (usually for a span of 49 years); i.e., their housing documentation 
indicates that they have not bought their houses but rather rented them for 49 years:  
What you are getting is actually a 49-year contract, which means that you are renting the 
house that you own for 49 years. After 49 years, nobody knows what will happen, but 
probably they would extend these contracts for a price. In the beginning, it was supposed 
to be a tourism place, but later on it was turned into a residential area. Of course, people 
who started to live here, they did not know it; they all thought that this would be a legal 
and proper project, as it was in the form of a rich and elite housing. The existence of this 
area for the rich encouraged other projects that occupied the forest (Interviewee 25) 
The initial occupation of the forest areas has been followed by a construction boom, after the 
earthquake in 1999. Göktürk is normally registered as a neighbourhood within the district-
municipality borders of Eyüp. The mayor of Eyüp municipality is affiliated with the AKP, and 
many AKP bureaucrats, deputies, and even the former prime minister currently own residences in 
Göktürk. The gated projects have proliferated around the small village since 2004, and this 
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proliferation has been carried out with increasing interest of REITs in the area. Many REITs have 
begun to build gated community projects in the area, including Yapı Kredi Koray REIT (affiliated 
with Yapı Kredi Bank, one of the largest banks in Turkey), Özak REIT, and several developers 
such as Metal Structure Construction, NEF Holding, and Doğa Real Estate. There are currently 92 
gated communities in and around Göktürk. Most of them have been built by REITs or developers 
that are selling branded projects. 
 





Figure 40. Istanbul Istanbul Gated Community, with its securitized gate, in Göktürk. Photo credit: Murat Üçoğlu 
The question of who live in Göktürk is also important since the demand for these housing projects 
also constitutes the legitimacy point of suburban expansion on illegally colonized land:  
People who wanted to be seen prestigious began to buy houses in Kemer Country; later on, 
people from the middle-classes and high-middle classes, mainly financiers, bankers, 
popular lawyers, managers of international corporations, and some politicians, began to 
live here in order to be close to the business elites of Istanbul. After the increase in the 
number of 4-storey condominium buildings, young professionals and some academic 
people also began to live here. Nowadays, young professionals working in the Levent-
Maslak Split are dominating the neighborhood (Interviewee 26). 
One study suggests that the average age of people currently living in Göktürk ranges from 35–40 
years old (Tanulku, 2016). In the meantime, the opening of the new airport Istanbul has also shaped 
the social profile of Göktürk: 
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A considerable amount of people from the sectors of logistics began to live here, and after 
the opening of new airport, now we have many pilots, flight attendants, professionals of 
airlines, and logistical companies. Particularly for pilots, it is easy to buy a house with a 
good down payment in Göktürk. After the opening of new airport, the prices increased in 
this area (Interviewee 26). 
Moreover, even with the ongoing social profile changes that have resulted from the construction 
of nearby mega-projects and infrastructural investments, people are still drawn to Göktürk due to 
their concerns about earthquakes: 
We began to live here because we have a fear of earthquake. I was a teenager in 1999, and 
still have fears, as the experts and academics say that Istanbul will be hit by a stronger 
earthquake in two decades. We checked a few options around the Levent area, but we 
decided on living in Göktürk as we believe that we share the same social values as people 
living here: usually middle-class people working in the financial sectors, like myself and 
my partner, are living here. Many of our neighbors are working in the financial sector, and 
there are many businesspeople around this area (Interviewee 27). 
The fear of earthquake constitutes one of the consent points of people living in this area. They are 
drawn there by the sense of safety and prestige that the town offers, even though they know that it 
was constructed through the destruction of forests.  
REITs and certain small developers are dominating Göktürk, and they are literally imposing a new 
lifestyle with new property relations based on the violation of the greenbelt and the offer of a safe 
investment that can never be devaluated, even in the case of a future earthquake (after the 1999 
earthquake, the value of houses in Istanbul declined by 50 percent). Eyüp municipality and crony 
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REITs and developers work together on the projects, forming a hegemonic alliance. These REITs 
and developers know that every year, the land-rent has gotten more valuable in Göktürk, and the 
average housing price has increased in the area tremendously; that is why they have initiated 
several projects. In Istanbul, the average price per square meter was 4,800 TL as of 2019 (IGD, 
2020). In comparison, the average price per square meter in Göktürk was 7,359 TL, while in the 
rest of Eyüp municipality, it was 4,220 TL (Zingat, 2020). This high average price makes Göktürk 
one of the leading luxury neighbourhoods in Istanbul. This value is subject to ongoing increase, as 
indicators show that the average yearly price increase in Göktürk over the last 3 years has been 
15.4 percent; in the last 5 years, housing prices have increased by 42.2 percent (Ibid.). This 
valorization of land-rent and high demand for the area leads to more investment of REITs in 
Göktürk:  
There are three types of projects here in Göktürk: boutique gated communities, 
condominium gated communities, and large-scale manor style detached gated 
communities. There is a main street called Istanbul Avenue in the middle of Göktürk. If 
the gated community is on that avenue, the average price of a house (3-bedroom in average) 
is 2.5 million TL, but if the gated community is a bit far behind the main street, the average 
price would be 1.4 million TL. Also, being close to Kemer Country plays an initial role in 
price measurement (Interviewee 23). 
The increase in prices leads people, particularly middle-class citizens that want to live in Göktürk, 
to seek mortgage credits.  
As I indicated at the beginning of this case study, this suburban expansion has become a key model 
of urban life in Istanbul. Following the example set by Göktürk, many projects have been built 
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based on a suburban gated community plan. Similar kinds of gated communities now constitute 
the socio-spatial order. In this socio-spatial order, living in a gated community or branded housing 
project is promoted, and people are mobilized into this construction boom through the necessary 
means of financial credits. REITs and developers in the field are working closely with 
municipalities, TOKI, and Emlak REIT, in order to get their share from the new rent-seeking crony 
capitalist social order. As a result, gated and authoritarian housing systems have become a norm 
in Istanbul, and this norm has helped to manufacture consent for the conservative and rent-seeker 
hegemony of the AKP (until June 2019). The result is the total commodification of land, with 
massive housing construction combined with mega-projects and large shopping malls. Istanbul has 
become the ultimate centre of this state-led construction economy: 17.6 percent of housing sales 
in Turkey are taking place in Istanbul.  
 
Figure 41. Kasaba Gated Community in Ömerli. Located on the Asian side of Istanbul, this gated community was 




Figure 42. The number of houses sold in Turkey (thousands). Source: IGD Report, 2020: https://www.igd.com.tr/wp-
content/uploads/2020/06/2020-gayrimenkul-piyasasi-raporu-igd.pdf 
In 2010, the average selling price of a house in Istanbul was 1,415 TL/m2. In 2019, this average 
hit 4,938 TL/m2. This represents a 300-percent increase in housing prices over just 10 years. The 
number of people that began to use mortgage credits to obtain housing also increased from 947,104 
in 2009 to 2,283,846 in 2019—and the 2019 rate is similar to that reported for the last 5 years 
(Turkish Banks Association Report, 2019). Most of these credits are also Istanbul-based. 
Speculation is encouraged through the attraction of foreign investors into Istanbul’s real estate 
market. Massive suburbanization has thus been used as the key growth model, through the boosting 
of land commodification. However, after a while, this economic model can only continue with 
more speculative investments in suburban land, and these investments come with increasing 
indebtedness, unaffordability, and socio-spatial segregation. 
6.5. Conclusion 
In Turkey, the financialization of housing market leads to a deep social segregation. As I indicated 
before, 76 percent of all wealth in Turkey is invested in real estate. This percentage signals that 
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Turkey. In Turkey, the top 10 percent owns 81.2 percent all total wealth in the country (World 
Inequality Report, 2020), this also means that the top decile of the society dominates the real estate 
market as the majority of wealth is in the form of real estate investment. This new socio-economic 
transformation occurs within the matrix of new housing market structure, suburban land 
transformation and mega-projects. In Istanbul, particularly, the social segregation takes place in 
the form of gated communities and the key indicator of segregation is income disparity. In recent 
years, however, social segregation also has the dimension of ethnic exclusion essentially against 
Kurds and Syrians, the main component of social segregation is still the wealth inequality.  
Since the early 2000s, Turkey has chosen the economic growth model based on the financialization 
of the housing market. This model leads to the consolidation of social segregation as the key spatial 
indicator of this policy is the rise of gated communities where people from different income groups 
began to reside gated communities in the form of social enclaves. The AKP regime has built all its 
consent and coercion strategy on this strategy of social segregation and land-rent speculation. 
Coercion has taken place in the form of police brutality (as it was seen at Gezi Park in 2013), social 
exclusion (poor infrastructure around Mass-Housing nearby TOKI projects) and ethnic segregation 
(essentially the ongoing discourse of hatred against Syrians is still a problem that the AKP never 
wants to solve). Consent has taken place in the form of providing mass housing and distributing 
charities as social aid. The crony capitalism and the hegemony created by the AKP are severely 
dependent on dominating the suburban land in Istanbul, and this domination has created a divided 
society in which a small group continues to appropriate properties whereas the rest is struggling to 
own a property. 
On March 29, 2019, Ekrem İmamoğlu—the social democratic candidate of the opposition 
Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi , CHP)—won the local elections and became 
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the new mayor of Istanbul. This was a turning point in Turkey’s history, as the mentality of the 
AKP had been ruling Istanbul since 1994. However, the AKP regime did not recognize the election 
results, as land-rent speculation is very crucial to their hegemonic existence. On June 23, 2019, 
İmamoğlu won the renewed Istanbul mayoral elections again, this time with a much higher margin 
than the March elections. This time, the AKP regime did not overturn the results.  
This electoral triumph of the opposition in Istanbul does not mean that the AKP regime will stop 
its land commodification in Istanbul. Most of the recent district-level municipal elections were in 
fact won by the AKP, and the party that wins the majority of district municipalities obtains the 
most seats in Istanbul’s City Council. Thus, even though the mayor is from the opposition party, 
AKP council members can easily block or change municipal decisions using their seat majority. 
Also, most land commodification decisions, operations, and planning have either been centralized, 
under TOKI, or decentralized, to the district-level municipalities. This also provides a maneuver 
point to the AKP regime, enabling it to continue its agenda of land commodification by bypassing 
the IBB mayor.  
All these maneuvers for perpetuating land commodification and the housing industry are essential 
for the AKP regime, since this regime is built upon a speculative construction economy. Studies 
on the financialization of housing often focus on the increasing mortgage debt of households and 
the ration of household debt to GDP in mature economies. In Canada, for instance, the ratio of 
household debt to GDP is 102 percent, and more than 70 percent of household debt takes the form 
of mortgage credits. In Turkey, however, the ratio of mortgage debt to GDP is only 5.7 percent 
(Yeşilbağ, 2019). One might ask in this case, how does financialization takes place in Turkey? Or 
even, is it really possible to talk about the financialization of housing in Turkey? 
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Financialization in Turkey takes place through massive suburbanization, primarily by new 
developers and REITs that have ties to AKP party politics. In its efforts to form a new political 
society with Islamic patterns, the AKP regime has invested in the creation of a new Islamic 
bourgeoisie (Balkan and Öncü, 2016). They need to keep financial flow circulating through real 
estate investments, so they can keep their new bourgeoisie in their new rich status; they also keep 
the urban poor in their low-income status, by distributing limited social aid through local district-
level municipalities. Thus, the financialization process proceeds through the agency of REITs, 
mega-projects, and the attraction of financial money for real estate investment in Turkey. One of 
the consequences of this state-led financialization process is a tax burden that Turkish citizens 
must pay.  
This hegemonic growth model can only continue as long as the actors are able to sell commodified 
land in Istanbul. Losing any share of governance in Istanbul, as occurred in the local elections in 
March 2019, is intolerable to the AKP regime because the regime relies on land-rent speculation 
in the city to manufactures consent for its hegemonic rule. The crony capitalism that this regime 
seeks to perpetuate cannot operate without dominating suburban space in Istanbul. Due to this 
reason, more mega-projects, more branded gated communities, more suburbanization, and more 
destruction of ecological balances await the city and its residents. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion: The growth models, comparison, and further questions 
In capitalist societies, property relations have always been at the core of social relations and a 
starting point of Marx’s critique of capitalism: capitalism constantly transforms itself to increase 
capital accumulation for the benefit of the bourgeoisie, while the working class has only labour 
power to sell (1977). In fact, capitalist property relations in capitalism cannot be reduced to 
ownership of the means of production. As Mason (2015) explains, the success of capitalism is not 
a matter of fixing the problems that stem from its internal contradictions and crises; rather, it 
depends on the capacity of capitalism to mutate into new hegemonic forms.  
Mutations in capitalism also change the scope and extent of property relations. In fact, these 
mutations are related to the key defining phenomenon of capitalism: growth (Harari 2014). Growth 
is often portrayed through numeric analyses of GDP, national income, and per capita income. 
These measurements are intrinsic to neoclassical economics. Growth is measured as the expansion 
of supply and demand, in order to find the optimum equilibrium in the market. From this 
perspective, we can say that, similar to what Hirsch (2005 [1980]: 16) argues, economics is often 
based on the aggregation of statistical measurements of national income and production. 
Throughout the history of capitalism, various growth models have served as guiding itineraries for 
development and economic prosperity. The classical growth model that we know through the 
writings of Smith (2004 [1776]), Ricardo (1996 [1817]), and Malthus (2015 [1820]), as well as 
through the critique of Marx (1867), relies on the phenomenon of productivity. The division of 
labour, the boosting of productivity through technological advancement, and international trade 
are all key factors of economic growth. In fact, the labour process remains central to this 
framework because as Malthus and Ricardo point out, there is a natural limit for the factors of 
production. Land and natural resources are limited; that is why labour is important for creating 
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value and transforming the world. Marx, in The Grundrisse (1993), indicates that everything 
around us is a product of human labour that shapes nature. He refers to a metabolic relationship 
between human labour and nature: human labour, as part of nature, is the driving force of 
production and shapes the world in a way to produce commodities. Capitalism is a system of 
commodity production, and it exists through a set of social relations.  
Thus, productivity is the source of enrichment and economic growth in classical economics. Marx 
(1867) also indicates that even though resources are limited, capitalism advances by commodifying 
natural resources and life necessities; moreover, labour has also become commodified under 
capitalism. His theory of surplus value holds that the purpose of production is to extract surplus 
value by exploiting labour power. However, neoclassical economics, together with its advocates 
from the school of marginal utility (Jevons, 2003 [1871]), challenge the labour value theory and 
surplus value theory. Neoclassical economists assert that growth comes from consumption, rather 
than production. Neoclassical economics, as I have indicated before, goes through the aggregation 
of economic activities, which often comprise the expectations, policies, and models for 
perpetuating growth and eschewing potential recession. The growth models of neoclassical 
economics are multi-faceted; they can take the form of public choice, business choice, or strict 
governmental choice models. In each case, growth is considered as a development towards an 
economic expansion.  
The neoclassical model deals with the demand-side of growth. Economic development and 
investments are based on consumer preferences; hence, according to this model, it is consumer 
sovereignty that boosts economic growth (Mohun, 1977). As Hirsch puts forward, consumer 
demand must be transmitted to the market in order to find the best choice of investments: 
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If both consumer preferences and full social costs could be correctly passed on to 
producers, fulfillment of these preferences of individual consumers would be the accepted 
goal of the system. The general view remains that consumption, whether in the form of 
private goods individually purchased or in the form of individual participation in collective 
provision, provides the ultimate drive and purpose of the economic system. Economic 
growth, then, is interpreted as growth in the capacity of the economy to meet these 
individual and collective consumption demands. (2005 [1980]: 17–8).  
Therefore, the mainstream neoclassical approach prioritizes individual choices and consumer 
demand. We can say that neoclassical economists are mainly concerned with aggregate demand 
and aggregate output; however, as Acemoglu indicates: “economic growth, or development, is also 
about the fundamental transformation of an economy, ranging from its sectoral structure, to its 
demographic and geographic makeup, perhaps most importantly to its entire social and 
institutional fabric” (2012: 546). That is to say, the changes or trajectory shifts in an economic 
growth model refer to the structural changes in social, spatial, and business patterns. Economic 
growth is therefore is not only about aggregate demand and output; rather, it has a set of socio-
political and spatial relations behind market activities.  
In the meantime, economic growth is also a matter of developmentalism. Developmentalist 
ideologies may see economic growth as the ultimate way of eschewing mass unemployment and 
stagnation. According to developmentalist ideologies, rapid development and high numeric 
economic growth is necessary to impede potential inertia in the market (Güney, 2019). The gap 
between rich and poor countries has widened since the 19th century, and developmentalism is seen 
as a way of fostering rapid growth in order to enable poor countries to catch up with wealthy 
countries. The authoritarian developmentalism in countries such as Turkey, Singapore, and 
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Malaysia can be evaluated along this axis. “Growth is good for everyone” is capitalism’s mantra; 
however, growth has become an obsession of capitalism, as Noah Harari (2014) indicates, and 
growth at any cost silences concerns over resources—hence, growth at any cost is also the 
prominent cause of the Anthropocene.  
Here, I need to return to the assumptions of neoclassical economics. One of the neoclassical 
assumptions, which is presented as the mainstream economic theory in many schools in the 
English-speaking world, is that growth will continue as demand continues to increase. As Blair 
Fix (2015: 3) points out, there are many variants of neoclassical growth theory. The most well-
known, however, is the Solow-Swan model that was published in the 1950s. This growth model 
indicates that the capital/output ratio is reliant on the growth of exogenous factors, such as 
population growth, technological advancements, and the savings of households. The assumption 
here is that the number of households will increase as the population goes up, that this increase 
will boost the savings of households, and that these savings will be returned to the market in the 
form of investments. These investments may also accelerate technological advancement. Hence, 
growth will be achieved through the demand of a growing population; the capital/output ratio will 
go up due to growing demand. There will also be more investments from households and firms, 
which will help to increase this ratio.  
This entire set of assumptions are problematic. It provides no clues on how capitalism operates at 
a social level, and it has nothing to do with the sophisticated composition of households. Moreover, 




The Solow-Swan model assumes an economy populated by homogenous households and 
firms, such that each can be presented in aggregate by a single household and a single firm. 
Households own the factor of production (labour and capital) and rent them to firms for 
use in production. Investment (and thus capital accumulation) is a function of the 
household savings rate which is assumed to be constant. The single sector economy 
produces one unique good that is both consumed and used as capital for further production. 
(2015: 4)  
In fact, the neoliberal interpretation of this neoclassical approach also rests on the assumption of 
homogenous households and firms in the market. Milton and Rose Friedman, in Free to Choose 
(1991), for instance, construct their entire theory on the demand-side of the economy, and they 
begin with the assumption that consumer choices are the key reference point of the economy. 
Households are free to choose their preferences in the economy, as the economy provides them 
the freedom of choosing. This is of course an assumption based on an aggregated and stereotyped 
household model.  
In fact, Pierre Bourdieu repeatedly criticizes these neoclassical assumptions. In Distinction (1984) 
and the Social Structures of the Economy (2005), Bourdieu asserts that neoclassical economists 
develop their theories by disregarding the social relations behind economic choice-making in the 
market. According to Bourdieu, we cannot talk about a homogenous household structure in the 
market; rather, consumption patterns are determined by the cumulative practices and cultural 
capital of people from different classes. Hence, what determines consumption is habitus—the 
reproduction of social relations through educational, social, and cultural capital that people possess 
as a result of the social class practices in which they participate. 
310 
 
Despite these criticisms of the neoclassical growth model’s aggregated assumptions, GDP 
measurements and the capital/output ratio are still widely viewed as the key indicators of growth 
and development. While in recent years the Gini coefficient has become an increasingly important 
indicator to measure development, this model of measurement has not yet gained enough 
popularity. Neoliberalism has been constructed around the goals of boosting demand and 
enhancing GDP. The neoliberal growth model is built on the neoclassical growth model, as a 
counterattack against the Keynesian growth model. Unlike the neoclassical and classical 
approaches, the Keynesian growth model is based on stabilization. According to this model, 
demand must be boosted, but supply must be boosted as well. The supply-side is also important 
and must be expanded to drive effective demand. The supply-side must be expanded so that more 
people may be employed and full employment may be provided. In the long run, these two sides 
of the economy will ideally continue in a stabilized condition, so that the inflation rate does not go 
through the roof (Hirsch, 1980).  
However, neoliberalism aims to deconstruct this stabilization model by establishing the demand-
side economy and commodifying all of the social necessities and provisions of life. To justify this 
approach, neoliberal economists argue that if everything is commodified in a market with perfect 
competition, then people will be able to choose whatever they like (Hayek, 1971). Hence, Hayek 
and his followers embrace the idea of perfect competition as the locomotive of the economy, and 
according to them, perfect competition can only be achieved by providing freedom of choice and 
rejecting state intervention in the market. They contend that the market is the key domain where 
everyone can enjoy the freedom of choice and perfect competition will provide necessary welfare 




This neoliberal growth model has been accompanied by a new hegemonic strategy that has literally 
mutated capitalism into a new form. In the neoclassical growth model, there are two key factors 
that are taken for granted: finance capital and natural resources. Natural resources are treated as 
limitless in the neoclassical model. While this does not in fact reflect reality, neoclassical 
economists, unlike classical economists, rarely mention scarcity or the limits of natural resources. 
Finance capital is also taken for granted under the neoclassical model. As Marx indicates in the 
third volume of Capital (1991), finance capital operates as the engine of the capitalist mode of 
production by providing the capital needed for the perpetuation and expansion of capitalism. 
Finance capital also changes the exploitation of labour power for the extraction of more surplus 
value.  
For the purpose of this study, I have focused on the financialization of housing. I have argued that 
financialization refers to a new socio-economic reorganization of social order, which occurs 
through the transformation of property relations. Moreover, neoliberalism introduces 
financialization as the locomotive of economic growth. According to neoliberal assumptions, as 
finance capital expands, people will be able to access the funds needed for more consumption and 
investment. Therefore, the rise of financialization refers to a new growth model and a socio-
economic transformation that boosts demand and enables the economy to grow while restricting 
the supply-side of industrial production. In many countries, this new growth model has morphed 
into a new engine that works together with new property relations and assetization.  
This paradigm shift also accelerates with the transformation of welfare systems. As Piketty (2019) 
suggests, each ideology in inegalitarian regimes promises to provide welfare and prosperity to 
society and individuals. Neoliberalism, for example, claims that prosperity will be achieved 
through two means: perfect competition and the deregulation of financial markets, which will 
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allow people to obtain the necessary credits to acquire their dreamed-of assets. In fact, with the 
rise of neoliberal policies of austerity, financial deregulation, and privatization, we have been 
witnessing the emergence of a sophisticated growth model based on the permeation of finance 
capital in every part of social life, whereby almost everything is converted into a financial 
commodity. On the one hand, in mature capitalist economies, we see a slow annual growth rate 
but sharp escalation of wealth accumulation; on the other hand, in developing economies, we see 
a very high average growth rate but stark inequalities in wealth accumulation (Alverado et al. 2018; 
Milanovic; 2016; Piketty, 2013, 2019).  
One of the key drivers of these ongoing economic transformations is the accumulation of more 
and more wealth through financial speculation and real estate investment. The financialization of 
housing stands as the most crucial growth model for many countries, as the process involves in the 
circulation of financial flows and increased assetization. Asset ownership is not only a matter of 
modest households owning a house; rather, many investors, big funds, and investment trusts are 
investing in asset ownership in order to increase the value of their investments or shareholder 
values. In this framework, financialization does not only refer to the crescendo of financial 
activities; it is rather a hegemonic process that goes hand in hand with the transformation of 
property relations and the geographical fabric.  
Assetization is inevitably related to housing because for most people, the most important asset to 
own is a house (or sometime more than one). The financialization of housing is a multi-faceted 
process or strategy of business elites and/or governments. It is a dominant way of creating value 
by investing in urban land and speculating on that investment through the development and use of 
a sophisticated financial system, via which the market provides a variety of options. More 
specifically, the financialization of housing occurs within a sophisticated financial system in which 
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creditor-debtor relations have been complicated by the securitization of mortgage credits 
(Soederberg, 2014). This financial system entails many variegated forms of financial leveraging 
at each step of the credit distribution process, which produces a sophisticated global system that 
Sassen (2017) identifies as “high finance.” High finance is a twofold phenomenon: on the one 
hand, it exists in a sophisticated technical matrix, which is produced and reproduced by financiers; 
on the other hand, it commodifies all life necessities, by spreading the tools of finance capital into 
every corner of social life. Housing is the best example of this process.  
Another point of consideration in this dissertation is how governments: (a) allow the dominance 
of finance capital through their own regulations, as well as through international regulations and 
agreements; or (b) initially act as the promoters of financialization, under the belief that 
distributing more credits, particularly for housing, will boost the economy. On this point, I have 
described four main approaches to the financialization of housing: financialization of housing as a 
state strategy (Aalbers, 2019; Schwartz, 2019; Serin et al. 2020), financialization of housing as a 
business strategy of real estate and financial growth coalitions, financialization of rental housing 
(August; 2019; Fields, 2015), and financialization of housing as part of urban governance (Aalbers, 
2019). All of these types may exist together in a single country, or one or more of them may exist 
together at the same time. In Germany, for instance, financialization proceeds through rental 
markets. In the US, the financialization of housing is a strategy of both state and business circles. 
In China, it is seen as an infrastructural and spatio-temporal fix. In Spain, it is a governmental 
strategy that articulates many people into the mortgage pool.  
Studies on these different approaches to financialization often interpret the power of finance as a 
detached movement of capital to instigate a neoliberal society in which the urban poor are excluded 
and the wealthy continue to prosper. Although I agree with many of these approaches, I argue that 
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the financialization of housing also represents a new growth model; as such, it refers to a socio-
economic transformation and socio-spatial reorganization, at least in certain countries. For the 
purposes of this study, I have analyzed the examples of Toronto/Brampton in the Greater Toronto 
Area (GTA) of Ontario, Canada, and Istanbul/Göktürk in the Marmara Region of Turkey. These 
two regional examples show how the financialization of housing has become an economic growth 
model, associated with the real estate financial complex (REFCOM). In fact, this growth model 
becomes a dominant way of producing urban space and transforming the social order through 
massive suburbanization. That is why I define the growth model of REFCOM as a new hegemony 
that predominantly operates by bringing about a suburban-financial nexus.  
In the Toronto/Brampton case, we see a twofold process at work: the financialization of the 
housing market is carried out by market actors (developers, REITS, banks, shadow banking 
institutions, secondary mortgage lenders, private lenders, and all other people and sectors that 
benefit from the financialization of housing); at the same time, the state features as a multi-level 
political structure that facilitates and promotes this market-actor-led growth model. The market 
actors act as hegemonic growth coalitions that aim to extract value from the urbanization process, 
while also connecting people to financial debt mechanisms. This growth model is led by business 
elites, but it operates with the help of policies pursued by the government at federal, provincial, 
and municipal levels.  
In Canada, one of the key factors in the transition to this model was the withdrawal of the Federal 
Government from the domain of social housing in the 1990s. This moved served to encourage 
market actors in real estate sectors and related industries, as the decline of social housing 
necessarily entailed an increase in the commodification of housing. In the case of Ontario, the 
conservative provincial government in the 1990s relegated responsibility for building social and 
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affordable housing to local municipalities. Again, this move served to encourage and enable 
market actors. It was left to local municipalities to build affordable social housing; however, as I 
emphasize, neither the municipalities of Toronto nor Brampton nor Peel Region have shown 
enthusiasm for building affordable rental housing. Afterall, that investment in social welfare would 
slow the growth of market prices; given that property tax is the key revenue source for 
municipalities, they appear more keen to expand the number of properties in their cities than 
provide proper housing for those who need it.  
At the federal level, the financialization of housing has been also supported by the Canada Housing 
and Mortgage Corporation (CMHC). According to Walks (2016), since the 1980s, the CMHC has 
served as an agency that facilities the securitization of mortgage credits in order to ease the credit 
lending of banks. The CMHC aims to provide a guarantee of mortgage credits to the banks, so the 
banks may continue lending credits without taking their necessary deposits into consideration. This 
has served as a key federal policy for stimulating the commodification of housing, so that real 
estate actors may continue to expand their portfolios by building more housing projects and 
expanding the housing market into suburban subdivisions.  
There is also a regional and municipal aspect of the financialization of housing in the GTA. 
Regional and municipal governments support the prevailing growth model by facilitating suburban 
land development, as well as massive suburban investments in the form of both housing and 
infrastructure. Regional governance has gained importance in recent years, particularly after the 
dispersal of industrial production from city centres to the suburbs. The decline of manufacturing 
industries, and the move of some industries from cities to suburbs, has instigated the rise of service 
and transportation sectors. The circulation of commodities, logistics, warehousing, and supply 
networks are now crucial to the regional economies that are popularly known as part of the global-
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city region. In the GTA, the global-city region of Toronto, the transportation and circulation of 
commodities and people are planned in such a way as to boost the economy; the real estate market 
is also intricately connected to these investments, which provide employment as well as 
infrastructure for further suburban development.  
In Canada, the majority of the population lives in the suburbs. That is why suburban regional 
governance has become a crucial element of urban development, as well as the real estate market 
in the GTA. That is why regional and suburban municipalities, such as Peel Region and Brampton, 
are operating in such a way as to boost demand for real estate—as the housing market and land-
rent speculation are key locomotives of economic growth. In Canada, and more particularly in the 
GTA, we can say that the real estate and construction sectors— together with the expansion of 
service sectors, including financial services (e.g., banking and other financial tools), technological 
services (e.g., software development and techno-scientific sectors), and logistics (e.g., 
warehousing, shipping, and transportation)—have become the engines of a new growth model. In 
order to maintain the new economic growth model, financialization is proceeding on a massive 
scale in the suburbs. For the growth model in Canada and more particularly Ontario, the 
financialization of housing takes place mainly in the suburbs, and it is carried out mainly by market 
actors from private sectors that are acting together as hegemonic growth coalitions that influence 
governmental decision-making and even judicial processes. Governmental regulations and policies 
come later, or they exist to facilitate the financialization of housing.  
In the case of Istanbul, we also see that the financialization of housing has become a growth model 
that is mainly carried out through massive suburbanization. This type of suburbanization has 
similarities and differences, compared with the GTA case. One similar point is that transportation 
and service sector-reliant infrastructure investments are playing an important role in the massive 
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suburbanization of the Istanbul Metropolitan Area (IMA). The key difference is that the 
financialization of housing began in Turkey as a strategy of the state, rather than a process led 
primarily by private market actors. The Turkish strategy has aimed to create a new hegemony over 
urban space and a new developmentalist discourse based on the expansion of the construction and 
real estate economy. The AKP government emphasizes the importance of real estate and 
construction for generating ongoing economic growth, and the process in Turkey has proceeded 
through the authority of the central government, which shares the accumulated wealth with 
members of its inner political society and crony capitalists. Thus, in Turkey, the hegemony that is 
constructed through the financialization of housing comprises the institutionalization of crony 
capitalism through land commodification and housing market speculation.  
In the case of Istanbul, the institutionalization of crony capitalism has occurred through the 
construction of mega infrastructure projects (e.g., an airport, highways, bridges, shopping malls) 
in the suburbs and erstwhile greenbelt areas. Such mega-projects have been used to fuel further 
land-rent speculation; new large-scale housing projects and massive gated communities have been 
constructed in the suburbs in order to extract the highest possible land-rent, leveraging the 
economic potential and impacts of mega-projects. Again, this growth model has been initiated by 
the state. The Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKI) has been reformed to 
manage land commodification and provide mass housing for low- to middle-income families. After 
the transformation of Emlak Bank into Emlak REIT, financialization has also begun to take place 
through REITs (Erol, 2019).  
Unlike the example of the GTA, financialization is only a supplementary part of the process in 
Istanbul. In the GTA, market actors and financial institutions have served as the key drivers of the 
REFCOM growth model; the state has come later, as a supporter or regulator of the process. In 
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Istanbul, the state is the key driving actor, along with its cronies; financialization comes as a 
supporter of the system. Following a program of neoliberal reforms, the Turkish state has attracted 
global financial flows by privatizing large-scale public institutions and industrial complexes, as 
well as by following a strict policy of low interest rates in order to increase financial investments 
in the country. These financial flows have been used as loans for mega-projects and land 
commodification. REITs and developers, with the help of TOKI, have begun to dominate urban 
land markets, and they have begun to widely distribute mortgage credits. The banks remained 
reluctant to do so for a while; however, in the 2010s, public banks began to distribute mortgage 
credits to almost everyone. The Ministry of Treasury and Finance, along with the Ministry of 
Transportation, provides treasury guarantees for the profitability of mega-projects built by cronies. 
Thus, the entire process has increased the tax burden of citizens and indebtedness at a public level. 
The result has been massive suburbanization in Istanbul, which is now full of gated communities.  
The cases of Brampton and Göktürk stand as two distinct examples of massive suburbanization, 
with similarities and differences between them. Brampton is a suburban town in the Peel Region 
of the GTA that aims to attract new immigrants, eager to own their own homes; to serve this goal, 
Peel Region and the City of Brampton follow the policies that attract jobs and construction into 
the suburban area. Brampton’s 2040 Vision Plan and the Peel Region’s Goods Movement Plans 
have been designed for the purpose of boosting the local economy, through a strategy that increases 
the profitability of land commodification in the area. Brampton’s 2040 Vision Plan relies on a 
strategy to build new suburban subdivisions, filled with high-rise condominium projects. The idea 
is to provide necessary land and infrastructure for the further financialization of housing. Investors, 
developers, and REITs would come to Brampton and bring with them financial flows. In short, 
Brampton’s City Hall envisages massive suburban investment, through which it believes that all 
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of the problems of the city will be fixed. In fact, the plan would first and foremost help the actors 
of REFCOM to accumulate more wealth. It would do little to address the myriad problems facing 
residents of Brampton, including the lack of affordable housing, insufficient integrational policies 
for immigrants, inadequate healthcare and school systems, and increasing crime rates.  
Göktürk, a suburban town in Istanbul, now stands in the midst of the government’s new logistical 
plans. As an elite and middle-class district full of gated communities, Göktürk has become a nodal 
point of land-rent speculation—thanks in large part to the informal commodification of forest 
lands. Currently, it is located at the centre of expanding transportation, logistics, warehousing, and 
financial districts. It continues to expand through the provision of mortgage credits to aspiring 
middle-classes residents, as well as the investments of business elites; now, thanks to its strategic 
location, it occupies a position of growing importance in the ongoing transportation and logistical 
plans of the government.  
In Istanbul, TOKI and REITs are able to grab land for further commodification, and we see that 
suburbanization has become more and more reliant on the construction of gated communities. 
TOKI mass housing projects for low-income families, high-quality projects for middle-income 
families, and luxury projects built by developers and REITs in the suburbs now commonly take 
the form of gated communities built in segregated subdivisions. Göktürk provides the first and 
primary example of the rise of gated communities in Istanbul, and it has served as a model for the 
entire massive suburbanization process, not only in Istanbul but across all of Turkey.  
These two models of massive suburbanization in the GTA and Istanbul are driving growth models 
based on the financialization of housing. Suburban expansion is not only a mere and simple 
development for providing housing to growing populations; rather, in a neoliberal matrix, it serves 
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as a crucial source of economic growth. In certain countries or regions, it becomes the ultimate 
model of economic growth—boosted by government policies, immigration streams, and financial 
flows, and in some cases directly orchestrated by the state (Yeşilbağ, 2019).  
The consequences and impacts of these growth models are multifaceted: 
1) In both cases, the financialization of housing does not fix the housing crisis that people 
experience. The difference is that in Canada, we see the proliferation of financial options 
and the decline of housing options. In other words, people are left to meet their welfare 
needs by accessing credit on the financial market. For many, financialization remains the 
only choice. In Turkey, the housing options proliferate through the processes of 
financialization initiated by state-led REITs, state-led banks, and to some extent private 
banks and financial institutions. However, while housing options proliferate, they largely 
take the form of gated communities, including manor-style, high-rise mass housing for 
low-income families; large-scale, high-rise gated communities for middle-income 
residents; and luxury condominiums and manor-style gated communities for the rich. In 
the GTA, gated communities also exist in the form of condominiums; however, in the 
suburbs, we do not see the mass proliferation of truly gated communities, but rather find 
the construction of new subdivisions as segregated areas. 
2) In both cases, we see a tremendous increase in housing prices, a widening gap between the 
top deciles and bottom deciles of society, and the concentration of wealth in real estate. In 
Turkey, 75 percent of all wealth is concentrated in real estate (Güney, 2019). In Canada, 
76.1 percent of total wealth is concentrated in real estate (Statistics Canada, 2019). In 
contrast, financial investments dominate the economy in the US, where 72 percent of all 
wealth is invested in financial assets (Brookings, 2018). In Canada and Turkey, the 
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concentration of wealth in real estate also shapes trends of assetization. The key questions 
here are: How is wealth acquired through assetization? Who are able to own assets? And 
how do those people come to own assets?  
These are questions that must be addressed in both cases. Data on wealth and income 
inequalities in both countries can provide us with the necessary information for a 
comparative analysis. In Turkey, the top 10 percent owns 81.2 percent all total wealth in 
the country, whereas in Canada, the top 10 percent owns 56.4 percent of total wealth. The 
concentration of wealth in the upper decile is increasing in Canada; however, the middle 
class remains stronger in Canada than in Turkey, which is why there is greater 
concentration of wealth in the hands of the top 10 percent in Turkey. In Canada, the top 20 
percent owns 73.5 percent of total wealth; in other words, the high-middle class accounts 
for a prominent share of total wealth in society. The bottom 80 percent owns only 26.5 
percent of wealth in Canada. In Turkey, the bottom 90 percent own only 18.8 percent of 
total wealth. 
A similar comparison can also be made for income inequality: In Turkey, the top 10 percent 
own 53.9 percent of all income in the country, whereas the bottom 50 percent receives only 
14.6 percent of the income (World Inequality Database, 2020). In Canada, the top 10 
percent owns 41.4 percent of all income in the country (Ibid.). Therefore, as we can see, 
income inequality and wealth gaps affect both countries. These data are important for 
understanding the prevailing economic growth models in both contexts, as well as the 
wealth that is generated in these countries, mainly in real estate. 
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3) The key difference between the growth models in these two cases is that household debt is 
much higher in Canada than in Turkey. In fact, there are many reasons for that. Canada is 
considered to be a developed country, and Canadian households have higher average 
savings and incomes compared with Turkish households; that is why financial tools are 
easier to access for Canadians. Turkey, as a developing country, distributes loans usually 
in the form of consumer credits. Housing loans were not very common in Turkey until the 
early 2000s. Credits for housing were only taken from banks to top up household savings 
to buy a house; these credits usually took the form of consumer credits, constituting only 
10–20 percent of the total payment for buying a home. In the early 2000s, under the new 
strategy of the AKP, the mortgage markets began to develop in Turkey. The total volume 
of mortgage credits reached a total of 188 billion TL in 2018 (Yeşilbağ, 2019: 548). 
However, efforts to evaluate indebtedness in Turkey are complicated by the lack of clear 
distinctions drawn between consumer credits and housing credits, as well as alternative 
financing mechanisms. As indicated above, REITs may offer their own financing for 
ownership; however, there is no reliable data on this matter in Turkey. That is why in 
Turkey, mortgage credits and consumer credits must be evaluated as harmonized debt: the 
total household debt is currently 700 billion TL. In comparison, in Canada, the ratio of 
disposable income to household debt was 177 percent as of 2017. That means that 
Canadians owed 1.77 CAD for every 1.00 CAD. The total debt of households is 2.33 
trillion CAD, and 1.53 trillion CAD of this household debt is in the form of mortgage 
credits (CBC, 2020).  
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4) Another aspect of the process is massive suburbanization. Massive suburbanization is the 
key driving force of the growth model in both cases. However, there are three main 
differences between the two cases:  
i. Massive suburbanization in Istanbul is carried out by the central government, and 
sometimes municipal governments are either bypassed or integrated into the 
process. In the GTA, local municipalities play more active roles in attracting real 
estate investments. 
ii. In the case of Brampton and the wider GTA, massive suburbanization takes two 
dominant forms: detached houses and condominium projects. In Brampton, we see 
the creation of new subdivisions full of detached houses and townhouses. The 
condominium market is also expanding, and the planner at Brampton City Hall has 
constructed a vision of the city based on further condofication. In the case of 
Istanbul, massive suburbanization mainly takes the form of gated communities. 
These gated communities have emerged as a model of housing and construction in 
Göktürk, which now hosts diverse types of gated communities. Thus, in Brampton, 
the housing model is predominately restricted to detached housing and 
condominiums, while in Göktürk, the model it is predominantly restricted to gated 
communities. Both models are segregative. 
iii. In both cases, suburbs have become the terrains of land-rent speculation. Prices are 
increasing tremendously, and suburban land has now become one of the primary 
sites of investment.  
5) Finally, in both cases we witness the rise of a housing crisis. In the GTA, the housing crisis 
takes the form of increasing prices and difficulty finding proper housing. The vacancy rate 
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in Toronto is 0.7 percent, and in Brampton it is 1 percent. The immigration stream to the 
region increases the population, which maintains high demand. In turn, limited supply of 
housing increases prices. In the GTA, 30 percent of the housing stock is now owned by 
investors. In Istanbul, prices have gone through the roof, and due to declining affordability, 
the rate of homeownership is also decreasing. The homeownership rate in Istanbul has 
decreased from 63 to 59 percent over the last decade. Thus, in both cases, the number of 
investors has increased; however, people are unable to obtain proper shelters without 
accessing colossal mortgage credits.  
This comparison illustrates that when the financialization of housing becomes the economic 
growth model in a region, it leads to the rise of wealth and income inequality, as well as the 
development of a housing crisis. Furthermore, this comparison demonstrates that the 
financialization of housing is not merely a matter of the rise of financial markets over housing 
markets; rather, financialization as an economic growth model transforms the socio-economic 
order. Norms of property ownership, limited housing options, and increasing indebtedness are all 
components of this new socio-economic order. The comparative approach taken here is also 
important for showing how countries with different geographical and social structures may take 
similar paths. There are of course many differences that emerge in the comparison of these cases; 
it is after all normal for countries to have different institutional and economic traditions, as well as 
different compositions of urban policies and economic affairs. However, in both cases, instituting 
the financialization of housing as a growth model has yielded similar results: massive suburban 
development, increasing indebtedness, and increasing socio-economic inequalities.  
From the perspective of urban studies, we can say that such comparative research provides a wide 
range of insights for understanding ongoing urbanization in different parts of the world. The GTA 
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and IBB are both arrival points for immigration. The difference is that the GTA is more reliant on 
foreign immigrants, whereas the IBB attracts more internal migrants. Of course, foreign 
immigrants travel to Istanbul as well; however, the number is not as high there as in the GTA. The 
comparison of these arrival points is important for understanding how they may serve as inter-
referencing points (remember Roy, 2011) for further urban research.  
This dissertation leaves some lines of questioning open: Is it possible to reverse the financialization 
of housing? How we can create more affordable cities? And do we really need economic growth 
to create affordable housing systems—or should we find formulas for degrowth?  These questions 
await answers. Many scholars have embarked on finding answers to address them, but in the 
meantime, what we see right now is the rising discontent of populations in many parts of the world. 
Tensions between investors and tenants continues to escalate, and we will most likely see conflicts 
in the future between investors-owners and tenants-mortgage debt payers. These represent two 
sides of the financialization of housing process throughout the world. Urban movements such as 
Berlin’s tenant movement, the Parkdale tenant movement in Toronto, the Gezi Park uprising of 
2013 in Istanbul all kindle hope for those would claim the right to the city and demand proper 
affordable housing. We also see that after 25 years, the municipality of Istanbul is now ruled by 
the social democrat opposition party, with a mayor that invests in affordable housing projects 
without including any financial burden. Thus, the future of urbanization may rely on the 
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